Journal of Theoretical Politics

1989 - 2025

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A Citizen-Candidate Model with Sequential Elections pp. 387-407: John Cadigan and Eckhard Janeba
A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents pp. 409-438: Sugato Dasgupta and Kenneth C. Williams
A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization pp. 439-464: Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman
Veto Players and Referendums Around the World pp. 465-515: Simon Hug and George Tsebelis
Annual Index pp. 517-517: N/a

Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections pp. 275-300: Samuel Merrill and James Adams
Top-Down Divergence pp. 301-323: Kristin Kanthak
Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93 pp. 325-358: Marek M. Kaminski
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions pp. 359-383: Steven Brams, Michael A. Jones and D. Marc Kilgour

What Rational Political Actors Can Expect pp. 139-165: Robert Grafstein
Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy pp. 167-193: Andrew B. Whitford
Why Do Societies Collapse? pp. 195-230: Gregory G. Brunk
Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations pp. 231-267: Gary J. Miller and Andrew B. Whitford

Editorial pp. 5-6: N/a
Tribute to the Outgoing Editors pp. 7-7: Keith Dowding
Anti-System Parties pp. 9-35: Giovanni Capoccia
The Advantages of Ideological Cohesion pp. 37-70: A. J. McGann
The Effective Length of the Presidential Primary Season pp. 71-92: Alexandra L. Cooper
Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court pp. 93-122: Lee Epstein and Olga Shvetsova
A Note on Nice pp. 123-128: Jan-Erik Lane and Reinert Maeland
The Schartz-Metterclume Method pp. 129-134: Dagobert D. Manteltasche and Otto I.Q. Besser-Wisser

Party Size Baselines Imposed by Institutional Constraints pp. 331-354: Rein Taagepera
Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics pp. 355-388: James Lee Ray
Constraining Leviathan pp. 389-411: Dino Falaschetti and Gary Miller
The Calculus of Stonewalling pp. 413-424: Amihai Glazer and Refael Hassin
Game Theory and Juries pp. 425-435: Howard Margolis

Introduction pp. 235-247: Josep M. Colomer
Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation pp. 249-269: Gerard Alexander
Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexicoâ€™s Transition to Democracy pp. 271-293: Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni
From Majoritarian to Pluralist Democracy? pp. 295-319: Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts
A Comment on Institutional Change pp. 321-325: Kenneth A. Shepsle

An Informational Rationale for Congruent Bicameralism pp. 123-151: James R. Rogers
Institutional Choice in New Democracies pp. 153-182: Kenneth Benoit and John W. Schiemann
A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting pp. 183-208: Brandice Canes-Wrone
Strategic Voting under Plurality and Runoff Rules pp. 209-227: Emerson M. S. Niou

The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science pp. 5-33: Rose McDermott
The Paradox of Integration in Intra-State Conflicts pp. 35-51: Axel Hadenius and Lauri Karvonen
Perceptions, Opinions and Party Preferences in the Face of a Real World Event pp. 53-80: Wouter van der Brug
Myths and Meanings of Voting Power pp. 81-97: Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU pp. 99-105: Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis
Myths and Meanings of Voting Power pp. 107-110: Manfred J. Holler
Pivotal Voting pp. 111-116: Howard Margolis

Erratum pp. 4-4: N/a
The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational Theory pp. 395-423: Matthijs Bogaards
Definitions, Evidence, and Policy pp. 425-431: Arend Lijphart
Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement pp. 433-449: Matthias Sutter
When Business Speaks: Political Entrepreneurship, Discourse and Mobilization in American Partisan Regimes pp. 455-476: Andrew Polsky
Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories pp. 477-501: Bo Rothstein

Rational Action and Political Activity pp. 243-268: Sidney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady
The Legislative Design of Judicial Review pp. 269-304: Charles R. Shipan
The Choices Judges Make pp. 305-323: Martin van Hees and Bernard Steunenberg
Employment, Party Economic Performance, and the Formation of Partisan Preferences pp. 325-351: Robert Grafstein
The Foundations of Eclecticism pp. 353-387: Rudra Sil

The Geometry of Voting Cycles pp. 131-153: James F. Adams and Ernest W. Adams
The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology pp. 155-181: Fabio Franchino
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition pp. 183-204: Enriqueta AragonÃ¨s and Zvika Neeman
On Measuring Freedom pp. 205-227: Eckehard Rosenbaum
The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence pp. 228-240: Mark M. Berger, Michael C. Munger and Richard F. Potthoff

A Problem with Referendums pp. 5-31: Dean Lacy and Emerson M.S. Niou
Collusion, Competition and Democracy pp. 33-65: Stefano Bartolini
The Transition from Authoritarian Rule pp. 67-89: Daniel Sutter
Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies pp. 91-112: Timothy P. Nokken and Brian R. Sala
Ministrables and Government Formation: Munchkins, Players and Big Beasts of the Jungle pp. 113-124: Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle