Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
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- Ch 01 The game of chess , pp 1-17

- Herbert Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
- Ch 1 Rationality , pp 1-26

- Ken Binmore
- Ch 2 Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games , pp 27-93

- Rida Laraki and Sylvain Sori
- Ch 02 Games in extensive and strategic forms , pp 19-40

- Sergiu Hart
- Ch 03 Games with perfect information , pp 41-70

- Jan Mycielski
- Ch 3 Games on Networks , pp 95-163

- Matthew Jackson and Yves Zenou
- Ch 04 Repeated games with complete information , pp 71-107

- Sylvain Sorin
- Ch 4 Reputations in Repeated Games , pp 165-238

- George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Ch 05 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum , pp 109-154

- Shmuel Zamir
- Ch 5 Coalition Formation , pp 239-326

- Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra
- Ch 6 Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics , pp 327-380

- Chris Wallace and H. Peyton Young
- Ch 06 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum , pp 155-177

- Francoise Forges
- Ch 07 Noncooperative models of bargaining , pp 179-225

- Ken Binmore, Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 7 Advances in Auctions , pp 381-453

- Todd Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir
- Ch 08 Strategic analysis of auctions , pp 227-279

- Robert Wilson
- Ch 8 Combinatorial Auctions , pp 455-476

- Rakesh V. Vohra
- Ch 9 Algorithmic Mechanism Design , pp 477-515

- Noam Nisan
- Ch 09 Location , pp 281-304

- Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques Thisse
- Ch 10 Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling , pp 517-573

- Colin F. Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho
- Ch 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence , pp 305-329

- Robert Wilson
- Ch 11 Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology , pp 575-617

- Peter Hammerstein and Olof Leimar
- Ch 11 Patent licensing , pp 331-354

- Morton I. Kamien
- Ch 12 Epistemic Game Theory , pp 619-702

- Eddie Dekel and Marciano Siniscalchi
- Ch 12 The core and balancedness , pp 355-395

- Yakar Kannai
- Ch 13 Axiomatizations of the core , pp 397-412

- Bezalel Peleg
- Ch 13 Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics , pp 703-778

- William Sandholm
- Ch 14 The Complexity of Computing Equilibria , pp 779-810

- Christos Papadimitriou
- Ch 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies , pp 413-457

- Robert M. Anderson
- Ch 15 Theory of Combinatorial Games , pp 811-859

- Aviezri S. Fraenkel, Robert A. Hearn and Aaron N. Siegel
- Ch 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies , pp 459-483

- Jean Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
- Ch 16 Two-sided matching , pp 485-541

- Alvin Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
- Ch 16 Game Theory and Distributed Control , pp 861-899

- Jason R. Marden and Jeff S. Shamma
- Ch 17 Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility , pp 901-947

- Edi Kami, Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci
- Ch 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , pp 543-590

- William Lucas
- Ch 18 Calibration and Expert Testing , pp 949-984

- Wojciech Olszewski
- Ch 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus , pp 591-667

- Michael Maschler
- Ch 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics , pp 669-707

- John Harsanyi
- Ch 20 Zero-sum two-person games , pp 735-768

- T.E.S. Raghavan
- Ch 21 Game theory and statistics , pp 769-779

- Gideon Schwarz
- Ch 22 Differential games , pp 781-799

- Avner Friedman
- Ch 23 Differential games -- Economic applications , pp 801-825

- Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan
- Ch 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility , pp 827-847

- Roger Myerson
- Ch 25 Signalling , pp 849-867

- David Kreps and Joel Sobel
- Ch 26 Moral hazard , pp 869-903

- Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner
- Ch 27 Search , pp 905-927

- John McMillan and Michael Rothschild
- Ch 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology , pp 929-993

- Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten
- Ch 29 Game theory models of peace and war , pp 995-1053

- Barry O'Neill
- Ch 30 Voting procedures , pp 1055-1089

- Steven Brams
- Ch 31 Social choice , pp 1091-1125

- Herve Moulin
- Ch 32 Power and stability in politics , pp 1127-1151

- Philip Straffin
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