Economics Working Papers

From Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science
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0048: Coordinating on Lower Prices: Pharmaceutical Pricing Under Political Pressure

Sara Fisher Ellison and Catherine Wolfram

0047: Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting

Akhmed Akhmedov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

0046: Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

0045: Decentralization and Political Institutions

Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

0044: The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass

Eric Maskin

0043: Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back

Eric Maskin

0042: Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare

Michihiro Kandori, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

0041: On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

Roberto Serrano

0040: The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic

Roberto Serrano

0039: The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets

Ilya Segal

0038: Firm-Specific Training

Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris

0037: Managerial Firms, Vertical Integration, and Consumer Welfare

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

0035: Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents

Klaus Nehring

0034: Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs

Klaus Nehring

0033: The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Roberto Serrano

0032: Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

0031: Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions

Eric Maskin and John Riley

0030: Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

0029: Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting

Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

0028: A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

0027: Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading

Piero Gottardi and Roberto Serrano

0026: Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent

Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli and Tomas Sjostrom

0025: Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation

James Bessen and Eric Maskin

0024: Mechanism Design for the Environment

Sandeep Baliga and Eric Maskin

0023: Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting

Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin

0022: On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity

Francois Maniquet

0021: Fair Income Tax

Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet

0020: The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole

0019: Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint

János Kornai, Eric Maskin and Gérard Roland

0018: Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

Massimo Morelli

0017: The Evolution of Focal Points

Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson

0016: Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont

0015: Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects

Francois Maniquet

0014: Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont

0013: Vertical Foreclosure and Specific Investments

Rachel Kranton and Deborah F. Minehart

0012: Retrading in Market Games

Sayantan Ghosal and Massimo Morelli

0011: The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games

Massimo Morelli and Maria Montero

0010: Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales

Gil Kalai, Ariel Rubenstein and Ran Spiegler

0009: Testing Threats in Repeated Games

Ran Spiegler

0008: On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Eric Maskin

0007: Arms Races and Negotiations

Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom

0006: Implementation Theory

Eric Maskin and Tomas Sjostrom

0005: The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems

Sandeep Baliga and Ben Polak

0004: Roy Radner and Incentive Theory

Eric Maskin

0003: Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium

Philippe Jehiel

0001: A Credit Market à la David Hume

Menahem Yaari

9602: Auctions and Efficiency

Eric Maskin