Department of Economics, Working Paper Series

From Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley
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1987: Political vs. Currency Premia in International Real Estate Differentials: A Study of Forward Rates for 24 Countries

Jeffrey Frankel and Alan T. MacArthur

1987: Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development

Pranab Bardhan

1987: Renegotiation in Repeated Games

Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin

1987: Optimal Contracts with Lock-In

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

1987: Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules

Leo Simon and William Zame

1987: A Multistage Duel in Continuous Time

Leo Simon

1987: Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition

Joseph Farrell and Nancy Gallini

1987: Market Forces or Group Interests: Inconvertible Currency in Pre-1914 Latin America

Albert Fishlow

1987: Some Reflections on Comparative Latin American Economic Performance and Policy

Albert Fishlow

1987: Real Exchange Rate Behavior Under Alternative International Monetary Regimes: Interwar Evidence

Barry Eichengreen

1987: exchange rate determination, asset market approach

Jeffrey Frankel

1987: Did International Economic Forces Cause the Great Depression?

Barry Eichengreen

1987: Learning Through Price Experimentation

Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton and Bruno Jullien

1987: Information and the Coase Theorem

Joseph Farrell

1987: Basic Timing Games

Leo Simon

1987: Extensive From Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Leo Simon and Maxwell Stinchcombe

1987: International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policy-Makers Disagree on the Model

Jeffrey Frankel and Katharine Rockett

1987: Arbitrage q: An Equilibrium Theory of Investment

Roger Craine

1987: Adverse Selection Without Hidden Information

Paul Milgrom

1987: employment contracts, influence activities and efficient organization design

Paul Milgrom

1987: Coordination Through Committees and Markets

Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner

1987: Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

Jeffrey Frankel

1987: international Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies

Jeffrey Frankel

1987: Are Exchange Rates Excessively Variable?

Jeffrey Frankel and Richard Meese

1987: NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games

Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin

1987: Alternative Approaches to Development Economics: An Evaluation

Pranab Bardhan

1987: Probit with Dependent Obervations

Dale J. Poirier and Paul Ruud

1987: Industrial Relations

Lloyd Ulman

1987: Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity

Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

1987: Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries

Richard Gilbert

1987: Economic Policy and Nonrational Behavior

James Mirrlees

1987: The Impact of U.S. Economic Policies on a Commodity-Exporting Debtor: The Case of Thailand

Jeffrey Frankel

1987: Regression vs. Volatility Tests of the Efficiency of Foreign Exchange Markets

Jeffrey Frankel and James H. Stock

1987: The Sources of Disagreement Among International Macro Models, and Implications for Policy Coordination

Jeffrey Frankel

1987: Lessons of the 1890s for the 1980s

Albert Fishlow

1987: Multinational Rivalry and National Advantage: Some Theoretical Considerations

Pranab Bardhan and Nirvikar Singh

1987: Competition with Lock-In

Joseph Farrell

1986: Core Allocations and Small Income Transfers

Robert M. Anderson

1986: Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games

Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons

1986: Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case of Stifled Innovation in the American Life Insurance Industry, 1868-1905

Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch

1986: Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition

Joseph Farrell and Nancy Gallini

1986: On the Rate of Convergence of the Core

Wan-Jin Kim

1986: Partnerships

Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer

1986: Communication Between Potential Entrants

Joseph Farrell

1986: Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview

Drew Fudenberg

1986: Three Essays Using Survey Data on Exchange Rate Expectations

Jeffrey Frankel and Kenneth Froot

1986: Credit Markets and Patterns of International Trade

Kenneth Kletzer and Pranab Bardhan

1986: Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

Joseph Farrell

1986: Competition, Compatability and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings

Joseph Forrell and Garth Solaner

1986: The Second Welfare Theorem with Nonconvex Preferences

Robert M. Anderson

1986: Interest Rate Variations, Mortgage Payments and the Geographic Mobility of Labor

John Quigley

1986: Risky Business: the Allocation of Capital

Roger Craine

1986: Using Survey Data to Explain Standard Propositions Regarding Exhange Rate Expectations

Jeffrey Frankel and Kenneth Froot

1986: Extensive From Games in Continuous Time Part I: Pure Strategies

Leo Simon and Maxwell Stinchcombe

1986: Explaining the Demand for Dollars: International Rates of Return and the Expectations of Chartists and Fundamentalists

Jeffrey Frankel and Kenneth Froot

1986: Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants

Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps

1986: Using Survey Data to Test Standard Propositions Regarding Exchange Rate Expectations

Jeffrey Frankel and Kenneth Froot

1986: What's to be GAINed: Welfare in California Since 1971

Vicky Albert and Michael Wiseman

1986: Neoclassical Model=Tobin's q =Marginal q: The Theory of Optimal Investment

Roger Craine

1986: The Desirability of a Currency Depreciation, Given a Contradictory Monetary Policy and the Concave Supply Relationships

Jeffrey Frankel

1986: Proposition 13 and Effective Property Tax Rates in San Francisco

Michael Wiseman

1986: Dynamic Competition with Lock-In

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

1985: Tournaments, Termination Schemes, and Forcing Contracts

Sudipto Bhattacharya

1984: Testing for Bubbles in Exchange Waters: The Case for Sparkling Rates

Richard Meese

1984: Holes in the Backstop: Optimal Contracts and the Saga of the US Synthetic Fuels Corporation

Richard J. Gilbert

1984: Approximate Power Functions for Some Robust Tests of Regression Coefficients

Thomas J. Rothenberg

1984: Tests of Specification in Econometrics

Paul Ruud

1984: Noncooperative Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem (?)

Richard Gilbert and Xavier Vives

1984: Competition with Lumpy Investment

Richard Gilbert and Richard G. Harris

1980: Epsilon-Rational Consistent Equilibria and Decentralization

Steven Goldman and Kenneth Kletzer

1973: Three Notes on Equilibrium Prices and the Equilibrium Price Correspondence in Pure Exchange Economies

Andreu Mas-Colell

1972: Smooth Preferences and Differentiable Demand Functions

Andreu Mas-Colell

1971: The Sampling Distribution of the Least Absolute Residuals Regression Estimates

Barr Rosenberg and Daryl Carlson

1970: Least Absolute Residuals Regression Routine

Barr Rosenberg and Daryl Carlson

1970: Urban Migration in the Process of Industrialization: Britain and the United STates in the Nineteenth Century

Richard Sutch, Richard Roehl, John Lyons and Michael Boskin

1968: The Quantitative Impact of Tax Policy on Investment Expenditures

Robert Hall and Dale Jorgenson

1967: Monopolistic Behavior in a Market for Durable Goods

A. J. Douglas and Steven Goldman

1967: Monopoly and Market Organization

Aaron J. Douglas

1967: The Social Thresholds: Patterns Associated with Economic Growth

Simone Clemhout

1967: The Class of Homothetic Isoquant Production Functions

Simone Clemhout