Working papers

From Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Linda Woodbury (none@repec.org this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).

Access Statistics for this working paper series.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

1997: Efficiency Effects of Punitive Damages

Peter Diamond

1997: Efficient Unemployment Insurance

Daron Acemoglu and Robert Shimer

1997: The Labor Market and Corporate Structure

Daron Acemoglu and Andrew Newman

1997: Efficient Wage Dispersion

Daron Acemoglu and Robert Shimer

1997: Setting Standards: Information Accumulation in Development

Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti

1997: Time Consistent Optimal Stopping

Lones Smith

1997: A Theory of Misgovernance

Abhijit Banerjee

1997: The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange

David Genesove and W. Mullin

1997: Assortative Matching and Search

Robert Shimer and Lones Smith

1997: Assortative Matching and Search

Robert Shimer and Lones Smith

1997: Why Some Firm Export

A. Berbard

1997: Efficient Wage Dispersion

Daron Acemoglu and Robert Shimer

1997: The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training

Daron Acemoglu and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

1997: Why Did West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Ineqiality and Growth in Historical Perspective

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

1997: Informational Herding and Optimal Experientation

Lones Smith and Peter Sørensen

1997: Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or Both?

Andrew Bernard

1997: Aggregaete Investment

R.J. Cabalero

1997: Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others

Peter Diamond

1997: Jobless Growth: Appropriability, Factor-Substitution, and Unemployment

Ricardo Caballero and M.L. Hammour

1997: Efficiency Effects of Punitive Damages

Peter Diamond

1997: Observations and Conjectures on the U.S. Employment Miracle

Alan Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

1997: Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality

Daron Acemoglu

1997: Gradual Incorporation of Information into Stock Prices: Empirical Strategies

S.F. Ellison and W.S. Mullin

1997: The Leontief-Trefler Hypothesis and Factor Price Insensitivity

Andrea Repetto and Jaume Ventura

1997: Current Acounts in Debtor and Creditor Countries

Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura

1997: Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Susan Athey

1997: Rationing Medical Care: An Economist's Perspective

Peter Diamond

1997: A Graphical Depiction of the Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining Solution

Lones Smith

1996: Informational Herding as Experimentation Deja Vu

Lones Smith and Peter Sørensen

1996: Agency Costs in the Process of Development

Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti

1996: Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence

Daron Acemoglu and J.S. Pischki

1996: On the Irrelevance of Trade Timing

Lones Smith

1996: Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach

Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier

1996: Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution

Glenn Ellison

1996: Social Learning in a Changing World

Lones Smith

1996: Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs: Theory and Some Evidence

Daron Acemoglu

1996: Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspetive

Daron Acemoglu

1996: Disorganization

Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer

1996: Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives

Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison

1996: What We Know and Do Not Know about the Natural Rate of Unemployment

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz

1996: Continuous Training in Germany

Jorn-Steffen Pischke

1996: Conditional Independance in Sample Selection Models

Joshua Angrist

1996: Technology, Unemployment and Efficiency

Daron Acemoglu

1996: The Macroeconomics of Specificity

Ricardo Caballero and M-L Hammour

1996: Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: an Examination of four Cephalosporins

S Ellison, Iain Cockburn, Zvi Griliches and Jerry Hausman

1996: Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill

Michael Kremer and Eric Maskin

1996: Comparative Statics under Uncertainty: Single Crossing Properties and Log-Supermodularity

Susan Athey

1996: Private and Public Supply of Liquidity

Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole

1996: Do Rational Traders Frenzy?

Lones Smith

1996: Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations, and Consumption

James Poterba and Andrew Samwick

1996: Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning

Lones Smith and Peter Sørensen

1996: How Much Does Sorting Increase Inequality?

Michael Kremer

1996: Elephants

Michael Kremer and C. Morcom

1996: An Inequality for Vector-Valued Martingales and Its Applications

Jushan Bai

1996: Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence

Daron Acemoglu

1996: Fixed Costs: The Demise of Marginal q

Ricardo Caballero

1996: A Note on Spurious Break and Regime Shift in Cointegrating Relationship

Jushan Bai

1996: The Returns to Computer Use Revisited: Have Pencils Changed the Wage Structure Too?

John DiNardo and Jorn-Steffen Pischke

1996: A Representative Consumer Theory of Distribution

Francesco Caselli and Jaume Ventura

1996: Exports and Success in German Manufacturing

Andrew Bernard and Joachim Wagner

1996: Characterizing Properties of Stochastic Objective Functions

Susan Athey