The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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1989, volume 5, articles 2

Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? pp. 225-48

Gregg A Jarrell and Annette B Poulsen

Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social Contract?: New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888 pp. 249-69

Christopher Grandy

A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers pp. 271-92

Charles R Knoeber

Time Dependent Information Costs, Price Controls, and Successive Government Intervention pp. 293-306

Lott, John R, and Gertrud M Fremling

An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking pp. 307-31

Robert Ekelund, Robert Hebert and Robert Tollison

Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice pp. 333-53

Jose Edgardo L Campos

Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing pp. 355-74

W. Reed

The Delaware Courts, Poison Pills, and Shareholder Wealth pp. 375-93

Dosoung Choi, Sreenivas Kamma and Joseph Weintrop

Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare pp. 395-412

Elazar Berkovitch, Michael Bradley and Naveen Khanna

Defensive Tactics and Optimal Search pp. 413-24

Alan Schwartz

1989, volume 5, articles 1

The Anatomy of Tax Evasion pp. 1-24

Steven Klepper and Daniel Nagin

Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior pp. 25-52

David Besanko and Daniel Spulber

Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal Government pp. 53-82

Ronald N Johnson and Gary Libecap

A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry pp. 83-97

Robert C Ellickson

Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law pp. 99-108

A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell

Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry pp. 109-26

Gary P Pisano

The Transaction-Cost Rationale for Countertrade pp. 127-53

Jean-Francois Hennart

The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy pp. 155-84

Thomas H Hammond and Paul A Thomas

The Interaction between Product Liability and Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries pp. 185-210

W Viscusi

Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity? pp. 211-22

Sumner La Croix

1988, volume 4, articles 2

How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection pp. 217-41

Jeffrey A Dubin and Peter Navarro

The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules pp. 243-65

Michael J Trebilcock

Ownership of the Firm pp. 267-304

Henry Hansmann

The Multinational Corporation's Degree of Control over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation pp. 305-36

Hubert Gatignon and Erin Anderson

Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis pp. 337-55

George John and Barton A Weitz

The Rationale for Regulation: Shareholder Losses under Various Assumptions about Managerial Cognition pp. 357-72

Alfred Marcus and Philip Bromiley

Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law pp. 373-83

Michael Ryngaert and Jeffrey M Netter

Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies pp. 385-408

Jonathan B Baker

1988, volume 4, articles 1

The Nature of the Firm: Origin pp. 3-17

Ronald Coase

The Nature of the Firm: Meaning pp. 19-32

Ronald Coase

The Nature of the Firm: Influence pp. 33-47

Ronald Coase

Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets pp. 49-64

Sherwin Rosen

The Logic of Economic Organization pp. 65-93

Oliver Williamson

Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence pp. 95-117

Paul Joskow

Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm pp. 119-39

Oliver Hart

The Theory of the Firm Revisited pp. 141-61

Harold Demsetz

On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation pp. 163-80

Sidney Winter

A Legal Basis for the Firm pp. 181-98

Scott Masten

Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited pp. 199-213

Benjamin Klein

1987, volume 3, articles 2

Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? pp. 143-76

Avery Katz

Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper? pp. 177-84

Roger Bowles

Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American and English Rules pp. 185-92

Charles Plott

Measuring Legal Change pp. 193-225

George L Priest

Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change." pp. 227-34

Robert Cooter

Conceptualizing Legal Change and Its Effects: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change." pp. 235-41

Marc Galanter

Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control pp. 243-77

Mathew D McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast

Political Control of Administrative Officials pp. 279-86

R Douglas Arnold

Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures pp. 287-335

Thomas W Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel

Comment: Alternative Rationales for Restrictive Procedures [Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures] pp. 337-43

Morris P Fiorina

The Concept of Information: A Comment on Gilligan and Krehbiel's "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees." pp. 345-50

Martin Shapiro

The Use of Hedonic Analysis for Certification and Damage Calculations in Class Action Complaints pp. 351-72

Raymond S Hartman and Michael J Doane

An Organizational Coordination Model of Salesforce Compensation Plans: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test pp. 373-95

George John, Allen M Weiss and Barton Weitz

The Effects of Industry-Wide Price Regulation on Industrial Organization pp. 397-434

Andrew Daughety and Robert Forsythe

The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political Control pp. 435-48

Ronald Wintrobe

1987, volume 3, articles 1

Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil pp. 1-25

Steven N Wiggins and Gary Libecap

Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation pp. 27-46

A. Mitchell Polinsky

Vertical Integration and Risk Reduction pp. 47-67

Constance E Helfat and David Teece

Bargaining and the pp. 69-98

Douglas D Heckathorn and Steven M Maser

Volatile Interest Rates and the Divergence of Incentives in Mortgage Contracts pp. 99-115

J Harold Mulherin and Walter Muller

A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation pp. 117-28

Edward C Gallick and David E Sisk

Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade pp. 129-39

Beth V Yarbrough and Robert M Yarbrough

Identity and Cooperation: A Comment on Sen's Alternative Program [Goals, Commitment, and Identity] pp. 140-42

Robert Higgs