The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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2002, volume 18, articles 2

Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency pp. 295-323

Kathryn E. Spier

Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper pp. 324-361

George P. Baker and Robert E. Kennedy

Contractual Intermediaries pp. 362-384

Garey Ramey and Joel Watson

Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency of Securities Trading pp. 385-410

Craig Pirrong

Rethinking Political Bargaining: Policymaking with a Single Proposer pp. 411-427

David M. Primo

An Experimental Bribery Game pp. 428-454

Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch and Elke Renner

Two Economic Applications of Sympathy pp. 455-487

David Sally

Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve pp. 488-510

Dino Falaschetti

Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising pp. 511-535

James A. Brickley

Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion pp. 536-555

Sean Gailmard

2002, volume 18, articles 1

The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress pp. 1-38

John Boyce

An Economic Analysis of "Riding to Hounds": Pierson v. Post pp. 39-66

Dhammika Dharmapala

Verifiability and Contract Enforcement: A Model with Judicial Moral Hazard pp. 67-94

Murat Usman

Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies pp. 95-116

Paul Joskow

Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others pp. 117-139

Peter Diamond

Does Party Matter? An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in Three Institutional Settings pp. 140-154

David Brady and Judith Goldstein

Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited pp. 155-186

David Stasavage

Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States pp. 187-220

Craig Volden

Courts and Relational Contracts pp. 221-277

Simon Johnson and John McMillan

Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry pp. 278-294

John E. Kwoka, Jr.

2001, volume 17, articles 2

Working and Shirking: Equilibrium in Public-Goods Games with Overlapping Generations of Players pp. 285-318

Eric S Dickson and Kenneth A Shepsle

The President versus the State: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve pp. 319-55

Kelly H Chang

Bankruptcy Decision Making pp. 356-72

Douglas G Baird and Edward R Morrison

Legislative Organization under Separate Powers pp. 373-96

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran

Project-Specific External Financing and Headquarters Monitoring Incentives pp. 397-412

Christian Laux

Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives pp. 413-48

John Matsusaka and Nolan M McCarty

On the Regulation of Social Norms pp. 449-76

Dorothea Kübler

Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation pp. 477-506

Michael Bailey and Kelly H Chang

The Phantom Profits of the Opera: Nonprofit Ownership in the Arts as a Make-Buy Decision pp. 507-20

Jennifer Kuan

2001, volume 17, articles 1

A Model of a Predatory State pp. 1-33

Boaz Moselle and Benjamin Polak

Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems pp. 34-61

William B Heller

Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects pp. 62-82

James N Druckman

Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs pp. 83-120

Robert Daines and Michael Klausner

Damages for Breach of Contract: Should the Government Get Special Treatment? pp. 121-48

Abraham L Wickelgren

Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial pp. 149-67

Scott Baker and Claudio Mezzetti

Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence from China pp. 168-200

Mary M Shirley and Lixin Xu

Earnouts: The Effects of Adverse Selection and Agency Costs on Acquisition Techniques pp. 201-38

Srikant Datar, Richard Frankel and Mark Wolfson

Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement pp. 239-56

Robert Innes

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution pp. 257-84

Benito Arruñada, Luis Garicano and Luis Vazquez

2000, volume 16, articles 2

The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB pp. 269-305

Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast

Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the Jury pp. 306-33

Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok

The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment pp. 334-64

Witold Henisz

On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias pp. 365-94

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems pp. 395-423

Aaron Edlin and Benjamin Hermalin

Legislative Organization and Congressional Review of Agency Regulations pp. 424-48

Steven J Balla

The Directors' and Officers' Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance pp. 449-77

John E Core

Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law pp. 478-502

Timothy Frye and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

The WTO Dispute Settlement System: First Assessment from an Economic Perspective pp. 503-33

Monika Bütler and Heinz Hauser

Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of the States pp. 534-71

F. Andrew Hanssen

2000, volume 16, articles 1

A Theory of Legal Presumptions pp. 1-49

Antonio E Bernardo, Eric Talley and Ivo Welch

Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative Property Rights Regimes pp. 50-73

Rachel Croson and Jason Scott Johnston

Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets pp. 74-101

Thomas J Miles

Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions pp. 102-28

Ken Kollman, John H Miller and Scott E Page

When Should Market-Supporting Institutions Be Established? pp. 129-54

Robert Fleck

Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests pp. 155-65

Kai Konrad

Transaction Costs and the Collection of Information: Presale Measurement on Private Timber Sales pp. 166-88

Keith B Leffler, Randal R Rucker and Ian A Munn

Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm pp. 189-208

Alexander Pfaff and Chris Sanchirico

Promises, Trust, and Contracts pp. 209-32

Yongmin Chen

Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms pp. 233-68

Stephen Choi