The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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1994, volume 10, articles 2

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation pp. 201-46

Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller

A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance pp. 247-67

Erik Berglof

Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings pp. 268-95

Michelle J White

The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis of Robinson-Patman pp. 296-318

Daniel P O'Brien and Greg Shaffer

Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials pp. 319-42

Joel Schrag and Suzanne Scotchmer

The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes pp. 343-59

Michael L Davis

Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contact? pp. 360-89

Steven C Hackett

More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures pp. 390-406

Peter H Huang and Ho-Mou Wu

The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy pp. 407-26

Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb

1994, volume 10, articles 1

Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems pp. 1-34

Debra J Aron and Pau Olivella

Ownership Structure, Potential Competition, and the Free-Rider Problem in Tender Offers pp. 35-62

Michael F Ferguson

Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game pp. 63-83

Eric Rasmusen

Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards pp. 84-95

Kathryn E Spier

Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed pp. 96-125

Arthur Lupia and Mathew D McCubbins

Organizational Choices for Public Service Supply pp. 126-41

James M Ferris and Elizabeth Graddy

Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany pp. 142-59

Steven Kaplan

Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model pp. 160-67

Phillip A Huxtable

Bargaining through an Expert Attorney pp. 168-86

Alison Watts

Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information pp. 187-200

Gyu Ho Wang, Jeong-Yoo Kim and Jong-Goo Yi

1993, volume 9, articles 2

Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition pp. 205-29

Morton I Kamien and Israel Zang

Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach pp. 230-55

Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz

Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising pp. 256-89

Francine Lafontaine

Countertrade and the Minimization of Transaction Costs: An Empirical Examination pp. 290-313

Jean-Francois Hennart and Erin Anderson

Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation pp. 314-48

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation pp. 349-67

James Dana and Kathryn E Spier

Sales of Corporate Control pp. 368-79

Marcel Kahan

Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas pp. 380-98

Thomas Lyon and Steven C Hackett

The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation pp. 399-424

Yeon-Koo Che and Jong Goo Yi

Industry Effects of Interfirm Lawsuits: Evidence from Pennzoil v. Texaco pp. 425-44

Michael G Hertzel and Janet Smith

1993, volume 9, articles 1

Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy pp. 1-29

David Besanko and Daniel Spulber

Performance Measures and Optimal Organization pp. 30-50

Amir Ziv

Information and the Control of Productive Assets pp. 51-76

Matthew Rabin

Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance? pp. 77-97

Avery Katz

How Institutional Constraints Affected the Organization of Early U.S. Telephony pp. 98-126

William P Barnett and Glenn R Carroll

Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects pp. 127-35

Benjamin Hermalin

The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization pp. 136-58

Trond Olsen and Gaute Torsvik

Procedural Rules and Procurement Regulations: Complexity Creates Trade-offs pp. 159-80

Shane Greenstein

Endogenous Legal Booms pp. 181-87

Holger C Wolf

Delivery-Contingent Contracts for Research pp. 188-203

Curtis Taylor

1992, volume 8, articles 3

Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine pp. 441-70

Lewis A Kornhauser

Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising pp. 471-501

Nancy Gallini and Nancy A Lutz

The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflict between Defendants and Liability Insurers pp. 502-22

Michael J Meurer

The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform pp. 523-46

Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart and John Moore

Ambition and Constraint: The Stabilizing Role of Institutions pp. 547-60

David Soskice, Robert Bates and David Epstein

Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure pp. 561-81

Susan Helper and David Levine

The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information pp. 582-606

Lars Stole

Manager Shareholding, the Market for Managers, and the End-Period Problem: Evidence from the U.S. Whaling Industry pp. 607-27

Lee Craig and Charles R Knoeber

Hands-Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt pp. 628-55

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law pp. 656-72

John Pound

Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy-Making pp. 673-94

Bernard Steunenberg

1992, volume 8, articles 2

Policy, Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court Decision-Making pp. 219-52

Edward P Schwartz

Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization pp. 253-79

Lucian Bebchuk and Howard F Chang

On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis pp. 280-305

Tai-Yeong Chung

Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice pp. 306-20

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell

Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective pp. 321-45

Hideshi Itoh

The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields pp. 346-65

Price Fishback

The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts pp. 366-76

Douglas Allen and Dean Lueck

Vertical Integration in Oligopoly pp. 377-93

Esther Gal-Or

Defining the Deal: Legislative Bargaining and the Chevron Decision pp. 394-410

Julianne Nelson

Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses pp. 411-26

Jennifer H Arlen

Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition pp. 427-40

David T Levy and James D Reitzes

1992, volume 8, articles 1

The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction pp. 1-17

Pablo Spiller and John Ferejohn

Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines pp. 8-46

Pablo Spiller and Matthew L Spitzer

Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines: Comment pp. 47-58

Roberta Romano

Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law pp. 59-81

Daniel A Farber

Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law: Comments pp. 82-89

Thomas S Ulen

Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law: Comments pp. 90-92

James Snyder

Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies pp. 93-110

Jonathan R Macey

Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: A Comment: Bureaucratic Drift, Coalition Drift, and Time Consistency pp. 111-18

Kenneth A Shepsle

Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies: Comment pp. 119-25

Michael Levine

Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate pp. 126-54

Daniel Spulber and David Besanko

Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comment pp. 155-58

Stephen F Ross

Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate: Comments pp. 159-64

Lanny Arvan

Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State pp. 165-89

Eskridge, William N, and John Ferejohn

Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: Positive Models and Normative Theory pp. 190-96

Jack Knight

Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Comment: The Administrative State and the Original Understanding pp. 197-204

Daniel B Rodriguez

Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State: A Response: The Game of Politics and Law pp. 205-13

Peter L Strauss and Andrew R Rutten