The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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2010, volume 26, articles 3

Disobedience and Authority* pp. 427-459

Jan Zabojnik

Population-Based Liability Determination, Mass Torts, and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial pp. 460-492

Jennifer Reinganum

What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Corruption? pp. 493-514

Facundo Sepúlveda

Early Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation: Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review pp. 515-545

Evan James Zucker

Gaming the Liver Transplant Market pp. 546-568

Jason Snyder

Noneconomic Damage Caps and Medical Malpractice Claim Frequency: A Policy Endogeneity Approach pp. 569-591

Christine Piette Durrance

Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards pp. 592-608

Henrik Lando

2010, volume 26, articles 2

Putting the "Con" into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs pp. 183-211

David Skarbek

Party Organization and Electoral Competition pp. 212-242

Nicolas Sahuguet

An Institutional Explanation for the Stickiness of Federal Grants pp. 243-264

Justin H. Phillips

The Social Desirability of Punishment Avoidance pp. 265-289

Avraham D. Tabbach

Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary pp. 290-336

Eric A. Posner

Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation pp. 337-364

Matthias Kräkel

Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect pp. 365-384

Gerrit De Geest

Disagreement and the Allocation of Control pp. 385-426

Eric Van den Steen

2010, volume 26, articles 1

Growing Pains: The School Consolidation Movement and Student Outcomes pp. 1-29

Martin R. West

Should Firms be Allowed to Indemnify Their Employees for Sanctions? pp. 30-53

Christopher Snyder

Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets pp. 54-91

Michael Waldman

A Right to Silence for Civil Defendants? pp. 92-114

Abraham L. Wickelgren

Incentive Contracts with Enforcement Costs pp. 115-143

Katherine Doornik

Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process pp. 144-157

Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren

Opportunism in Organizations pp. 158-181

Kouroche Vafaï

Announcement pp. NP-NP

Rhodri Jackson

2009, volume 25, articles 2

Editor's Note pp. 285-285

Ian Ayres

Coming to the Nuisance: Revisiting Spur in a Model of Location Choice pp. 286-310

Robert Innes

Chinatown Revisited: Owens Valley and Los Angeles--Bargaining Costs and Fairness Perceptions of the First Major Water Rights Exchange pp. 311-338

Gary D. Libecap

Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within and between Law Firms pp. 339-371

Thomas N. Hubbard

Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis pp. 372-399

Steven Tadelis

Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information pp. 400-441

Felipe Balmaceda

Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law pp. 442-471

Nicolas Melissas

Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System pp. 472-498

Andrew C. Sobel

The Distributional Consequences of Diversity-Enhancing University Admissions Rules pp. 499-517

Erik Eyster

Why Have Robberies Become Less Frequent but More Violent? pp. 518-534

Rajiv Sethi

Where Is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, Connections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam pp. 535-578

Markus Taussig

Revenue Sharing Distortions and Vertical Integration in the Movie Industry pp. 579-610

Ricard Gil

2009, volume 25, articles 1

Editor's Note pp. 1-1

Ian Ayres

Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments pp. 2-30

Hayong Yun

Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures pp. 31-54

Thomas Ross

A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review pp. 55-79

Tom S. Clark

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce pp. 80-106

Abraham L. Wickelgren

Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis pp. 107-133

Eric Talley

Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures pp. 134-156

Claude Fluet

An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy pp. 157-182

Sandeep Kapur

Has Devolution Injured American Workers? State and Federal Enforcement of Construction Safety pp. 183-210

Alison D. Morantz

Optimal Vertical Arrangements When Resale Is Possible pp. 211-234

Mariano Selvaggi

Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety pp. 235-261

Nuno Garoupa

Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959--2006 pp. 262-284

Raphael Franck

2008, volume 24, articles 2

Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice pp. 247-272

Oliver Williamson

Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments pp. 273-306

Atif Mian

Urban Extremism pp. 307-318

Amihai Glazer

An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind Affirmative Action pp. 319-355

Tolga Yuret

Infectious Ethics: How Upright Employees Can Ease Concerns of Tacit Collusion pp. 356-370

Brian Mittendorf

Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism pp. 371-406

Razvan Vlaicu

Trust in Transition: Cross-Country and Firm Evidence pp. 407-433

Utku Teksoz

Environmental Liability in Transboundary Harms: Law and Forum Choice pp. 434-457

Henry van Egteren

Bureaucratic Rents and Life Satisfaction pp. 476-488

Alois Stutzer

2008, volume 24, articles 1

Editor's Note pp. 1-1

Ian Ayres

Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental Involvement Laws and Sexually Transmitted Diseases pp. 2-21

Thomas Stratmann

The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis pp. 22-44

Sue Mialon

Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator pp. 45-71

Michael Toffel

Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance pp. 72-94

George Triantis

Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model pp. 95-119

Yasutora Watanabe

Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss pp. 120-137

Amihai Glazer

Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design pp. 138-162

Anja Schöttner

A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments pp. 163-183

Konstantin Sonin

Commitment, Exchange Autonomy, and the Boundary of the Hierarchical Firm pp. 184-214

Nadav Levy

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits pp. 215-246

Jeremy Thornton