The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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2005, volume 21, articles 2

Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach pp. 285-314

Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? pp. 315-329

Patrick Schmitz

Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions pp. 330-358

Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz

Adverse Selection, Political Parties, and Policy Delegation in the American Federal System pp. 359-387

George A. Krause and Ann O'M. Bowman

Should Tort Damages be Multiplied? pp. 388-416

Keith N. Hylton and Thomas Miceli

Agency Problems and the Corporate Charter pp. 417-440

David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith

Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers pp. 441-466

Scott Ashworth

Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment pp. 467-500

Kay Mitusch and Roland Strausz

Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation pp. 501-523

John M. de Figueiredo

Banks and Enterprise Privatization in China pp. 524-546

Loren Brandt, Hongbin Li and Joanne Roberts

Contractual Disputes and the Channels for Interfirm Communication pp. 547-575

William Pyle

2005, volume 21, articles 1

The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate pp. 1-19

Edward Glaeser

The Scope of Open Source Licensing pp. 20-56

Josh Lerner

Ex-Post Egalitarianism and Legal Justice pp. 57-75

Alon Harel

Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency pp. 76-102

Enrico Perotti

Self-Enforcing Federalism pp. 103-135

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo

Loggers versus Campers: Compensation for the Taking of Property Rights pp. 136-152

Ron Giammarino

Why Roll Calls? A Model of Position-Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections pp. 153-178

James Snyder

Career Concerns of Bargainers pp. 179-204

John Fingleton

Does the Structure and Composition of the Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations pp. 205-227

Katherine O'Regan

An Examination of the Presence of Ownership Effects in Mixed Markets pp. 228-255

Jeffrey P. Ballou

Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision pp. 256-283

Eric Van den Steen

2004, volume 20, articles 2

Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements pp. 261-298

Sergio G. Lazzarini

Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making pp. 299-330

Sean Farhang

Law and Preferences pp. 331-352

Oren Bar-Gill

On the Composition of Committees pp. 353-378

Klaas Beniers

Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence pp. 379-399

Matthew C. Stephenson

Using Job Rotation to Extract Employee Information pp. 400-414

Anil Arya

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties pp. 415-437

Suzanne Scotchmer

Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology pp. 438-457

David C. Nixon

Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions pp. 458-483

Guy L. F. Holburn

The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances pp. 484-526

Rachelle C. Sampson

Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process pp. 527-557

Stephen Nunez

2004, volume 20, articles 1

Editor's Note pp. 1-1

Ian Ayres

The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting pp. 2-31

Alan Schwartz

The Disappearing Delaware Effect pp. 32-59

Guhan Subramanian

Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals" pp. 60-101

Julie Wulf

Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers pp. 102-124

Alon Klement

Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm pp. 125-147

Niko Matouschek

Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem pp. 148-169

Thomas Lyon

Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting Mechanism pp. 170-191

Albert Choi

Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning pp. 192-206

Nuno Garoupa

Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology pp. 207-229

Arturs Kalnins

The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling pp. 230-260

Kenneth Corts

2003, volume 19, articles 2

Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds pp. 245-280

Eric Zitzewitz

The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina pp. 281-306

Pablo Spiller

Regulating Slavery: Deck-Stacking and Credible Commitment in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 pp. 307-342

Scott J. Basinger

Augmenting the Value of Ownership by Protecting It Only Partially: The "Market-Overt" Rule Revisited pp. 343-372

Barak Medina

Municipalizing American Waterworks, 1897--1915 pp. 373-400

Werner Troesken

Property Enforcement as Organized Consent pp. 401-444

Benito ArruÒada

Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government pp. 445-490

AlÌcia Adserý

Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective pp. 491-516

Rohan Pitchford

Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets pp. 517-542

Eric Helland

National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause pp. 543-570

Clifford Carrubba

2003, volume 19, articles 1

On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration pp. 1-23

Michael Whinston

Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem pp. 24-44

Kaushik Mukhopadhaya

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers pp. 45-63

Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty

Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: Does the Use of Final Offer Arbitration Impede Settlement? pp. 64-82

Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino

Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy pp. 83-105

Dino Falaschetti

Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to Holdup Problems with Small Stakes pp. 106-118

Lorne Carmichael and W. Bentley Macleod

Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments pp. 119-140

Kong-Pin Chen

Why Are the Levels of Control (So) Different in German and U.K. Companies? Evidence from Initial Public Offerings pp. 141-175

Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog

Privatization and Management Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom pp. 176-217

Michael I. Cragg and Isaac Dyck

Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence pp. 218-244

Oriana Bandiera