The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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1999, volume 15, articles 3

Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court pp. 549-72

Gregory A Caldeira, John R Wright and Christopher J W Zorn

Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance pp. 573-601

Mary Olson

A Theory of Policy Advice pp. 602-14

Otto Swank, Wilko Letterie and Hendrik van Dalen

Endogenous Business Networks pp. 615-36

Raja Kali

Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam pp. 637-58

John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff

Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures pp. 659-84

Paul Povel

The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem pp. 685-703

Zvika Neeman

The Role of Risk in Contract Choice pp. 704-36

Douglas Allen and Dean Lueck

Self-Enforcing Transactions: Reciprocal Exposure in Fisheries pp. 737-49

Patricia Koss

Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals pp. 750-81

Myron J Roomkin and Burton A Weisbrod

1999, volume 15, articles 2

Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law pp. 349-77

Emerson H Tiller and Pablo Spiller

Color Blind Is Not Color Neutral: Testing Differences and Affirmative Action pp. 378-400

Jean-Pierre Benoit

The Form of U.S. In-Kind Assistance pp. 401-17

Brendan O'Flaherty

How to Restore Higher-Powered Incentives in Multitask Agencies pp. 418-33

Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

Monitoring and Collusion with "Soft" Information pp. 434-40

Sandeep Baliga

Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance pp. 441-67

Yeon-Koo Che and Alan Schwartz

Limited Attention and the Optimal Incompleteness of Contracts pp. 468-86

Sharon Gifford

Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth pp. 487-502

Lucian Bebchuk and Christine Jolls

Information, Civil Liberties, and the Political Economy of Witch-Hunts pp. 503-25

Vai-Lam Mui

The Self-Enforcing Provisions of Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence pp. 526-48

Gary Libecap and James Smith

1999, volume 15, articles 1

Engineering Bureaucracy: The Genesis of Formal Policies, Positions, and Structures in High-Technology Firms pp. 1-41

James N Baron, M Diane Burton and Michael T Hannan

Comment on "Engineering Bureaucracy." pp. 42-46

Josh Lerner

Comment: Dynamically Engineering Bureaucracy pp. 47-55

Jack A Nickerson and Todd Zenger

Informal Authority in Organizations pp. 56-73

George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy

The Firm as a Subeconomy pp. 74-102

Bengt Holmstrom

The Firm as a Noneconomy: Some Comments on Holmstrom pp. 103-06

Benjamin Hermalin

Practices for Managing Information Flows within Organizations pp. 107-31

Demski, Joel S, et al

The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act pp. 180-217

McNollgast

Comment on "The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act," by McNollgast pp. 218-21

Alan Schwartz

The Quality of Government pp. 222-79

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

Comment on "The Quality of Government": Why Do Some Governments Have Better Institutions Than Others? pp. 280-82

Lynne Zucker and Michael Darby

An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures pp. 283-305

de Figueiredo, Rui J P,, Pablo Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo

Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective pp. 306-42

Oliver Williamson

Comment on "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Tranbsaction Cost Economics Perspective," by Oliver Williamson pp. 343-47

W. Bentley Macleod

1998, volume 14, articles 2

Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress pp. 183-204

David Epstein

Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy? pp. 205-31

Michelle J White

Why Repeated Criminal Opportunities Matter: A Dynamic Stochastic Analysis of Criminal Decision Making pp. 232-55

Brendan O'Flaherty

The Role of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System pp. 256-76

Daniel P Kessler and Anne Piehl

Allocating Access for Information and Contributions pp. 277-303

David Austen-Smith

Primary Election Systems and Representation pp. 304-24

Elisabeth R Gerber and Rebecca Morton

Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight? pp. 325-57

Omri Ben-Shahar

Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises pp. 358-78

Mary M Shirley and Lixin Xu

A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool." pp. 379-87

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

1998, volume 14, articles 1

Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises pp. 1-23

Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian

Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness pp. 24-43

Christopher Avery, Judith Chevalier and Scott Schaefer

Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions pp. 44-60

Steffen Huck

Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax pp. 61-83

Louis Kaplow

Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets pp. 84-113

Margaret Slade

Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making pp. 114-35

Emerson H Tiller

Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities pp. 136-51

Marcel Kahan and David Yermack

Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia pp. 152-73

Aloysius Siow

A Comment on "Corruption by Design." pp. 174-79

Cemile Yavas

Correction to "Corruption by Design." pp. 180-82

Melanie Manion