The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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1997, volume 13, articles 2

Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan pp. 259-86

John Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen

Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency pp. 287-318

Thomas Noe

An Informational Theory of the Legislative Veto pp. 319-43

Elizabeth M Martin

Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability pp. 344-65

Richard Posner

Specialization Decisions within Committee pp. 366-86

Thomas W Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel

Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach pp. 387-409

Joanne Oxley

Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition pp. 410-32

Andrew F Doughety and Jennifer Reinganum

The Optimality of the Mandatory Bid Rule pp. 433-51

Clas Bergstrom, Peter Hogfeldt and Johan Molin

1997, volume 13, articles 1

The pp. 1-25

Werner Troesken

Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920 pp. 26-49

David Brady and David Epstein

Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings pp. 50-73

Tracy Lewis and Michel Poitevin

United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance? pp. 74-100

Joseph C Mullin and Wallace P Mullin

Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System pp. 101-26

Kathleen Bawn

Contracting about Bankruptcy pp. 127-46

Alan Schwartz

Performance Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act pp. 147-68

Michael Cragg

Profit-Sharing versus Fixed-Payment Contracts: Evidence from the Motion Pictures Industry pp. 169-201

Darlene C Chisholm

Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California pp. 202-31

Karen Clay

The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability? pp. 232-58

James Boyd and Daniel E Ingberman

1996, volume 12, articles 2

Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies pp. 277-98

Mehmet Bac

Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation pp. 299-324

Gary W Cox and Matthew Soberg Shugart

The Challenge of Peremptory Challenges pp. 325-60

Edward P Schwartz and Warren F Schwartz

Policing Team Production through Job Design pp. 361-75

Irene Valsecchi

Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives pp. 376-407

Mary Olson

Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices pp. 408-31

Arindam Das-Gupta and Dilip Mookherjee

Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes pp. 432-60

Daniel Kessler

Underinvestment, Debt Financing, and Long-Term Supplier Relations pp. 461-79

Venkat Subramaniam

Long-Term Firm Performance and Chief Executive Turnover: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics pp. 480-96

Yungsan Kim

Roll Call Voting in the NCAA pp. 497-516

Lawrence DeBrock and Wallace Hendricks

1996, volume 12, articles 1

The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach pp. 1-24

Klaus Schmidt

The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier pp. 25-61

Lee Alston, Gary Libecap and Robert Schneider

Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness pp. 62-97

D Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly

Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment under Expectation Damages pp. 98-118

Aaron Edlin

Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making pp. 119-66

Thomas H Hammond and Jack H Knott

Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing pp. 167-95

Melanie Manion

Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies pp. 196-213

Hugo Hopenhayn and Susanne Lohmann

The Formation of Cooperative Relationships pp. 214-33

Rachel Kranton

Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban pp. 234-56

Keith Krehbiel

Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence? pp. 257-76

Luke Froeb and Bruce Kobayashi

1995, volume 11, articles 2

A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy pp. 227-55

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran

Bargaining under Rules versus Standards pp. 256-81

Jason Scott Johnston

Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986 pp. 282-312

Nolan M McCarty and Keith T Poole

Cheap Talk about Specific Investments pp. 313-34

Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons

Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment pp. 335-61

Howard A Shelanski and Peter Klein

Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects pp. 362-78

James Anton and Dennis A Yao

Regulatory Agency Discretion among Competing Industries: Inside the FDA pp. 379-405

Mary Olson

Nonfatal Accident Compensation and the Common Law at the Turn of the Century pp. 406-33

Shawn Kantor and Price Fishback

Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime pp. 434-55

Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel

Double Moral Hazard and Shopping Center Similarity in Canada pp. 456-78

Dorothy Golosinski and Douglas West

An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States pp. 479-501

Bruce Benson

1995, volume 11, articles 1

The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development pp. 1-31

Barry Weingast

Where Is the Sin in Sincere? Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters (With Applications to Other Voting Environments) pp. 32-63

Pablo Spiller and Matthew L Spitzer

An Economic Analysis of Takings pp. 64-86

Benjamin Hermalin

Combining Lab Experiments and Industry Data in Transaction Cost Analysis: The Case of Competition as a Safeguard pp. 87-111

Shantanu Dutta and George John

The Creditors' Financial Reorganization Decision: New Evidence from Canadian Data pp. 112-26

Timothy Fisher and Jocelyn Martel

The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan pp. 127-49

John Ramseyer

A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules pp. 150-63

Louis Kaplow

Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility pp. 164-88

Matthew S R Palmer

Understanding Dual Distribution: The Case of Reps and House Accounts pp. 189-204

Dutta, Shantanu, et al

Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History pp. 205-26

Stan Liebowitz and Stephen E Margolis