The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): Andrea Prat

From Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
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1991, volume 7, articles 2

Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form pp. 201-28

Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole

Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus pp. 229-47

Mark Bagnoli and Michael McKee

Cooperation versus Competition in Agency pp. 248-83

Ram T S Ramakrishnan and Anjan Thakor

Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley vs. Baxendale pp. 284-312

Lucian Bebchuk and Steven Shavell

Constitutional Rights pp. 313-33

Dennis Mueller

Bargaining Costs, Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules pp. 334-54

David D Haddock and Fred S McChesney

Imports and Domestic Wages: Is the Relationship Consistent with Expense Preference Behavior? pp. 355-72

John Heywood

Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis pp. 373-400

Jeffrey S Hill and James E Brazier

Promotion Lotteries pp. 401-09

Brendan O'Flaherty and Aloysius Siow

State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware pp. 410-28

Jahera, John S, and William N Pugh

1991, volume 7, articles 1

The Costs of Organization pp. 1-25

Scott Masten, Meehan, James W, and Edward Snyder

Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation pp. 27-53

Peter Cramton and Alan Schwartz

The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation? pp. 55-87

Roberta Romano

Indentured Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry pp. 89-116

John Ramseyer

Surviving Industrial Targeting: State Credibility and Public Policy Contingencies in Multinational Subcontracting pp. 117-43

Thomas P Murtha

Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate pp. 145-62

Ronald N Johnson and Allen M Parkman

Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners pp. 163-81

Jennifer Reinganum and Louis L Wilde

Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission? pp. 183-99

Mark Cohen

1991, volume 7

Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of Organizations pp. 1-6

Kenneth Arrow

Constructed Organization: First Principles pp. 7-23

James S Coleman

Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design pp. 24-52

Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom

The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies pp. 53-83

Paul Joskow

Privatization and Incentives pp. 84-105

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole

Politics and the Theory of Organization pp. 106-29

Terry M Moe

Reward Systems and the Distribution of Wages pp. 130-58

Trond Petersen

Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance pp. 159-87

Oliver Williamson

1990, volume 6, articles 2

A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases pp. 263-300

Rafael Gely and Pablo Spiller

Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy pp. 301-24

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Auctions and Contract Enforcement pp. 325-44

Daniel Spulber

The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory pp. 345-80

Edward Snyder and James Hughes

Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency pp. 381-409

Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin

Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Progressivity of Income Taxes pp. 410-31

Dilip Mookherjee and Ivan Png

Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence pp. 433-52

Keith N Hylton

Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement of Computer Systems pp. 453-69

Luis Cabral and Shane Greenstein

1990, volume 6, articles 1

The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions pp. 1-31

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole

Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation pp. 33-63

Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee

Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts pp. 65-92

Eric Rasmusen and Todd Zenger

Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions pp. 93-128

Louis Kaplow

Investment "Myopia" and the Internal Organization of Capital Allocation Decisions pp. 129-54

Anjan Thakor

The Comparative Advantage of Long-term Contracts and Firms pp. 155-70

Steven N Wiggins

Time, Space, and Shopping: The Regulation of Shopping Hours pp. 171-87

J. Stephen Ferris

Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain pp. 189-201

Thomas Miceli

Rings and Promises pp. 203-15

Margaret F Brinig

The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price? pp. 217-33

Edmund W Kitch

An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation pp. 235-51

Donald G Margotta, Thomas P McWilliams and Victoria B McWilliams

Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects pp. 253-62

Michael Ryngaert and Jeffry Netter

1990, volume 6

Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy pp. 1-20

John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan

Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy: Comment pp. 21-27

Susan Rose-Ackerman

Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of Administrative Agency Behavior pp. 29-43

Matthew L Spitzer

The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups pp. 45-72

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Nalebuff

Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing Groups pp. 73-77

Keith Krehbiel

Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record pp. 79-132

Robert P Inman and Michael A Fitts

Budget Policy-Making and the Appearance of Power: Note pp. 133-53

Mathew D McCubbins

Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record: Comment pp. 155-66

William P Rogerson

Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis pp. 167-98

Michael Levine and Jennifer L Forrence

Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis: Comments pp. 199-202

Robert A Katzmann

Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy pp. 203-12

Mathew D McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast

Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story pp. 213-53

Terry M Moe

The Problems with PPT: Comment pp. 255-61

Morris P Fiorina

Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story--Comment pp. 263-66

Oliver Williamson

Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development pp. 267-98

Jerry L Mashaw

Political Economy, Administrative Law: A Comment pp. 299-306

Cass Sunstein

Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures pp. 307-32

Mathew D McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast