Discussion Papers

From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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985: Additive Representation of Non-Additive Measures and the Choquet Integral

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

984: A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods

Enriqueta Aragones

983: Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions

Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

982: The Cyclical Behavior of Job Creation and Job Destruction

Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides

981: Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games

Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

980: Acyclicity and Dynamic Stability: Generalizations and Applications

Michele Boldrin and Luigi Montrucchio

978: Credit Cards and Buyer Price Protection

Gail Cohen

977: Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions

Randolph McAfee and Daniel Vincent

976: Properties of Dynamic Traffic Equilibrium Involving Bottlenecks

Richard Arnott

975: The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game

Helmut Bester

974: Information and Usage of Congestible Facilities Under Free Access

Richard Arnott

973: Multiproduct Firms: A Nested Logit Approach

Simon P. Anderston and André de Palma

972: Bounded Perception and Learning how to Decide

Karl Schlag

971: The Double Auction Market: Institutions

Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams

970: An Approach to Equilibrium Selection

Akihiko Matsui and Kiminori Matsuyama

969: Symmetry Extensions of 'Neutrality' I: Advantage to the Condorcet Loser

Donald G. Saari

968: We'd Rather Fight than Switch: Trying to Understand 'Let's Make a Deal'

Scott E. Page

967: A Decentralized Linear Process for Finding Equilibria

Stanley Reiter

966: Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms

Matthew Jackson

965: Implementing Social Choice Functions: A New Look at Some Impossibility Results

Matthew Jackson and Sanjay Srivastava

964: A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods

Salvador Barberà and Matthew Jackson

963: Millions of Election Outcomes from a Single Profile

Donald G. Saari

962: An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories

Robert Forsythe

961: The Afternoon Effect

Randolph McAfee and Daniel Vincent

960: The Correlation of Durations in Multivariate Hazard Rate Models

Gerard van den Berg and Ton Steerneman

959: Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services

Asher Wolinsky

958: Arbitrage

Thomas A. Rietz

957: Parallel Search: An Application to R & D

Tara Viswanath

956: Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Roger Myerson

955r: Indeterminacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Externalities

Michele Boldrin and Aldo Rustichini

954: Competitive Limit Pricing Under Imperfect Information

Kyle Bagwell

953: Threshold Externalities and Economic Development: A Note

Michele Boldrin

952: Simulations and Spatial Voting Methods

Scott E. Page

951: The Capital Market

Andrew Newman

950: Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard

Steven Matthews

949: Duration of Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks

Jacek Prokop

948: Information Sources and Equilibrium Wage Outcomes

Dale Mortensen and Tara Vishwanath

947: Imperfect Competition

Kiminori Matsuyama

946: Dynamics of International Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks

Jacek Prokop

945: A Game Theoretical Approach to the International Debt Overhang

Mamoru Kaneko and Jacek Prokop

944: Linear Measures, the Gini Index and the Income-Equality Tradeoff

Elchanan Ben-Porath and Itzhak Gilboa

943: Rationality and Ascriptive Science

Itzhak Gilboa

942: The Capital Structure of Regulated Firms

Yossef Spiegel and Daniel Spulber

941r: Efficiency in Bargaining with Information Externalities

Daniel Spulber

940: Custom Versus Fashion: Hysteresis and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game

Kiminori Matsuyama

939: Equilibrium Unemployment Cycles

Dale Mortensen

938: Sufficient Statistics

Donald G. Saari

937: Social Conflict

Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini

936: Monopoly Pricing Strategies

Daniel Spulber

935: Absorbent Stable Sets

Itzhak Gilboa and Dov Samet