Discussion Papers
From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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- 1233: Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing and Returns to Scale

- Timothy Van Zandt and Roy Radner
- 1232: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies

- Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo
- 1231: Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation

- Timothy Van Zandt
- 1230: Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers

- Jinpeng Ma
- 1229: Second Opinions and Price Competition Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice

- Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Asher Wolinsky
- 1228: Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited

- Matthew Jackson, Ehud Kalai and Rann Smorodinsky
- 1227: Quitting Games

- Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1226: Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games

- Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1225: Strategic Formation of Coalitions

- Jinpeng Ma
- 1224: The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Incentive Scheme Commitment

- Nolan H. Miller and Amit Pazgal
- 1223: A Reputational Model of Authority

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar
- 1222: Postponement and Information in a Supply Chain

- Krishnan S. Anand and Haim Mendelson
- 1221: Banks Versus Bonds: the Emergence and Persistence of Two Financial Systems

- Sandeep Baliga and Ben Polak
- 1220: Experimentation in Markets

- Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki
- 1219: Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate Returns Due to Demand Complementarities

- Antonio Ciccone and Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1218: Maximum Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors

- Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff and Emre Ozdenoren
- 1217: Interdependent Preferences and Groups of Agents

- Stanley Reiter
- 1216r: Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster

- Roger Myerson
- 1215: Dynamics of Parliamentary Systems: Selections, Governments, and Parliaments

- David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
- 1214: Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games

- Roger Myerson
- 1213: Not Invented Here

- Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
- 1212: Stochastic Independence and Uncertainty Aversion

- Peter Klibanoff
- 1211: Factorization and Decomposition of Relations

- Peter S. Faynzilberg
- 1210: Decentralization and Collusion

- Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
- 1209: An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness

- Stephen Morris
- 1208: Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty: The Option Value of Subcontracting

- Jan A. Miegham
- 1207: Manipulation Through Bribes

- James Schummer
- 1206: On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections

- Eddie Dekel and Michele Piccione
- 1205: Repeated Implementation

- Ehud Kalai and John Ledyard
- 1204: Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty: Price vs. Quantity Competition

- Jan A. Miegham and Maqbool Dada
- 1203: Growing Through Cycles

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1202: A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies

- Eddie Dekel
- 1201: Investment Strategies for Flexible Resources

- Jan A. Van Miegham
- 1200: Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach

- Alvaro Sandroni
- 1199: Learning Rare Events

- Alvaro Sandroni
- 1198: An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion

- William Sandholm
- 1197: Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

- Atsushi Kajii and Stephen Morris
- 1196: Social Choice Theory

- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks
- 1195: Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences

- Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- 1194: A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts

- Asher Wolinsky
- 1193: Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games

- Atsushi Kajii and Stephen Morris
- 1192: The Speed of Rational Learning

- Alvaro Sandroni
- 1191: Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences

- Jeffrey Ely and Okan Yilankaya
- 1190: Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games

- Barton Lipman and Ruqu Wang
- 1189: Large Poisson Games

- Roger Myerson
- 1188: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

- Leslie Marx and Steven Matthews
- 1187: Explaining Positional Voting Paradoxes II: The General Case

- Donald G. Saari
- 1186: The Optimal Design of a Market

- Matthew Jackson and Sandro Brusco
- 1185: A Patentability Requirement For Sequential Innovation

- Ted O'Donoghue
- 1184r: False Reputation in a Society of Players

- Matthew Jackson and Ehud Kalai