Discussion Papers

From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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1483: Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources

Daniele Condorelli

1482: What money can't buy: allocations with priority lists, lotteries and queues

Daniele Condorelli

1481: Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time

Lance Fortnow and Rahul Santhanam

1480: Discounting and Patience in Optimal Stopping and Control Problems

John Quah and Bruno Strulovici

1479: Affiliation and Dependence in Economic Models

Luciano I. de Castro

1478: Capital Mobility and Asset Pricing

Darrell Duffie and Bruno Strulovici

1477: A Relationship Between Risk and Time Preferences

Kota Saito

1476: Information Independence and Common Knowledge

Olivier Gossner, Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber

1475: Diversity and Popularity in Social Networks

Yann Bramoullé and Brian Rogers

1474: The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Bard Harstad

1473: Program Equilibria and Discounted Computation Time

Lance Fortnow

1472: Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses

Simon Loertscher and Andras Niedermayer

1471: Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

Mallesh M. Pai and Rakesh Vohra

1470: Topologies on Types: Connections

Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong

1469: Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade and Luciano de Castro

1468: Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences

Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff

1467: The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms

Artyom Shneyerov and Adam Chi Leung Won

1466: Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration

Pohan Fong

1465: Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power

Pohan Fong

1464: Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power

Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong

1463: Equilibria Existence in Regular Discontinuous Games

Luciano de Castro

1462: Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring

George Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski

1461: Optimal Dynamic Auctions

Mallesh Pai and Rakesh Vohra

1460: Constrainted Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models

Che-Lin Su and Kenneth Judd

1459: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria

George-Marios Angeletos, Alessandro Pavan and Christian Hellwig

1458: Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games

Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan

1457: Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals

Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan

1456: Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World

Alessandro Pavan

1455: Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes toward Variation

Marciano Siniscalchi

1454: Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition

Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky

1453: Information Independence and Common Knowledge

Olivier Gossner, Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber

1452: Do side payments help? Collective decisions and strategic delegation

Bard Harstad

1451: The Dynamics of Distributive Politics

Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey

1450: Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising

Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi and Rakesh Vohra

1449: Games in Coalitional Form

Ehud Kalai

1448: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

First:Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz and Rakesh Vohra

1447: Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation

Christopher Armstrong, David Larcker and Che-Lin Su

1446: A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games

Julio González-Díaz and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

1445: Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk

Maria Goltsman, Johannes Hörner, Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani

1444: Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency

Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet

1443: Signalling with Career Concerns

Kim-Sau Chung and Peter Eso

1442: Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules

Bard Hastad

1441: A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt

Marco Battaglini and Stephen Coate

1440: When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Olivier Gossner and Jöhannes Horner

1439: An Approach to Bounded Rationality

Eli Ben-Sasson, Adam Tauman Kalai and Ehud Kalai

1438: Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

Ascension Andina-Diaz and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

1437: Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Alp Atakan

1436: Incentives for Quality through Endogenous Routing

Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu, Jan A. Van Mieghem and R. Canan Savaskan

1435: Fat Products

Alexei Alexandrov

1434: Vote Bying I: General Elections

Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinksy