Discussion Papers
From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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- 1383: Foundations of Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics. Existence, Purification, and Multiplicity

- Ulrich Doraszelski and Mark Satterthwaite
- 1382: Approximate Versus Exact Equilibria

- Felix Kubler and Karl Schmedders
- 1381: Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit

- Jeffery Ely, Johannes Hörner and Wojciech Olszewski
- 1380: Entry Patterns over the Product Life Cycle

- Oscar Gutierrez Arnaiz and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
- 1379: Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly with Entry and Exit

- Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
- 1378: Real Options with Unknown-Date Events

- Oscar Gutierrez Arnaiz and Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
- 1377: Afrait's Theorem and Negative Cycles

- Teo Chung Piaw and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1376: Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1375: Zero-sum Dynamic Games and a Stochastic Variation of Ramsey Theorem

- Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan
- 1374: Excludability and Bounded Computational Capacity Strategies

- Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan
- 1373: No-Regret with Bounded Computational Capacity

- Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan
- 1372: Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms

- Kim-Sau Chung and Jeffrey Ely
- 1371: Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements

- Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1370: Undescribable Contingencies

- Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
- 1369: The One Who Controls the Information Appropriates Its Rents

- Peter Eso and Balazs Szentes
- 1368: Ascending Auctions and Linear Programming

- Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven de Vries, James Schummer and Rakesh Vohra
- 1367: Polyhedral Properties of the K -median Problem on a Tree

- Sven de Vries, Marc Posner and Rakesh Vohra
- 1366: Bayesian Updating for General Maxmin Expected Utility Preferences

- Marciano Siniscalchi
- 1365: A Behavioral Characterization of Plausible Priors

- Marciano Siniscalchi
- 1364: Characterization of Additive Cost Sharing Methods

- Herve Moulin and Rakesh Vohra
- 1363: Continuous-time Games of Timing

- Rida Laraki, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1362: Redistribution in a Divided Society

- David Austen-Smith and Michael Wallerstein
- 1361: Optimal Information Disclosures in Auctions: The Handicap Auction

- Peter Eso and Balazs Szentes
- 1360: The Inferiority of Deliberation Under Unanimity

- David Austen-Smith and Tim Feddersen
- 1359: Deliberation and Voting Rules

- David Austen-Smith and Tim Feddersen
- 1358: When is Reputation Bad?

- Jeffrey Ely, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
- 1357: Bribing and Signalling in Second Price Auctions

- Peter Eso and James Schummer
- 1356: Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations

- Eilon Solan
- 1355: Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games

- Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vielle
- 1354: Stopping Games in Continuous Time

- Rida Laraki and Eilon Solan
- 1353: Designing Optimal Benefit Rules for Flexible Retirement

- Peter Eso and Andras Siminovits
- 1352: Peer Pressure and Job Market Signaling

- David Austen-Smith
- 1351: Ex-Post Stability in Large Games

- Ehud Kalai
- 1350: Large Robust Games

- Ehud Kalai
- 1349: Local Conventions

- Jeffrey Ely
- 1348: Bad Reputation

- Jeffrey Ely and Juuso Välimäki
- 1347: Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time

- Eran Shmaya and Eilon Solan
- 1346: Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1345: Approximating a Sequence of Approximations by a Simple Process

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1344: On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1343: Optimal Rules for Patent Races

- Kenneth Judd and Karl Schmedders
- 1342: Perturbed Markov Chains

- Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1341: Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1340: Price Caps and Uncertain Demands

- Robert L. Earle, Karl Schmedders and Tymon Tatur
- 1339: Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design

- Jeffrey Ely and Kim-Sau Chung
- 1338: Controlling Price Volatility Through Financial Innovation

- Alessandro Citanna and Karl Schmedders
- 1337: On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring

- Eilon Solan, Dinah Rosenberg and Nicolas Vieille
- 1336: Explaining Diversity: Symmetry-Breaking in Complementarity Games

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1335: Good and Bad Investment: An Inquiry into the Causes of Credit Cycles

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1334: Financial Market Globalization and Endogenous Inequality of Nations

- Kiminori Matsuyama