Discussion Papers
From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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- 1283: Randomization and Simplification

- Ehud Kalai and Eilon Solan
- 1282: Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World

- Charles Zheng
- 1281: Reciprocity and the Costs of Authority Relationships

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Chris Forman
- 1280: Growing Through Cycles in an Infinitely -lived Agent Economy

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1279: Participation Rights and Mechanism Design

- Peter S. Faynzilberg
- 1278: Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation

- James Schummer
- 1277: Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts

- Asher Wolinsky
- 1276: Deliberations with Double-Sided Information

- Ulrich Doraszelski
- 1275: Imitation and Experimentation in a Changing Environment

- Francesco Squintani and Juuso Välimäki
- 1274: On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence

- Francesco Squintani
- 1273: Games with Small Forgetfulness

- Francesco Squintani
- 1272: Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games

- Eilon Solan and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1271: Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices

- Donal G. Saari and Katri K. Sieberg
- 1270: Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation

- David Austen-Smith
- 1269: Moral Hazard

- Francesco Squintani
- 1268: Enforceable Contracts under Generalized Information of the Court

- Francesco Squintani
- 1267: An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures

- Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo
- 1266: Strategic Polarization

- Adam Kalai and Ehud Kalai
- 1265: Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring

- Jeffrey Ely
- 1264: A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma

- Jeffrey Ely and Juuso Välimäki
- 1263: Coordination of Economic Activity: An Example

- Stanley Reiter
- 1262: Equilibrium Existence in Incomplete Information Games with Atomic Posteriors

- Nabil Al-Najjar and Eilon Solan
- 1261: Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems

- Roger Myerson
- 1260: Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets

- Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki
- 1259: Dynamic Common Agency

- Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki
- 1258: Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1257: Games with Espionage

- Eilon Solan and Leeat Yariv
- 1256: The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism

- Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams
- 1255: Strategy-proofness and Markets

- Mark A. Satterthwaite
- 1254: Calibration, Expected Utility and Local Optimality

- Dean Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1253: Strategy-proof Location on a Network

- James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1252: On the Possibility of Stock Market Crashes in the Absence of Portfolio Insurance

- Gadi Barlevy and Pietro Veronesi
- 1251: Credit Market Frictions and the Reallocation Process

- Gadi Barlevy
- 1250: Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky
- 1249: Subjective Representation of Complexity

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Emre Ozdenoren
- 1248: Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma

- Thomas Wiseman and Okan Yilankaya
- 1247: Stable Matchings and the Small Core in Nash Equilibrium in the College Admissions Problem

- Jinpeng Ma
- 1246: Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model

- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks
- 1245: Cheap Talk and Burned Money

- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks
- 1244: Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

- Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu
- 1243: Auctions with Downstream Interaction

- Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu
- 1242: Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters

- Roger Myerson
- 1241: A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under Non-homothetic Preferences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distribution, and North-South Trade

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1240: Playing Multiple Complementarity Games Simultaneously

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1239: Geography of the World Economy

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1238: Endogenous Inequality

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1237: Economic Development with Endogenous Retirement

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1236: Information and Congressional Hearings

- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen
- 1235: Risk Sharing and the Dynamics of Inequality

- Ezra Friedman
- 1234: Public Debate Among Experts

- Ezra Friedman