Discussion Papers

From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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1533: Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

Eduardo Andrade and Luciano De Castro

1532: Uncertainty, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luciano De Castro

1531: Observability and “Second-Order Acts"

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luciano De Castro

1530: Affiliation, Equilibrium Existence and Revenue Ranking of Auctions

Luciano De Castro

1529: Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luciano De Castro

1528: A new perspective to rational expectations: maximin rational expectations equilibrium

Marialaura Pesce, Peter Cramton and Nicholas C. Yannelis

1527: Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand

Peter Cramton and Luciano I. de Castro

1526: Ambiguity Aversion and Trade

Alain Chateauneuf and Luciano I. de Castro

1525: Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking

Martin Szydlowski

1524: Preference for Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion

Kaito Sato

1523: Increasing Interdependence of Multivariate Distributions

Margaret Meyer and Bruno Strulovici

1522: Federal Directives, Local Discretion and the Majority Rule

Antoine Loeper

1521: Contractual Federalism and Strategy-proof Coordination

Antoine Loeper

1520: Commitment, Flexibility and Optimal Screening of Time Inconsistency

Simone Galberti

1519: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information

Bruno Strulovici

1518: Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

Fabrizio Germano and Martin Meier

1517: How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies

Ludwig Ensthaler and Thomas Giebe

1516: The Dynamics of Innovation (superseded by DP #1546)

Umberto Garfagnini and Bruno Strulovici

1515: Direct Democracy, Political Delegation, and Responsibility Substitution

Carlo Prato and Bruno Strulovici

1514: Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo

Wioletta Dziuda and Antoine Loeper

1513: Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion in Decentralized Markets

Briana Chang

1512: Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited

Adam Kalai and Ehud Kalai

1511: Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations

Mehmet Ekmekci, Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson

1510: A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players

Mehmet Ekmekci and Alp Atakan

1509: Manipulation through political endorsements

Mehmet Ekmekci

1508: Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

1507: Reputation in Long-Run Relationships

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

1506: Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

1505: Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems

Mehmet Ekmekci

1504: Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Games

Bard Harstad

1503: Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design

Alessandro Pavan, Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka

1502: Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach

George-Marios Angeletos, Guido Lorenzoni and Alessandro Pavan

1501: Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure

Alessandro Pavan, Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka

1500: Robust Predictions in Global Games with Multiple Equilibria: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks

George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan

1499: Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals

Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan

1498: On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency

Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan

1497: Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

1496: Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

1495: Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions

Marco LiCalz and Alessandro Pavan

1494: Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

1493: Long Term Contracting in a Changing World

Alessandro Pavan

1492: Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach

Alessandro Pavan, Ilya Segal and Juuso Toikka

1491: Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach

Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan

1490: Managerial Turnover in a Changing World

Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan

1489: Preference for Randomization: Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion

Kaito Sato

1488: When are Signals Complements or Substitutes

Tilman Börgers, Angel Hernanco-Veciana and Daniel Krohmer

1487: Common Knowledge of Rationality and Market Clearing in Economies with Asymmetric Information

Elchanan Ben-Porath and Aviad Heifetz

1486: Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design

Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Balasubramanian Sivan

1485: Influential Opinion Leaders

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

1484: Communication, Timing, and Common Learning

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart