Discussion Papers
From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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- 1433: Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying

- Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinksy
- 1432: Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning

- Alessandro Lizzeri and Marciano Siniscalchi
- 1431: Structural Robustness of Large Games

- Ehud Kalai
- 1430: Dynamic Choice Under Ambiguity

- Marciano Siniscalchi
- 1429: Trading for the Future: Signaling in Permit Markets

- Bard Harstad and Gunnar Eskeland
- 1428: Flexible Integration

- Bard Harstad
- 1427: Bond Portfolios and Two-Fund Separation in the Lucas Asset-Pricing Model

- Kenneth Judd, Felix Kubler and Karl Schmedders
- 1426: Some Personal Views of Game Theory

- Ehud Kalai
- 1425: Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests

- Wojciech Olszewski and Alvaro Sandroni
- 1424: Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times

- Ariel Rubinstein
- 1423: Temptation–Driven Preferences

- Eddie Dekel, Barton Lipman and Aldo Rustichini
- 1422: Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions

- Johannes Hörner and Julian Jamison
- 1421: Optimal Search Auctions

- Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel and Charles Zheng
- 1420: Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders

- Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel and Charles Zheng
- 1419: Optimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders

- Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1418: Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction

- Eddie Dekel and Yossi Feinberg
- 1417: Topologies on Type

- Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg
- 1416: The Price of Advice

- Peter Eso and Balázs Szentes
- 1415: The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

- Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon and Yossi Spiegel
- 1414: What to Maximize if You Must

- Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon and Yossi Spiegel
- 1413: Efficient Use of Information and Welfare Analysis in Economies with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information
- George-Marios Angeletos
- 1412: On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information

- Johannes Hörner, Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1411: Analysis of Do-Not-Spam Registry

- Eran Reshef and Eilon Solan
- 1410: A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form

- Matthias Dahm and Nicolás Porteiro
- 1409: Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure

- Matthias Dahm and Nicolás Porteiro
- 1408: Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform

- Matthias Dahm and Nicolás Porteiro
- 1407: Emergent Class Structure

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1406: Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria

- Peter Eso and James Schummer
- 1405: Monopoly with Resale

- Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
- 1404: On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting

- Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
- 1403: Partially-Specified Large Games

- Ehud Kalai
- 1402: The Effect of Filters on Spam Mail

- Eilon Solan and Eran Reshef
- 1401: Wealth as a Signal in the Search Model of Money

- Tsunao Okumura
- 1400: Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps

- George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan
- 1399: An Economic Analysis of 'Acting White'

- David Austen-Smith and Ronald G. Fryer
- 1398: Two-Fund Separation in Dynamic General Equilibrium

- Karl Schmedders
- 1397: Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach

- Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1396: Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems

- Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
- 1395: Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis
- George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan
- 1394: On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting

- Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
- 1393: Monopoly with Resale

- Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
- 1392: Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

- Hongwei Gui, Rudolf M¨uller and Rakesh V. Vohra
- 1391: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: An Inquiry into the Causes and Nature of Credit Cycles

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1390: Beyond Icebergs: Modeling Globalization as Biased Technical Change

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1389: Credit Market Imperfections and Patterns of International Trade and Capital Flows

- Kiminori Matsuyama
- 1388: HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY

- Jeffrey Ely and Marcin Peski
- 1387: A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers

- Daniel Diermeier, Michael Keane and Antonio Merlo
- 1386: Vote Buying

- Eddie Dekel, Matthew Jackson and Asher Wolinsky
- 1385: A True Expert Knows which Question Should be Asked

- Eddie Dekel and Yossi Feinberg
- 1384: Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition

- Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov