Discussion Papers

From Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014.
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483: A Markov Model of Employment

Kenneth Burdett

482s: The Economics of Mating

Dale Mortensen

481: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal

Roger Myerson

480s: Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes

Steven Matthews

479: Contracts, Consensus, and Group Decisions

Ehud Kalai

478s: Regulation of Groups of Firms

Andrew Daughety

477s: The Pricing of Primary Care Physicians' Services: A Test of the Role of Consumer Information

Mark V. Pauly and Mark A. Satterthwaite

476: The Determination of Marginal-Cost Prices Under a Set of Axioms

Dov Samet and Yair Tauman

475: On the Complexity of Point Covering and Line Covering

N. Meggido and A. Tamir

474: Peasants, Potatoes, and Poverty: Transactions Costs in Prefamine Ireland

Elizabeth Hoffman and Joel Mokyr

473: When does the J-Curve Have a J-Shape? A Reconsideration

Pekka Ahtiala

472s: The Distribution of Family Income and Earnings Capacity Over the Life Cycle

Evelyn Lehrer and Marc Nerlove

471: Moral Hazard in Teams

Bengt Holmstrom

470: The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests

Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer

469s: Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading

Roger Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite

468: An Axiomatic Approach to the Allocation of a Fixed Cost Through Prices

Leonard Mirman

467: Values of Market with a Majority Rule

Yair Tauman

466s: Conjectural Variations

Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz

465: Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information

Richard Engelbrecht-Waggins

464: A Difficulty vith the 'Command' Allocation Mechanism

Richard E. Ericson

463: Topologies on Information and Strategies in Games with Incomplete Information

Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber

462: The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction

Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber

461r: A Theory of Price Formation and Exchange in Oral Auctions

David Easley and John Ledyard

461: A Theory of Price Formation and Exchange in Oral Auctions

David Easley and John Ledyard

460: Equilibrium Contracts in a Monetary Economy

Varadarajan Chari

459: Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts

Varadarajan Chari

458: Linear Stochastic Models with Decentralized Information

Varadarajan Chari

457: Tobin's Marginal q and Average a: A Neoclassical Interpretation

Fumio Hayashi

456: Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model

Bengt Holmstrom

455: On Search Over Rationals

Eitan Zemel

454: Martingales and Stochastic Integrals in the Theory of Continous Trading

J. Michael Harrison and Stanley R. Pliska

453: Time to Build and the Persistence of Unemployment

Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott

452: An Empirical Investigation of the Returns to Job Search

Bob Chirinko

451: Post-War U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation

Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott

450: Efficient Estimation of Time Series Models with Predetermined

Fumio Hayashi and Christopher Sims

449: Polynomial Algorithms for Estimating Network Reliability

Eitan Zemel

448: An Investigation of Competitive Preference Structures and Posterior Performance Through a Bayesian Decision-Theoretic Approach

Jehoshua Eliashberg

447r: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber

446: A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advisement and Distribution Services for New Issues

David P. Baron

445: A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud

Barry O'Neill

444: Estimation of Macroeconometric Models Under Rational Expectations: A Survey

Fumio Hayashi

443: A Sufficient Condition on f for f.u to be in pNAD

Leonard Mirman

442: Contractural Models of the Labor Market

Bengt Holmstrom

441: Conjectural Variations

Morton Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz

440: Attainable Sets of Markets: An Overview

Robert Weber

439: Intertemporal Optimization and Demand Analysis

Fumio Hayashi

438: On The Theory of Delegation

Bengt Holmstrom

437: On the Formation of Price Expectations: An Analysis of Business Test Data by Log-Linear Probability Models

Heinz Konig, Marc Nerlove and Grilles Oudiz

436: Growth as a Public Good

Truman F. Bewley

435: A Generalized Hazard Rate

Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz