Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

From:
Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 1, issue 1, 1994

Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions pp. 1-14

Leonid Hurwicz

On the relationship between economic development and political democracy pp. 15-39

John Roemer

2-person Bayesian implementation pp. 41-54

Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching pp. 55-77

Ebbe Hendon, Birgitte Sloth and Torben Tranaes

On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade pp. 79-102

Sanjeev Goyal

Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms pp. 103-117

Lu Hong and Scott Page

Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism pp. 119-140

Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods pp. 141-158

Jose Aizpurua and Antonio Manresa

Robust implementation under alternative information structures pp. 159-171

Luis Corchon and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin

Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments pp. 173-203

Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen and Rajiv Vohra

Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems pp. 205-216

John Conley and Simon Wilkie

A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution, with some implications for fiscal federalism pp. 217-224

Mark Shroder

A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal pp. 227-250

Shasikanta Nandeibam

On the screening power of incentive schemes pp. 251-274

Fredrik Andersson

Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets pp. 275-287

Jose Alcalde

Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences pp. 289-299

Dominique Lepelley

A mechanism implementing the proportional solution pp. 301-317

Sang-Chul Suh

Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly pp. 319-326

Mark Gradstein

Implementation and information in teams pp. 327-341

Tomas Sjostrom

Implementation by demand mechanisms pp. 343-354

Tomas Sjostrom

Strategic participation and the median voter result pp. 355-363

David Sunding

Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems pp. 365-380

Tayfun Sönmez