Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 18, issue 4, 2014

What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis pp. 243-264

Nicolas Jacquemet and Adam Zylbersztejn

Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making pp. 265-287

Sususmu Cato

Security bid auctions for agency contracts pp. 289-319

Byoung Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Volume 18, issue 3, 2014

A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies pp. 163-189

Özgür Kıbrıs and Ipek Gursel Tapki

Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability pp. 191-218

Gilles Grandjean

Knapsack cost sharing pp. 219-241

Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler

Volume 18, issue 2, 2014

Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study pp. 83-103

Mehmet Gurdal, Ayca Ozdogan and Ismail Saglam

Partnership markets with adverse selection pp. 105-126

Gregory Dow

Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions pp. 127-150

Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe and Jianpei Li

When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review pp. 151-161

Jens Gudmundsson

Volume 18, issue 1, 2014

An introduction to Allan Gibbard’s oligarchy theorem paper pp. 1-2

John Weymark

Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma pp. 3-10

Allan Gibbard

Ordering sellers in sequential auctions pp. 11-35

Qiang Gong, Xu Tan and Yiqing Xing

Workup pp. 37-71

Romans Pancs

An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions pp. 73-82

Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Volume 17, issue 4, 2013

Stable and efficient coalitional networks pp. 249-271

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, José Sempere-Monerris and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Multiple and last-minute bidding in competing internet auctions pp. 273-305

Marta Stryszowska

Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders pp. 307-321

Youngwoo Koh

Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains pp. 323-333

Ricardo Martinez and Bernardo Moreno

Volume 17, issue 3, 2013

Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power pp. 165-181

Donald Campbell and Jerry Kelly

Information concentration in common value environments pp. 183-203

Vlad Mares and Mikhael Shor

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences pp. 205-238

Shasikanta Nandeibam

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives pp. 239-248

Bonifacio Llamazares

Volume 17, issue 2, 2013

Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns pp. 83-94

Randolph McAfee, Kishore Papineni and Sergei Vassilvitskii

The Gates Hillman prediction market pp. 95-128

Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm

The “probability of a fit choice” pp. 129-150

Norman Schofield

Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems pp. 151-164

Koichi Tadenuma

Volume 17, issue 1, 2013

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study pp. 1-16

Christer Andersson, Ola Andersson and Tommy Andersson

An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear pp. 17-26

Toyotaka Sakai

Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation pp. 27-41

Dimitrios Voliotis

Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism pp. 43-62

Gaël Giraud and Hubert Stahn

The organization of expertise in the presence of communication pp. 63-81

Flavia Roldán

Volume 16, issue 4, 2012

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments pp. 269-282

Özgür Kıbrıs

Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness pp. 283-296

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser and Uday Rajan

Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction pp. 297-309

Michele Lombardi

Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types pp. 311-321

Xavier Ruiz del Portal

The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 323-330

François Maréchal and Pierre-Henri Morand

Volume 16, issue 2, 2012

Introduction to a festschrift for Andrew Schotter pp. 89-91

Boğaçhan Çelen and Erkut Ozbay

Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments pp. 93-118

Jeffrey Carpenter, Shachar Kariv and Andrew Schotter

Fear of losing in a clock auction pp. 119-134

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

Social learning in networks: a Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis of experimental data pp. 135-157

Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions pp. 159-173

Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Sarah Taylor and Neslihan Uler

A Bayesian approach to experimental analysis: trading in a laboratory financial market pp. 175-191

Marco Cipriani, Riccardo Costantini and Antonio Guarino

Heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes: a field experiment among small-scale stock investors in China pp. 193-213

Elizabeth Potamites and Bei Zhang

A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks pp. 215-250

Syngjoo Choi

An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing pp. 251-268

Boğaçhan Çelen and Kyle Hyndman

Volume 16, issue 1, 2012

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle pp. 1-13

Jérémy Picot

Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms pp. 15-40

Matthew Van Essen

The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers pp. 41-69

Martin Gregor and Lenka Stastna

Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation pp. 71-87

Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann