Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

From:
Springer
Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 20, issue 4, 2016

Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats pp. 255-288

Nadide Banu Olcay

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets pp. 289-327

Oriol Tejada and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

New axioms for immediate acceptance pp. 329-337

Yajing Chen

Volume 20, issue 3, 2016

Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids pp. 173-186

David Ettinger and Fabio Michelucci

Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy? pp. 187-205

Philipp E. Otto and Friedel Bolle

Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence pp. 207-236

Jesper Breinbjerg, Alexander Sebald and Lars Peter Østerdal

The airport problem with capacity constraints pp. 237-253

Youngsub Chun and Boram Park

Volume 20, issue 2, 2016

An optimistic search equilibrium pp. 89-114

Dipjyoti Majumdar, Artyom Shneyerov and Huan Xie

Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate pp. 115-143

Stefan Ambec and Michel Poitevin

Volume 20, issue 1, 2016

Groves mechanisms and communication externalities pp. 1-37

Efthymios Athanasiou, Santanu Dey and Giacomo Valletta

Fair compensation with different social concerns for forgiveness pp. 39-56

Aitor Calo-Blanco

Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 57-67

Kerim Keskin

Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 57-67

Kerim Keskin

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments pp. 69-88

Werner Güth, René Levínský, Kerstin Pull and Ori Weisel

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments pp. 69-88

Werner Güth, René Levínský, Kerstin Pull and Ori Weisel

Volume 19, issue 4, 2015

Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in G-hyperplane games pp. 259-278

M. Hinojosa, E. Romero-Palacios and J. Zarzuelo

The informational basis of scoring rules pp. 279-297

Matias Nuñez and Giacomo Valletta

Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains pp. 299-326

Raffaele Fiocco and Dongyu Guo

The optimal design of rewards in contests pp. 327-339

Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein

Volume 19, issue 3, 2015

Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information pp. 173-209

Emanuele Gerratana and Levent Kockesen

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations pp. 211-228

Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari and Christopher Dance

Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency pp. 229-245

Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin and Bertrand Tchantcho

Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills pp. 247-257

Kaname Miyagishima

Volume 19, issue 2, 2015

Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems pp. 91-116

Johannes Spinnewijn and Frans Spinnewyn

Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality pp. 117-143

Takeshi Nishimura

Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria pp. 145-165

M. Angeles Caraballo, A. Mármol, L. Monroy and E. Buitrago

A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution pp. 167-171

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Volume 19, issue 1, 2015

Letter from the editors pp. 1-2

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tilman Börgers and Fuhito Kojima

Group stability in matching with interdependent values pp. 3-24

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky

Probabilistic procurement auctions pp. 25-46

Thomas Giebe and Paul Schweinzer

Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion pp. 47-66

Azar Abizada and Siwei Chen

Accuracy in contests: players’ perspective pp. 67-90

Mustafa Yildirim

Volume 18, issue 4, 2014

What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis pp. 243-264

Nicolas Jacquemet and Adam Zylbersztejn

Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making pp. 265-287

Sususmu Cato

Security bid auctions for agency contracts pp. 289-319

Byoung Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Volume 18, issue 3, 2014

A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies pp. 163-189

Özgür Kıbrıs and Ipek Gursel Tapki

Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability pp. 191-218

Gilles Grandjean

Knapsack cost sharing pp. 219-241

Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler

Volume 18, issue 2, 2014

Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study pp. 83-103

Mehmet Gurdal, Ayca Ozdogan and Ismail Saglam

Partnership markets with adverse selection pp. 105-126

Gregory Dow

Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions pp. 127-150

Ludwig Ensthaler, Thomas Giebe and Jianpei Li

When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review pp. 151-161

Jens Gudmundsson

Volume 18, issue 1, 2014

An introduction to Allan Gibbard’s oligarchy theorem paper pp. 1-2

John Weymark

Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma pp. 3-10

Allan Gibbard

Ordering sellers in sequential auctions pp. 11-35

Qiang Gong, Xu Tan and Yiqing Xing

Workup pp. 37-71

Romans Pancs

An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions pp. 73-82

Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Volume 17, issue 4, 2013

Stable and efficient coalitional networks pp. 249-271

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, José Sempere-Monerris and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Multiple and last-minute bidding in competing internet auctions pp. 273-305

Marta Stryszowska

Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders pp. 307-321

Youngwoo Koh

Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains pp. 323-333

Ricardo Martinez and Bernardo Moreno

Volume 17, issue 3, 2013

Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power pp. 165-181

Donald Campbell and Jerry Kelly

Information concentration in common value environments pp. 183-203

Vlad Mares and Mikhael Shor

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences pp. 205-238

Shasikanta Nandeibam

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives pp. 239-248

Bonifacio Llamazares

Volume 17, issue 2, 2013

Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns pp. 83-94

Randolph McAfee, Kishore Papineni and Sergei Vassilvitskii

The Gates Hillman prediction market pp. 95-128

Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm

The “probability of a fit choice” pp. 129-150

Norman Schofield

Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems pp. 151-164

Koichi Tadenuma

Volume 17, issue 1, 2013

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study pp. 1-16

Christer Andersson, Ola Andersson and Tommy Andersson

An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear pp. 17-26

Toyotaka Sakai

Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation pp. 27-41

Dimitrios Voliotis

Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism pp. 43-62

Gaël Giraud and Hubert Stahn

The organization of expertise in the presence of communication pp. 63-81

Flavia Roldán