Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 16, issue 4, 2012

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments pp. 269-282

Özgür Kıbrıs

Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness pp. 283-296

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser and Uday Rajan

Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction pp. 297-309

Michele Lombardi

Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types pp. 311-321

Xavier Ruiz del Portal

The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 323-330

François Maréchal and Pierre-Henri Morand

Volume 16, issue 2, 2012

Introduction to a festschrift for Andrew Schotter pp. 89-91

Boğaçhan Çelen and Erkut Ozbay

Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments pp. 93-118

Jeffrey Carpenter, Shachar Kariv and Andrew Schotter

Fear of losing in a clock auction pp. 119-134

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

Social learning in networks: a Quantal Response Equilibrium analysis of experimental data pp. 135-157

Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions pp. 159-173

Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Sarah Taylor and Neslihan Uler

A Bayesian approach to experimental analysis: trading in a laboratory financial market pp. 175-191

Marco Cipriani, Riccardo Costantini and Antonio Guarino

Heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes: a field experiment among small-scale stock investors in China pp. 193-213

Elizabeth Potamites and Bei Zhang

A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks pp. 215-250

Syngjoo Choi

An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing pp. 251-268

Boğaçhan Çelen and Kyle Hyndman

Volume 16, issue 1, 2012

Random aggregation without the Pareto principle pp. 1-13

Jérémy Picot

Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms pp. 15-40

Matthew Van Essen

The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers pp. 41-69

Martin Gregor and Lenka Stastna

Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation pp. 71-87

Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann

Volume 15, issue 4, 2011

Consistency and its converse: an introduction pp. 257-291

William Thomson

Agreement toward stability in matching markets pp. 293-316

David Cantala

A dynamic analysis of collusive networks pp. 317-336

Yasunori Okumura

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts pp. 337-342

Toyotaka Sakai

Volume 15, issue 3, 2011

Bidder collusion at first-price auctions pp. 177-211

Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie Marx and Peng Sun

Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information pp. 213-243

Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

Selling goods of unknown quality: forward versus spot auctions pp. 245-256

Isa Hafalir and Hadi Yektas

Volume 15, issue 2, 2011

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade pp. 91-120

Nadia Burani and Clara Ponsati

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation pp. 121-145

Hemant Patil

The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations pp. 147-162

Serife Akin, Brennan Platt and Murat Sertel

Lender learning and entry under general demand uncertainty pp. 163-175

Neelam Jain and Leonard Mirman

Volume 15, issue 1, 2011

On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure pp. 1-36

Vasiliki Skreta

Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs pp. 37-58

Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen

Firms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delays pp. 59-89

Benjamin Golub and Randolph McAfee

Volume 14, issue 3, 2010

A mechanism for thawing the credit markets pp. 243-249

Edi Karni

On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information pp. 251-269

Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas

Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness pp. 271-289

Takashi Kunimoto

Forgive or buy back: an experimental study of debt relief pp. 291-309

Vivian Lei, Steven Tucker and Filip Vesely

Multibidding game under uncertainty pp. 311-329

Róbert Veszteg

Circular domains pp. 331-342

Shin Sato

Volume 14, issue 1, 2010

Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked pp. 1-15

William Thomson

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules pp. 17-25

Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel

Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations pp. 27-50

Paul Healy

Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods pp. 51-73

Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato

Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion pp. 75-93

Àlex Arenas, Antonio Cabrales, Leon Danon, Albert Díaz-Guilera, Roger Guimerà and Fernando Vega-Redondo

On aggregation and welfare analysis pp. 95-129

James Moore

Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment pp. 131-162

Myrna Wooders

Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale pp. 163-184

Guoqiang Tian

Random iterates of monotone maps pp. 185-192

Rabi Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar

The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria pp. 193-201

George Lady and James Quirk

The current non-status of general equilibrium theory pp. 203-219

Donald Katzner

Regional business development policy in Central and Eastern Europe: a mechanism design perspective pp. 221-242

Roswitha King