Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 15, issue 4, 2011

Consistency and its converse: an introduction pp. 257-291

William Thomson

Agreement toward stability in matching markets pp. 293-316

David Cantala

A dynamic analysis of collusive networks pp. 317-336

Yasunori Okumura

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts pp. 337-342

Toyotaka Sakai

Volume 15, issue 3, 2011

Bidder collusion at first-price auctions pp. 177-211

Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie Marx and Peng Sun

Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information pp. 213-243

Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

Selling goods of unknown quality: forward versus spot auctions pp. 245-256

Isa Hafalir and Hadi Yektas

Volume 15, issue 2, 2011

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade pp. 91-120

Nadia Burani and Clara Ponsati

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation pp. 121-145

Hemant Patil

The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations pp. 147-162

Serife Akin, Brennan Platt and Murat Sertel

Lender learning and entry under general demand uncertainty pp. 163-175

Neelam Jain and Leonard Mirman

Volume 15, issue 1, 2011

On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure pp. 1-36

Vasiliki Skreta

Franchise bidding, regulation and investment costs pp. 37-58

Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen

Firms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delays pp. 59-89

Benjamin Golub and Randolph McAfee

Volume 14, issue 3, 2010

A mechanism for thawing the credit markets pp. 243-249

Edi Karni

On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information pp. 251-269

Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas

Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness pp. 271-289

Takashi Kunimoto

Forgive or buy back: an experimental study of debt relief pp. 291-309

Vivian Lei, Steven Tucker and Filip Vesely

Multibidding game under uncertainty pp. 311-329

Róbert Veszteg

Circular domains pp. 331-342

Shin Sato

Volume 14, issue 1, 2010

Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked pp. 1-15

William Thomson

On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules pp. 17-25

Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel

Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations pp. 27-50

Paul Healy

Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods pp. 51-73

Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato

Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion pp. 75-93

Àlex Arenas, Antonio Cabrales, Leon Danon, Albert Díaz-Guilera, Roger Guimerà and Fernando Vega-Redondo

On aggregation and welfare analysis pp. 95-129

James Moore

Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment pp. 131-162

Myrna Wooders

Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale pp. 163-184

Guoqiang Tian

Random iterates of monotone maps pp. 185-192

Rabi Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar

The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria pp. 193-201

George Lady and James Quirk

The current non-status of general equilibrium theory pp. 203-219

Donald Katzner

Regional business development policy in Central and Eastern Europe: a mechanism design perspective pp. 221-242

Roswitha King

Volume 13, issue 4, 2009

Can the majority lose the election? pp. 305-317

Bryan McCannon

Efficient trading with restriction pp. 319-334

Hu Lu and Yuntong Wang

Optimal auctions and information disclosure pp. 335-344

Alex Gershkov

How does interest rate policy affect inflation? A simple general equilibrium model with the interest rate as the policy instrument pp. 345-360

Richard Watt

A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules pp. 361-376

J. Arin, Elena Inarra and P. Luquin

The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont (Publisher’s Erratum) pp. 377-377

Daniel McFadden

Volume 13, issue 3, 2009

Institutional design and conflict: an introduction pp. 167-170

Massimo Morelli

Power and efficiency in production pillage games pp. 171-193

James Jordan

Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example pp. 195-203

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups pp. 205-232

Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier

Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types pp. 233-250

Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay

Sanctions as revelation regimes pp. 251-278

Daniel Verdier

Arbitration systems and negotiations pp. 279-303

María Mercedes Adamuz and Clara Ponsati

Volume 13, issue 1, 2009

Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz pp. 1-1

John Ledyard

Two topics in Leo Hurwicz’s research pp. 3-6

Stanley Reiter

Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games pp. 7-43

Dennis Courtney and Thomas Marschak

Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary pp. 45-57

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner

Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz pp. 59-75

Roger Myerson

The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont pp. 77-100

Daniel McFadden

Discrete implementation of the Groves–Ledyard mechanism pp. 101-114

J. Swarthout and Mark Walker

Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games pp. 115-135

James Jordan

Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions pp. 137-145

Matthew Jackson

The endowment game when n=2 pp. 147-165

Lu Hong