Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 6, issue 3, 2001

Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation pp. 325-342

Steven R. Williams

Majority rule with dollar voting pp. 343-352

James Jordan

Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution pp. 353-370

Charles A. Wilson

Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment pp. 371-396

Andrés Velasco, Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini

Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? pp. 397-412

Akihiko Matsui and Roger Lagunoff

Trust and social efficiencies pp. 413-428

Robert Rosenthal

Survival and the art of profit maximization pp. 429-446

Prajit K. Dutta and Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity pp. 447-460

Sang-Chul Suh

First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge pp. 461-480

Jacob Rubinstein, Elmar Wolfstetter, Michael Landsberger and Shmuel Zamir

Volume 6, issue 2, 2001

original papers: On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy pp. 133-153

Rabi N. Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar

original papers: Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable pp. 155-173

Rose-Anne Dana

original papers: A model of Russia's "virtual economy" pp. 185-214

Richard E. Ericson and Barry W. Ickes

original papers: Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments pp. 215-223

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

original papers: Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives pp. 225-239

Peter B. Linhart

original papers: Investment and concern for relative position pp. 241-261

George Mailath, Harold Cole and Andrew Postlewaite

original papers: Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching pp. 289-304

Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter

Volume 6, issue 1, 2001

original papers: Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design pp. 5-40

Semih Koray and Rudolf Kerschbamer

original papers: Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection pp. 41-61

Pablo Amoros and Bernardo Moreno

original papers: Implementation with partial verification pp. 63-84

Nirvikar Singh and Donald Wittman

original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited pp. 85-98

Bettina Klaus

original papers: On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings pp. 99-111

Ahmet Alkan

original papers: Returns to scale in one-shot information processing when hours count pp. 113-124

Catherine de Fontenay and Kieron Meagher

Volume 5, issue 4, 2000

original papers: Altruism, redistribution and social insurance pp. 365-385

Udo Ebert and Oskar von dem Hagen

original papers: Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory? pp. 387-410

Ken Binmore and Joe Swierzbinski

original papers: Abstention and political competition pp. 411-432

Humberto Llavador

Volume 5, issue 3, 2000

original papers: A strategic analysis of network reliability pp. 205-228

Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal

original papers: Network formation with sequential demands pp. 229-249

Sergio Currarini and Massimo Morelli

original papers: The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks pp. 251-272

Matthew Jackson and Bhaskar Dutta

original papers: Spatial social networks pp. 273-299

Robert P. Gilles and Cathleen Johnson

original papers: Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks pp. 301-331

Deborah F. Minehart and Rachel Kranton

original papers: Network formation models with costs for establishing links pp. 333-362

(*), Anne van den Nouweland and Marco Slikker

Volume 5, issue 2, 2000

original papers: Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms pp. 111-127

Bhaskar Dutta and Salvador Barberà

original papers: Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods pp. 129-147

Francis Bloch and Sayantan Ghosal

original papers: Coalition formation in general NTU games pp. 149-175

Anke Gerber

original papers: Project evaluation and organizational form pp. 177-199

Thomas Gehrig, Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett

Volume 5, issue 1, 2000

original papers: Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment pp. 1-21

Georges Dionne and Claude Fluet

original papers: On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results pp. 23-58

Peter S. Faynzilberg and Praveen Kumar

original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers pp. 59-70

Domenico Menicucci

original papers: Auctions with endogenous participation pp. 71-89

Paulo Monteiro and Flavio Menezes

original papers: Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas pp. 91-105

Szilvia Pápai

Volume 4, issue 4, 1999

Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology pp. 295-305

Andrzej Baniak and Jacek Cukrowski

A profit-center game with incomplete information pp. 307-343

Roy Radner and Tatsuro Ichiishi

Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives pp. 345-356

M.J. Albizuri, Juan Carlos Santos and José Zarzuelo

Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods pp. 357-379

Josef Falkinger and Johann Brunner

Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness pp. 381-387

Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg

Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible pp. 389-393

John Weymark

Volume 4, issue 3, 1999

Optimal regulation of technical progress in natural monopolies with asymmetric information pp. 191-204

Thomas Kuhn and Uwe Cantner

A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms pp. 205-218

Liqun Liu and Guoqiang Tian

A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets pp. 219-230

Ezra Einy and David Wettstein

Multiproject team assignments pp. 231-254

Katerina Sherstyuk

Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem pp. 255-272

Maria-Angeles de Frutos

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment pp. 273-292

Michael Peters

Volume 4, issue 2, 1999

Hierarchies and information-processing organizations pp. 101-126

Hao Li

Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies pp. 127-151

Naoki Yoshihara

A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set pp. 153-160

Michel Le Breton and Peter J. Coughlan

Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer pp. 161-177

Hiroshi Osano

A note on van Damme's mechanism pp. 179-187

Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg

Volume 4, issue 1, 1999

Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination pp. 1-12

José Uriarte

Monotonic extensions on economic domains pp. 13-33

William Thomson

Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis pp. 35-55

Dirk Van de gaer, Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert

Feasible implementation of taxation methods pp. 57-72

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij and Roberto Serrano

The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction pp. 73-97

David P. Porter