Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

From:
Springer
Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 7, issue 2, 2002

original papers: Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem pp. 117-134

Jinpeng Ma

original papers: Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality pp. 135-153

Florence Naegelen

original papers: Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities pp. 155-171

Gopal Das Varma

original papers: Safety regulation and monitor liability pp. 173-185

Ulrich Hege and Eberhard Feess

original papers: Constitutional implementation pp. 187-204

Eyal Winter and Bezalel Peleg

original papers: Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs pp. 205-211

Yuntong Wang

original papers: Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation pp. 213-228

Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley and Jérôme Serais

Volume 7, issue 1, 2002

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology pp. 1-15

Francois Maniquet

The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation pp. 17-26

Sandeep Baliga

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory pp. 27-43

Walter Trockel

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation pp. 45-56

Hans Gersbach

Can we identify Walrasian allocations? pp. 57-73

Antonio Manresa

Achieving the first best in sequencing problems pp. 75-91

Manipushpak Mitra

Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games Marta Faias (1), Emma Moreno-García (1)(2), Mário Rui Páscoa (2) (1) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevao Pinto, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: mcm@mail.fct.unl.pt; pascoa@fe.unl.pt) (2) Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, Edificio F.E.S., Campus Miguel de Unamuno, 37008 Salamanca, Spain (e-mail: emmam@usal.es) Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001 JEL classification: D41, D51 Key words: Perfect competition, monopolistic power, Walrasian equilibrium, thick markets pp. 93-104

Mario Pascoa, Emma Moreno-García and Marta Faias

Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued pp. 105-115

Lars Ehlers

Volume 6, issue 3, 2001

Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation pp. 325-342

Steven R. Williams

Majority rule with dollar voting pp. 343-352

James Jordan

Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution pp. 353-370

Charles A. Wilson

Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment pp. 371-396

Andrés Velasco, Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini

Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric? pp. 397-412

Akihiko Matsui and Roger Lagunoff

Trust and social efficiencies pp. 413-428

Robert Rosenthal

Survival and the art of profit maximization pp. 429-446

Prajit K. Dutta and Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity pp. 447-460

Sang-Chul Suh

First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge pp. 461-480

Jacob Rubinstein, Elmar Wolfstetter, Michael Landsberger and Shmuel Zamir

Volume 6, issue 2, 2001

original papers: On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy pp. 133-153

Rabi N. Bhattacharya and Mukul Majumdar

original papers: Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable pp. 155-173

Rose-Anne Dana

original papers: A model of Russia's "virtual economy" pp. 185-214

Richard E. Ericson and Barry W. Ickes

original papers: Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments pp. 215-223

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

original papers: Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives pp. 225-239

Peter B. Linhart

original papers: Investment and concern for relative position pp. 241-261

George Mailath, Harold Cole and Andrew Postlewaite

original papers: Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching pp. 289-304

Leonid Hurwicz and Stanley Reiter

Volume 6, issue 1, 2001

original papers: Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design pp. 5-40

Semih Koray and Rudolf Kerschbamer

original papers: Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection pp. 41-61

Pablo Amoros and Bernardo Moreno

original papers: Implementation with partial verification pp. 63-84

Nirvikar Singh and Donald Wittman

original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited pp. 85-98

Bettina Klaus

original papers: On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings pp. 99-111

Ahmet Alkan

original papers: Returns to scale in one-shot information processing when hours count pp. 113-124

Catherine de Fontenay and Kieron Meagher

Volume 5, issue 4, 2000

original papers: Altruism, redistribution and social insurance pp. 365-385

Udo Ebert and Oskar von dem Hagen

original papers: Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory? pp. 387-410

Ken Binmore and Joe Swierzbinski

original papers: Abstention and political competition pp. 411-432

Humberto Llavador

Volume 5, issue 3, 2000

original papers: A strategic analysis of network reliability pp. 205-228

Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal

original papers: Network formation with sequential demands pp. 229-249

Sergio Currarini and Massimo Morelli

original papers: The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks pp. 251-272

Matthew Jackson and Bhaskar Dutta

original papers: Spatial social networks pp. 273-299

Robert P. Gilles and Cathleen Johnson

original papers: Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks pp. 301-331

Deborah F. Minehart and Rachel Kranton

original papers: Network formation models with costs for establishing links pp. 333-362

(*), Anne van den Nouweland and Marco Slikker

Volume 5, issue 2, 2000

original papers: Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms pp. 111-127

Bhaskar Dutta and Salvador Barberà

original papers: Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods pp. 129-147

Francis Bloch and Sayantan Ghosal

original papers: Coalition formation in general NTU games pp. 149-175

Anke Gerber

original papers: Project evaluation and organizational form pp. 177-199

Thomas Gehrig, Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett

Volume 5, issue 1, 2000

original papers: Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment pp. 1-21

Georges Dionne and Claude Fluet

original papers: On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results pp. 23-58

Peter S. Faynzilberg and Praveen Kumar

original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers pp. 59-70

Domenico Menicucci

original papers: Auctions with endogenous participation pp. 71-89

Paulo Monteiro and Flavio Menezes

original papers: Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas pp. 91-105

Szilvia Pápai