Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 9, issue 4, 2005

Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies pp. 307-316

Remzi Sanver

Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: The relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates pp. 317-336

William Gehrlein

Voluntary internalisations facing the threat of a pollution tax pp. 337-362

Franz Wirl and Claus Huber

Public goods provision: Unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core pp. 363-376

Yan Yu

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments pp. 377-396

Matthias Kräkel

Volume 9, issue 3, 2005

Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal pp. 191-202

Michela Cella

Entry deterrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts pp. 203-225

Neelam Jain, Thomas Jeitschko and Leonard Mirman

Externalities do not necessarily require larger message spaces for realizing pareto-efficient allocations pp. 227-269

Hiroaki Osana

Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space pp. 271-287

Guillaume Bernis and Gaël Giraud

Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling pp. 289-305

Laurence Kranich

Volume 9, issue 2, 2005

The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes pp. 73-90

Roberto Burguet

Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents pp. 91-108

Erdem Basci and Ismail Saglam

Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling pp. 109-125

Laurence Kranich

Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller pp. 127-143

Bernard Caillaud and Jacques Robert

The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense pp. 145-166

Marc Fleurbaey

Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade pp. 167-190

Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Bo Larsson

Volume 9, issue 1, 2004

Up-front payment under RD rule pp. 1-10

Ho-Chyuan Chen

To merge or not to merge: That is the question pp. 11-30

Luis Corchon and Ramon Fauli-Oller

Tax implementability of fair allocations pp. 31-41

Yukihiro Nishimura

Implementation and orderings of public information pp. 43-57

Colin Campbell

On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs pp. 59-71

Tommy Gabrielsen and Steinar Vagstad

Volume 8, issue 4, 2004

Link bidding in laboratory networks pp. 359-372

Cary Deck and Cathleen Johnson

Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies pp. 373-382

Antonio Nicolo'

Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism pp. 383-411

Roger Lagunoff and Akihiko Matsui

Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution pp. 413-447

Luca Anderlini and Paolo Siconolfi

Bargaining power in stationary parallelogram games pp. 449-464

Bart Taub and Özgür Kıbrıs

Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures pp. 465-477

Keith Waehrer

Volume 8, issue 3, 2003

Obituary pp. 241-248

Semih Koray

Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules pp. 249-268

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus

Optimal design of trade institutions pp. 269-292

Robert Gilles, Dimitrios Diamantaras and Pieter Ruys

A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference pp. 293-299

Shasikanta Nandeibam

SMEs and public procurement policy pp. 301-318

Pierre-Henri Morand

An alternative direct proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship theorem pp. 319-328

Yasuhito Tanaka

Who consults investment analysts? pp. 329-333

Jacob Paroush

An empirical analysis of transitivity with four scaled preferential judgment modalities pp. 335-346

José Luis García-Lapresta and Luis Meneses

Dictatorial voting operators pp. 347-358

Antonio Quesada

Volume 8, issue 2, 2003

Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information pp. 121-141

Matthew Jackson

Optimal two-object auctions with synergies pp. 143-164

Domenico Menicucci

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information pp. 165-184

Nils Hauenschild and Peter Stahlecker

Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs pp. 185-204

James Dearden and Karl Einolf

Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems pp. 205-215

Biung-Ghi Ju

Solomon's Dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation pp. 217-239

Giovanni Ponti, Anita Gantner, Dunia López-Pintado and Robert Montgomery

Volume 8, issue 1, 2003

Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment pp. 1-38

M. Boyer

The endogenous formation of cartels pp. 39-62

Joachim Rosenmüller

Elections and strategic positioning games pp. 63-83

Frank Page and Myrna Wooders

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions pp. 85-98

Flavio Menezes and Paulo Monteiro

He who must not be named pp. 99-119

Philippe Février

Volume 7, issue 2, 2002

original papers: Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem pp. 117-134

Jinpeng Ma

original papers: Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality pp. 135-153

Florence Naegelen

original papers: Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities pp. 155-171

Gopal Das Varma

original papers: Safety regulation and monitor liability pp. 173-185

Ulrich Hege and Eberhard Feess

original papers: Constitutional implementation pp. 187-204

Eyal Winter and Bezalel Peleg

original papers: Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs pp. 205-211

Yuntong Wang

original papers: Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation pp. 213-228

Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley and Jérôme Serais

Volume 7, issue 1, 2002

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology pp. 1-15

Francois Maniquet

The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation pp. 17-26

Sandeep Baliga

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory pp. 27-43

Walter Trockel

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation pp. 45-56

Hans Gersbach

Can we identify Walrasian allocations? pp. 57-73

Antonio Manresa

Achieving the first best in sequencing problems pp. 75-91

Manipushpak Mitra

Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games Marta Faias (1), Emma Moreno-García (1)(2), Mário Rui Páscoa (2) (1) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevao Pinto, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: mcm@mail.fct.unl.pt; pascoa@fe.unl.pt) (2) Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, Edificio F.E.S., Campus Miguel de Unamuno, 37008 Salamanca, Spain (e-mail: emmam@usal.es) Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001 JEL classification: D41, D51 Key words: Perfect competition, monopolistic power, Walrasian equilibrium, thick markets pp. 93-104

Mario Pascoa, Emma Moreno-García and Marta Faias

Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued pp. 105-115

Lars Ehlers