Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 27, issue 4, 2023

Trade of a common value good pp. 701-724

Steven R. Williams

Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence pp. 725-761

John Duffy, Alexander Matros and Zehra Valencia

Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects pp. 763-790

Ranojoy Basu and Conan Mukherjee

Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies pp. 791-824

Takeshi Momi

Bargaining power in crisis bargaining pp. 825-847

Bahar Leventoğlu

Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously? pp. 849-866

Remy Oddou

Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures pp. 867-891

Yukinori Iwata

Volume 27, issue 3, 2023

Religious affiliations of Chinese people and prosocial behavior: evidence from field experiments pp. 473-504

Weiwei Xia, Xiaohan Guo, Jun Luo, Hang Ye, Yefeng Chen, Shu Chen and Weisen Xia

Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests pp. 505-546

Dmitry Sedov

Compromising as an equal loss principle pp. 547-560

Olivier Cailloux, Beatrice Napolitano and Remzi Sanver

Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health pp. 561-579

Juan Moreno-Ternero and Lars Peter Østerdal

Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems pp. 581-602

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris and María-José Solís-Baltodano

The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions pp. 603-634

Colin von Negenborn

Designing randomized response surveys to support honest answers to stigmatizing questions pp. 635-667

James C. D. Fisher and Timothy J. Flannery

The Sumo coach problem pp. 669-700

Daniel Rehsmann

Volume 27, issue 2, 2023

Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective pp. 269-285

Hiroto Sato

A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list pp. 287-311

Rohan Chowdhury

New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions pp. 313-336

J. Sánchez-Pérez

Seller experimentation and trade pp. 337-357

Peter Wagner

Other-regarding preferences and giving decision in a risky environment: experimental evidence pp. 359-385

Mickael Beaud, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz

Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity pp. 387-417

Pinghan Liang and Juanjuan Meng

Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game pp. 419-438

Trivikram Dokka, Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray and Sonali SenGupta

Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems pp. 439-467

Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Iago Núñez Lugilde, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? pp. 469-469

Fatma Aslan, Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium pp. 471-471

Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel

Volume 27, issue 1, 2023

A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces pp. 1-43

Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer and Xu Tan

A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform pp. 45-77

Muharrem Yeşilırmak

Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity pp. 79-124

Darong Dai and Guoqiang Tian

Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization pp. 125-132

Jac Heckelman

A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule pp. 133-137

Hidekazu Anno and Sui Takahashi

Asymmetric price adjustment and price discovery in spot and futures markets of agricultural commodities pp. 139-162

Zhuo Chen, Bo Yan, Hanwen Kang and Liyu Liu

Allocating $$\hbox {CO}_2$$ CO 2 emissions: a dynamic claims problem pp. 163-186

Eun Jeong Heo and Jinhyuk Lee

Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism pp. 187-220

Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani

Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? pp. 221-244

Dhritiman Gupta

Correction to: Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? pp. 245-245

Dhritiman Gupta

An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically pp. 247-265

Chung-Hui Chou

Correction to: An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically pp. 267-268

Chung-Hui Chou

Volume 26, issue 4, 2022

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results pp. 491-542

William Thomson

An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium pp. 543-552

Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz

A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms pp. 553-560

Duygu Nizamogullari and İpek Özkal-Sanver

Stability of an allocation of objects pp. 561-580

Murat Yılmaz and Özgür Yılmaz

Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources pp. 581-604

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver

Computational implementation pp. 605-633

Mehmet Barlo and Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium pp. 635-649

Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model pp. 651-664

Sulagna Dasgupta and Debasis Mishra

Mechanism design by observant and informed planners pp. 665-677

Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen

Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria pp. 679-696

Semih Koray and Murat Sertel

Volume 26, issue 3, 2022

Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray pp. 247-254

Remzi Sanver

Mechanism design for pandemics pp. 255-259

Eric Maskin

Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities pp. 261-284

Bhaskar Dutta, Anirban Kar and John Weymark

Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm pp. 285-306

Dominic Keehan, Dodge Cahan, John McCabe-Dansted and Arkadii Slinko

Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly pp. 307-344

Ismail Saglam

Protectionist demands in globalization pp. 345-365

Arzu Kıbrıs, Özgür Kıbrıs and Mehmet Gurdal

Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle pp. 367-384

Lars Ehlers

To sell public or private goods pp. 385-415

Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx

When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? pp. 417-446

Fatma Aslan, Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule pp. 447-467

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh and Ton Storcken

Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking pp. 469-489

Onur Doğan and Ayça Giritligil

Volume 26, issue 2, 2022

Negotiation statements with promise and threat pp. 149-164

Jin Yeub Kim

Non-dictatorial public distribution rules pp. 165-183

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Coalition-proof stable networks pp. 185-209

Chenghong Luo, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Minimum coloring problems with weakly perfect graphs pp. 211-231

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Reorganizing a partnership efficiently pp. 233-246

Eric S. Chou, Meng-Yu Liang and Cheng-Tai Wu

Volume 26, issue 1, 2022

Testing alone is insufficient pp. 1-21

Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra and Rakesh Vohra

Contests for catch shares pp. 23-42

Kyung Baik and Youngseok Park

On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange pp. 43-73

Cyrinus B. Elegbede, Ludovic Julien and Louis de Mesnard

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, welfare, and vertical market structure pp. 75-86

Xingtang Wang and Lin Zhang

Optimal mechanism for land acquisition pp. 87-116

Soumendu Sarkar

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts pp. 117-125

Yusuke Iwase

On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules pp. 127-148

Dezső Bednay, Attila Tasnádi and Sonal Yadav