Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 26, issue 4, 2022

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results pp. 491-542

William Thomson

An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium pp. 543-552

Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz

A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms pp. 553-560

Duygu Nizamogullari and İpek Özkal-Sanver

Stability of an allocation of objects pp. 561-580

Murat Yılmaz and Özgür Yılmaz

Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources pp. 581-604

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver

Computational implementation pp. 605-633

Mehmet Barlo and Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium pp. 635-649

Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model pp. 651-664

Sulagna Dasgupta and Debasis Mishra

Mechanism design by observant and informed planners pp. 665-677

Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen

Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria pp. 679-696

Semih Koray and Murat Sertel

Volume 26, issue 3, 2022

Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray pp. 247-254

Remzi Sanver

Mechanism design for pandemics pp. 255-259

Eric Maskin

Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities pp. 261-284

Bhaskar Dutta, Anirban Kar and John Weymark

Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm pp. 285-306

Dominic Keehan, Dodge Cahan, John McCabe-Dansted and Arkadii Slinko

Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly pp. 307-344

Ismail Saglam

Protectionist demands in globalization pp. 345-365

Arzu Kıbrıs, Özgür Kıbrıs and Mehmet Gurdal

Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle pp. 367-384

Lars Ehlers

To sell public or private goods pp. 385-415

Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx

When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? pp. 417-446

Fatma Aslan, Hayrullah Dindar and Jean Lainé

An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule pp. 447-467

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh and Ton Storcken

Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking pp. 469-489

Onur Doğan and Ayça Giritligil

Volume 26, issue 2, 2022

Negotiation statements with promise and threat pp. 149-164

Jin Yeub Kim

Non-dictatorial public distribution rules pp. 165-183

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Coalition-proof stable networks pp. 185-209

Chenghong Luo, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Minimum coloring problems with weakly perfect graphs pp. 211-231

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Reorganizing a partnership efficiently pp. 233-246

Eric S. Chou, Meng-Yu Liang and Cheng-Tai Wu

Volume 26, issue 1, 2022

Testing alone is insufficient pp. 1-21

Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra and Rakesh Vohra

Contests for catch shares pp. 23-42

Kyung Baik and Youngseok Park

On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange pp. 43-73

Cyrinus B. Elegbede, Ludovic Julien and Louis de Mesnard

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, welfare, and vertical market structure pp. 75-86

Xingtang Wang and Lin Zhang

Optimal mechanism for land acquisition pp. 87-116

Soumendu Sarkar

Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts pp. 117-125

Yusuke Iwase

On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules pp. 127-148

Dezső Bednay, Attila Tasnádi and Sonal Yadav

Volume 25, issue 4, 2021

Do new mayors bring fresh air? Some evidence of regulatory capture in China pp. 227-249

Hongqi Ma and Guangjun Shen

Two-agent interactive implementation pp. 251-266

Shuichi Tsugawa

Matching markets and cultural selection pp. 267-288

Jiabin Wu

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests pp. 289-316

Martin Grossmann

Correction to: Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests pp. 317-318

Martin Grossmann

Volume 25, issue 3, 2021

Group bargaining in supply chains pp. 111-138

Derek J. Clark and Jean-Christophe Pereau

Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program pp. 139-156

Jinyong Jeong

Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem pp. 157-176

Rasoul Ramezanian and Mehdi Feizi

Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling pp. 177-226

Fabian Gouret

Volume 25, issue 1, 2021

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings pp. 1-32

Gino Loyola

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values pp. 33-64

Zhuoqiong Chen

Decentralized college admissions under single application pp. 65-91

Somouaoga Bonkoungou

A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks pp. 93-109

Juan F. Fung and Chia-Ling Hsu

Volume 24, issue 3, 2020

Health and fairness with other-regarding preferences pp. 123-141

Aitor Calo-Blanco

Does vertical integration enhance non-price efficiency? Evidence from the movie theater industry pp. 143-170

In Kyung Kim and Vladyslav Nora

The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness pp. 171-186

Yuta Nakamura

Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games pp. 187-197

Toru Hokari, Yukihiko Funaki and Peter Sudhölter

Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions pp. 199-213

Takumi Kongo

High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis pp. 215-269

Tong Wang and Congyi Zhou

Volume 24, issue 1, 2020

Contests with insurance pp. 1-22

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Gaining advantage by winning contests pp. 23-38

Derek J. Clark, Tore Nilssen and Jan Yngve Sand

Premium auctions in the field pp. 39-63

Sander Onderstal

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements pp. 65-99

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga

NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle pp. 101-122

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm and Arantza Estévez-Fernández