Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 3, issue 4, 1998

On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts pp. 303-328

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing pp. 329-345

Kieron Meagher and Timothy Van Zandt

Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: a closed form solution pp. 347-357

Rajat Deb and Tae Kun Seo

Process innovation and the persistence of monopoly with labour-managed firms pp. 359-369

Luca Lambertini

Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity pp. 371-387

Leslie Marx

Volume 3, issue 3, 1998

Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods pp. 195-213

Carmen Bevia

On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture pp. 215-236

Klaus Ritzberger and Werner Güth

A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information pp. 237-255

Chongwoo Choe

Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior pp. 257-269

Indrajit Ray

Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms pp. 271-300

Sandro Brusco

Volume 3, issue 2, 1998

The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks pp. 93-127

Timothy Van Zandt

Equitable nature of core allocations in atomless economies pp. 129-135

Farhad HØsseinov

Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market pp. 137-147

Antonio Romero-Medina

Organizational design with a budget constraint pp. 149-157

Hans Gersbach and Uwe Wehrspohn

Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies pp. 159-165

Shinsuke Nakamura

An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments pp. 167-191

John Duggan

Volume 3, issue 1, 1997

Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection pp. 1-13

Frank Page

The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks pp. 15-27

Timothy Van Zandt

Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods pp. 29-43

Kai Konrad, Wolfgang Buchholz and Kjell Lommerud

Redistribution and individual characteristics pp. 45-55

Inigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe

Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments pp. 57-74

Hiroaki Osana

Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian pp. 75-89

John Wooders

Volume 2, issue 1, 1996

On economies of scope in communication pp. 1-31

Thomas Marschak

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action pp. 33-68

Takashi Ishikida and Thomas Marschak

Capabilities and utilities pp. 69-88

Carmen Herrero

A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium pp. 89-97

Bezalel Peleg

Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file pp. 99-115

Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo

Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits pp. 119-146

Christian Arnsperger and David de la Croix

Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms pp. 147-162

Gregory Dow

The allocation of a shared resource within an organization pp. 163-192

John Ledyard, Charles Noussair and David Porter

On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making pp. 193-209

Jeroen Suijs

On endogenous economic regulation pp. 211-243

Stanley Reiter

Public good provision and the Smith Process pp. 245-261

Steffen Ziss

Instability in the labor market for researchers pp. 263-281

David Perez-Castrillo

Common value auctions with independent types pp. 283-309

Fernando Branco

Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism pp. 311-324

Bezalel Peleg

Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism pp. 325-337

Luis Corchon and Simon Wilkie

Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option pp. 339-368

Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini

Investment timing and efficiency in incomplete contracts pp. 369-378

James Dearden and Dorothy Klotz

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly pp. 379-397

Jonathan Hamilton and Jacques Thisse

Two versions of the tragedy of the commons pp. 399-421

Herve Moulin and Alison Watts

Volume 1, issue 1, 1994

Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions pp. 1-14

Leonid Hurwicz

On the relationship between economic development and political democracy pp. 15-39

John Roemer

2-person Bayesian implementation pp. 41-54

Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching pp. 55-77

Ebbe Hendon, Birgitte Sloth and Torben Tranaes

On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade pp. 79-102

Sanjeev Goyal

Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms pp. 103-117

Lu Hong and Scott Page

Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism pp. 119-140

Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods pp. 141-158

Jose Aizpurua and Antonio Manresa

Robust implementation under alternative information structures pp. 159-171

Luis Corchon and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin

Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments pp. 173-203

Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen and Rajiv Vohra

Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems pp. 205-216

John Conley and Simon Wilkie

A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution, with some implications for fiscal federalism pp. 217-224

Mark Shroder

A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal pp. 227-250

Shasikanta Nandeibam

On the screening power of incentive schemes pp. 251-274

Fredrik Andersson

Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets pp. 275-287

Jose Alcalde

Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences pp. 289-299

Dominique Lepelley

A mechanism implementing the proportional solution pp. 301-317

Sang-Chul Suh

Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly pp. 319-326

Mark Gradstein

Implementation and information in teams pp. 327-341

Tomas Sjostrom

Implementation by demand mechanisms pp. 343-354

Tomas Sjostrom

Strategic participation and the median voter result pp. 355-363

David Sunding

Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems pp. 365-380

Tayfun Sönmez