Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 13, issue 4, 2009

Can the majority lose the election? pp. 305-317

Bryan McCannon

Efficient trading with restriction pp. 319-334

Hu Lu and Yuntong Wang

Optimal auctions and information disclosure pp. 335-344

Alex Gershkov

How does interest rate policy affect inflation? A simple general equilibrium model with the interest rate as the policy instrument pp. 345-360

Richard Watt

A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules pp. 361-376

J. Arin, Elena Inarra and P. Luquin

The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont (Publisher’s Erratum) pp. 377-377

Daniel McFadden

Volume 13, issue 3, 2009

Institutional design and conflict: an introduction pp. 167-170

Massimo Morelli

Power and efficiency in production pillage games pp. 171-193

James Jordan

Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example pp. 195-203

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups pp. 205-232

Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier

Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types pp. 233-250

Mark Fey and Kristopher Ramsay

Sanctions as revelation regimes pp. 251-278

Daniel Verdier

Arbitration systems and negotiations pp. 279-303

María Mercedes Adamuz and Clara Ponsati

Volume 13, issue 1, 2009

Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz pp. 1-1

John Ledyard

Two topics in Leo Hurwicz’s research pp. 3-6

Stanley Reiter

Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games pp. 7-43

Dennis Courtney and Thomas Marschak

Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary pp. 45-57

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner

Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz pp. 59-75

Roger Myerson

The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont pp. 77-100

Daniel McFadden

Discrete implementation of the Groves–Ledyard mechanism pp. 101-114

J. Swarthout and Mark Walker

Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games pp. 115-135

James Jordan

Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions pp. 137-145

Matthew Jackson

The endowment game when n=2 pp. 147-165

Lu Hong

Volume 12, issue 4, 2008

Informed principal and information gathering agent pp. 229-244

Dongsoo Shin and Sungho Yun

Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders pp. 245-257

Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh Vohra

Opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs pp. 259-277

Carmen Herrero and Juan Moreno-Ternero

Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear pp. 279-291

Luis Corchon and José Rueda-Llano

Coordinating under incomplete information pp. 293-313

Geir Asheim and Seung Han Yoo

Volume 12, issue 3, 2008

Optimal fees in internet auctions pp. 155-163

Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Price experimentation with strategic buyers pp. 165-187

Oksana Loginova and Curtis Taylor

Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents pp. 189-208

Frederik Schmidt

On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers pp. 209-227

Gorkem Celik and Serdar Sayan

Volume 12, issue 2, 2008

Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity pp. 75-117

Nadia Burani

Labour market recruiting with intermediaries pp. 119-127

Paul Schweinzer

Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers pp. 129-154

Garud Iyengar and Anuj Kumar

Volume 12, issue 1, 2008

Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation pp. 1-19

Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller, Rahul Savani and Philippe Solal

Price asymptotics pp. 21-32

Kislaya Prasad

A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires pp. 33-44

Stefano Vannucci

Optimal speculative trade among large traders pp. 45-74

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler

Volume 11, issue 4, 2008

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons pp. 253-270

Akira Yamada and Naoki Yoshihara

Repeated implementation and complexity considerations pp. 271-293

Hannu Vartiainen

Bargaining: separately or together? pp. 295-319

Alp Atakan

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness pp. 321-338

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

In search of efficient network structures: the needle in the haystack pp. 339-359

Nicolas Carayol, Pascale Roux and Murat Yildizoglu

Volume 11, issue 3, 2007

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) pp. 175-184

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Jordi Masso

Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies pp. 185-198

Matthew Jackson and Ilan Kremer

The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods pp. 199-216

Francis Bloch and Ünal Zenginobuz

On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda pp. 217-224

Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond and Arkadii Slinko

On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach pp. 225-251

William Thomson

Volume 11, issue 2, 2007

The theory of contests: a survey pp. 69-100

Luis Corchon

Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds pp. 101-124

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Contingent payments in selection contests pp. 125-137

Derek Clark and Christian Riis

Endogenous coalition formation in contests pp. 139-163

Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information pp. 165-174

Kai Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger

Volume 11, issue 1, 2007

On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment pp. 1-11

Sandrine Ollier

Network potentials pp. 13-52

Subhadip Chakrabarti and Robert Gilles

Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower–lender relationship pp. 53-68

Levent Kockesen and Saltuk Ozerturk