Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2025

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 25, issue 4, 2021

Do new mayors bring fresh air? Some evidence of regulatory capture in China pp. 227-249

Hongqi Ma and Guangjun Shen

Two-agent interactive implementation pp. 251-266

Shuichi Tsugawa

Matching markets and cultural selection pp. 267-288

Jiabin Wu

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests pp. 289-316

Martin Grossmann

Correction to: Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests pp. 317-318

Martin Grossmann

Volume 25, issue 3, 2021

Group bargaining in supply chains pp. 111-138

Derek J. Clark and Jean-Christophe Pereau

Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program pp. 139-156

Jinyong Jeong

Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem pp. 157-176

Rasoul Ramezanian and Mehdi Feizi

Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich–McKelvey scaling pp. 177-226

Fabian Gouret

Volume 25, issue 1, 2021

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings pp. 1-32

Gino Loyola

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values pp. 33-64

Zhuoqiong Chen

Decentralized college admissions under single application pp. 65-91

Somouaoga Bonkoungou

A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks pp. 93-109

Juan F. Fung and Chia-Ling Hsu

Volume 24, issue 3, 2020

Health and fairness with other-regarding preferences pp. 123-141

Aitor Calo-Blanco

Does vertical integration enhance non-price efficiency? Evidence from the movie theater industry pp. 143-170

In Kyung Kim and Vladyslav Nora

The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness pp. 171-186

Yuta Nakamura

Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games pp. 187-197

Toru Hokari, Yukihiko Funaki and Peter Sudhölter

Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions pp. 199-213

Takumi Kongo

High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis pp. 215-269

Tong Wang and Congyi Zhou

Volume 24, issue 1, 2020

Contests with insurance pp. 1-22

Yizhaq Minchuk and Aner Sela

Gaining advantage by winning contests pp. 23-38

Derek J. Clark, Tore Nilssen and Jan Yngve Sand

Premium auctions in the field pp. 39-63

Sander Onderstal

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements pp. 65-99

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga

NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle pp. 101-122

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm and Arantza Estévez-Fernández

Volume 23, issue 3, 2019

Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets pp. 91-111

Daniel Monte, Ideen Riahi and Nikolaus Robalino

Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems pp. 113-126

Hikaru Kondo

Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality pp. 127-154

Darong Dai, Liqun Liu and Guoqiang Tian

Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value pp. 155-188

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran and Rajnish Kumar

Volume 23, issue 1, 2019

Letter from the editors pp. 1-2

Onur Kesten, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Huseyin Yildirim

Exchange-stability in roommate problems pp. 3-12

Azar Abizada

Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game pp. 13-25

Rahmi İlkılıç and Hüseyin İkizler

Gender differences in competition: gender equality and cost reduction policies pp. 27-52

António Osório

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions pp. 53-73

Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Elif Özcan-Tok

The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited pp. 75-89

Noriaki Okamoto and Toyotaka Sakai

Volume 22, issue 3, 2018

An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices pp. 101-122

Ryuji Sano

Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency pp. 123-147

Erol Akçay, Adam Meirowitz and Kristopher W. Ramsay

Kalai and Muller’s possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version pp. 149-157

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin

Choice functions and weak Nash axioms pp. 159-176

Sususmu Cato

Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts pp. 177-192

Noam Cohen, Guy Maor and Aner Sela

Volume 22, issue 1, 2018

Decreasing average cost in private schools, existence of majority voting equilibrium, and a policy analysis for Turkey pp. 1-24

Muharrem Yesilirmak

Stable cost sharing in production allocation games pp. 25-53

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other pp. 55-65

Yasemin Dede and Semih Koray

On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals pp. 67-99

William Thomson

Volume 21, issue 4, 2017

Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance pp. 231-252

Makoto Shimoji

Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning pp. 253-272

Aner Sela

Transfer of authority within hierarchies pp. 273-290

Pinghan Liang

Learning by fund-raising pp. 291-316

Alvaro J. Name-Correa

Volume 21, issue 3, 2017

Pareto efficiency in the jungle pp. 153-161

Harold Houba, Roland Iwan Luttens and Hans-Peter Weikard

Simple versus rich language in disclosure games pp. 163-175

Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler

Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage pp. 177-229

Dawen Meng, Guoqiang Tian and Zhe Yang

Volume 21, issue 2, 2017

(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) pp. 73-82

Tilman Börgers

The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity pp. 83-119

Christian Kellner

On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice pp. 121-151

Yun Liu

Volume 21, issue 1, 2017

Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints pp. 1-31

Phuong Le

Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights pp. 33-48

Antonio Miralles

Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism pp. 49-63

David Cantala and Juan Pereyra

Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges pp. 65-72

Remzi Sanver