Review of Economic Design

1994 - 2024

Current editor(s): Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

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Springer
Society for Economic Design
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Volume 23, issue 3, 2019

Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets pp. 91-111

Daniel Monte, Ideen Riahi and Nikolaus Robalino

Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems pp. 113-126

Hikaru Kondo

Interregional redistribution and budget institutions with private information on intergenerational externality pp. 127-154

Darong Dai, Liqun Liu and Guoqiang Tian

Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value pp. 155-188

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran and Rajnish Kumar

Volume 23, issue 1, 2019

Letter from the editors pp. 1-2

Onur Kesten, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Huseyin Yildirim

Exchange-stability in roommate problems pp. 3-12

Azar Abizada

Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game pp. 13-25

Rahmi İlkılıç and Hüseyin İkizler

Gender differences in competition: gender equality and cost reduction policies pp. 27-52

António Osório

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions pp. 53-73

Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Elif Özcan-Tok

The Borda rule and the pairwise-majority-loser revisited pp. 75-89

Noriaki Okamoto and Toyotaka Sakai

Volume 22, issue 3, 2018

An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices pp. 101-122

Ryuji Sano

Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency pp. 123-147

Erol Akçay, Adam Meirowitz and Kristopher W. Ramsay

Kalai and Muller’s possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version pp. 149-157

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin

Choice functions and weak Nash axioms pp. 159-176

Sususmu Cato

Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts pp. 177-192

Noam Cohen, Guy Maor and Aner Sela

Volume 22, issue 1, 2018

Decreasing average cost in private schools, existence of majority voting equilibrium, and a policy analysis for Turkey pp. 1-24

Muharrem Yesilirmak

Stable cost sharing in production allocation games pp. 25-53

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other pp. 55-65

Yasemin Dede and Semih Koray

On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals pp. 67-99

William Thomson

Volume 21, issue 4, 2017

Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance pp. 231-252

Makoto Shimoji

Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning pp. 253-272

Aner Sela

Transfer of authority within hierarchies pp. 273-290

Pinghan Liang

Learning by fund-raising pp. 291-316

Alvaro J. Name-Correa

Volume 21, issue 3, 2017

Pareto efficiency in the jungle pp. 153-161

Harold Houba, Roland Iwan Luttens and Hans-Peter Weikard

Simple versus rich language in disclosure games pp. 163-175

Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler

Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage pp. 177-229

Dawen Meng, Guoqiang Tian and Zhe Yang

Volume 21, issue 2, 2017

(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) pp. 73-82

Tilman Börgers

The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity pp. 83-119

Christian Kellner

On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice pp. 121-151

Yun Liu

Volume 21, issue 1, 2017

Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints pp. 1-31

Phuong Le

Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights pp. 33-48

Antonio Miralles

Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism pp. 49-63

David Cantala and Juan Pereyra

Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges pp. 65-72

Remzi Sanver

Volume 20, issue 4, 2016

Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats pp. 255-288

Nadide Banu Olcay

Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets pp. 289-327

Oriol Tejada and Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

New axioms for immediate acceptance pp. 329-337

Yajing Chen

Volume 20, issue 3, 2016

Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids pp. 173-186

David Ettinger and Fabio Michelucci

Organizational power: Should remuneration heterogeneity mirror hierarchy? pp. 187-205

Philipp E. Otto and Friedel Bolle

Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence pp. 207-236

Jesper Breinbjerg, Alexander Sebald and Lars Peter Østerdal

The airport problem with capacity constraints pp. 237-253

Youngsub Chun and Boram Park

Volume 20, issue 2, 2016

An optimistic search equilibrium pp. 89-114

Dipjyoti Majumdar, Artyom Shneyerov and Huan Xie

Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate pp. 115-143

Stefan Ambec and Michel Poitevin

Volume 20, issue 1, 2016

Groves mechanisms and communication externalities pp. 1-37

Efthymios Athanasiou, Santanu Dey and Giacomo Valletta

Fair compensation with different social concerns for forgiveness pp. 39-56

Aitor Calo-Blanco

Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 57-67

Kerim Keskin

Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions pp. 57-67

Kerim Keskin

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments pp. 69-88

Werner Güth, René Levínský, Kerstin Pull and Ori Weisel

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments pp. 69-88

Werner Güth, René Levínský, Kerstin Pull and Ori Weisel

Volume 19, issue 4, 2015

Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in G-hyperplane games pp. 259-278

M. Hinojosa, E. Romero-Palacios and J. Zarzuelo

The informational basis of scoring rules pp. 279-297

Matias Nuñez and Giacomo Valletta

Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains pp. 299-326

Raffaele Fiocco and Dongyu Guo

The optimal design of rewards in contests pp. 327-339

Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein

Volume 19, issue 3, 2015

Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information pp. 173-209

Emanuele Gerratana and Levent Kockesen

Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations pp. 211-228

Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari and Christopher Dance

Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency pp. 229-245

Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin and Bertrand Tchantcho

Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills pp. 247-257

Kaname Miyagishima

Volume 19, issue 2, 2015

Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems pp. 91-116

Johannes Spinnewijn and Frans Spinnewyn

Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality pp. 117-143

Takeshi Nishimura

Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria pp. 145-165

M. Angeles Caraballo, A. Mármol, L. Monroy and E. Buitrago

A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution pp. 167-171

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Volume 19, issue 1, 2015

Letter from the editors pp. 1-2

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tilman Börgers and Fuhito Kojima

Group stability in matching with interdependent values pp. 3-24

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky

Probabilistic procurement auctions pp. 25-46

Thomas Giebe and Paul Schweinzer

Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion pp. 47-66

Azar Abizada and Siwei Chen

Accuracy in contests: players’ perspective pp. 67-90

Mustafa Yildirim