Studies in Choice and Welfare

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Unequal Voting Power: Steve Bickerstaff
Independence, Monotonicity, and Balanced Consistency: Youngsub Chun
A Note on Incompleteness, Transitivity and Suzumura Consistency: Richard Bradley
The Measurement of Voting Power as a Special Case of the Measurement of Political Power: Abraham Diskin and Moshe Koppel
Remarks on Population Ethics: Tomoichi Shinotsuka
Echoes of Democracy in Ancient Rome: Andranik Tangian
John C. Harsanyi: Claude d’Aspremont and Peter Hammond
The Iowa and Nevada Democratic Caucuses: Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
SSB Preferences: Nonseparable Utilities or Nonseparable Beliefs: Yutaka Nakamura
Describing an Allocation Problem: A Checklist: William Thomson
On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction: René Brink and Frank Steffen
Single-Peaked Domains and Generalisations: Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Collective Choice for Simple Preferences: Biung-Ghi Ju
On Non-Welfarist Social Ordering Functions: Naoki Yoshihara
Apportionment: Uni- and Bi-Dimensional: Michel Balinski
Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences: Serguei Kaniovski and Alexander Zaigraev
Echoes of Democracy in Ancient Rome: Andranik Tangian
Acceptable representations: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Equality in Electors or Persons: Steve Bickerstaff
No-Envy: Youngsub Chun
Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Rationality and Context-Dependent Preferences: Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
Paul A. Samuelson: Kotaro Suzumura
The Republican Party Primary: Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
On Voting: Eerik Lagerspetz
Minimum Total Deviation Apportionments: Paul H. Edelman
Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention: Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou and Hatem Smaoui
The Upper Chamber of a Bicameral National Legislature: Steve Bickerstaff
Local Political Equilibria: Norman Schofield
Public Utility Pricing and Capacity Choice with Stochastic Demand: Laurent David, Michel Breton and Olivier Merillon
Revival of Democracy in Italian Medieval City-Republics: Andranik Tangian
Decision Making Based on Risk-Value Tradeoffs: Jianmin Jia and James S. Dyer
Strongly consistent representations: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Measures of Agreement in Voters’ Preferences: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Strategyproofness: Youngsub Chun
A Primer on Economic Choice Automata: Mark R. Johnson
Single-Crossing Domains: Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Comparison of Electoral Systems: Simulative and Game Theoretic Approaches: Vito Fragnelli and Guido Ortona
Proportional Representation and Electing Nationwide: Steve Bickerstaff
Voting Power Techniques: What Do They Measure?: Sreejith Das
Impossibility and Possibility Theorems; Single-peaked Preferences: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
Nash consistent representation through lottery models: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Revival of Democracy in Italian Medieval City-Republics: Andranik Tangian
Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy: Markus Brill and Vincent Conitzer
Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory: Yves Sprumont
Normally Distributed Admissible Choices are Optimal: James N. Bodurtha and Qi Shen
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner: Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi and Abdelmonaim Tlidi
Axiom Format: William Thomson
Properties of the Apportionment Methods Used in the Primaries: Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence: Youngsub Chun