Studies in Choice and Welfare

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How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting: D. Marc Kilgour, Steven Brams and Remzi Sanver
Amartya Sen: Wulf Gaertner and P. K. Pattanaik
Meta-agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences: Olivier Roy and Maher Jakob Abou Zeid
Single-Stage Election Procedures: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
A Conjoint Measurement Approach to the Discrete Sugeno Integral: Denis Bouyssou, Thierry Marchant and Marc Pirlot
Axiomatizations of Approval Voting: Yongsheng Xu
Majority Judgment: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
Election Inversions by the U.S. Electoral College: Nicholas R. Miller
Subgroup Additivity: Youngsub Chun
Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information: Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas Palfrey
Enlightenment and the End of Traditional Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Moral Responsibility and Individual Choice: Constanze Binder and Martin Hees
To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem: Marc Fleurbaey
On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules: Fuad Aleskerov, Alexander Ivanov, Daniel Karabekyan and Vyacheslav Yakuba
Salvador Barberà: Carmen Bevia and Jordi Masso
Axiom Content: Delineating Broad Categories: William Thomson
Introduction to Part II: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Voting Power and Probability: Claus Beisbart
On Some Distance Aspects in Social Choice Theory: Christian Klamler
Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox: Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel
Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts: Steve Bickerstaff
Bidimensional Inequalities with an Ordinal Variable: Nicolas Gravel and Patrick Moyes
Feasible elimination procedures: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections: D. Marc Kilgour
Algorithms for Biproportional Apportionment: Sebastian Maier
Enlightenment and the End of Traditional Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Axiom Content: Punctual Requirements on Welfare Distribution: William Thomson
Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice: A Survey: Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura
Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition: Jean-François Laslier
Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Additive Representability of Finite Measurement Structures: Arkadii Slinko
John Broome: Richard Bradley and Marc Fleurbaey
Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with Proportional Representation Elections: Steve Bickerstaff
Voting Power: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
A Noncooperative Approach: Youngsub Chun
Effectiveness, Decisiveness, and Success in Weighted Voting Systems: Collective Behavior and Voting Measures: Werner Kirsch
A Probabilistic Re-View on Felsenthal and Machover’s “The Measurement of Voting Power”: Olga Birkmeier and Friedrich Pukelsheim
Distance from Consensus: A Theme and Variations: Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi
Two-Stage Election Procedures: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox: William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin
Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off: Koichi Tadenuma
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters
Protecting Access by Minorities and Women to the Political Process: Steve Bickerstaff
Other Voting Paradoxes: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?: Gilbert Laffond and Jean Lainé
Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and π: Karol Życzkowski and Wojciech Słomczyński
Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions: İpek Özkal-Sanver, Pelin Pasin and Remzi Sanver
Paradoxes: Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data: Rahhal Lahrach and Vincent Merlin
Gabrielle Demange: Karine der Straeten