Studies in Choice and Welfare
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- Acyclic Domains of Linear Orders: A Survey
- Bernard Monjardet
- Characterization of the Maximin Choice Function in a Simple Dynamic Economy
- Koichi Suga and Daisuke Udagawa
- David Donaldson
- Nick Baigent and Walter Bossert
- The Impact of Voter Indifference
- William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
- Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers
- Youngsub Chun
- Single-Profile Choice Functions and Variable Societies: Characterizing Approval Voting
- Hanji Wu, Yongsheng Xu and Zhen Zhong
- All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games
- Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
- Axiom Content: Solidarity Underlying Relational Requirements on Welfare Redistribution
- William Thomson
- The Institution Responsible for Redistricting or Reallocating Seats in the National Legislature
- Steve Bickerstaff
- The Fate of the Square Root Law for Correlated Voting
- Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner
- Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach
- Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin
- A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections
- Olga Birkmeier, Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim and Matthias Rossi
- The Italian Bug: A Flawed Procedure for Bi-Proportional Seat Allocation
- Aline Pennisi
- The Basic Approval Voting Game
- Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver
- Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems
- Koichi Tadenuma
- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
- William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
- The Role of Courts
- Steve Bickerstaff
- Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy
- Andranik Tangian
- Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox
- Maria Montero
- The Mean Voter, the Median Voter, and Welfare-Maximizing Voting Weights
- Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
- Suzumura Consistency
- Walter Bossert
- Condorcet Domains: A Geometric Perspective
- Donald G. Saari
- Other Voting Rules and Considerations
- William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
- Axiom Content: Robustness to Choices of Perspective in Evaluating Changes
- William Thomson
- Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
- Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet and Laurent Vidu
- The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
- Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Breton
- Peter Fishburn
- Steven Brams, William Gehrlein, Fred Roberts and Maurice Salles
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- Matias Nuñez
- Current Issues of Apportionment Methods
- Friedrich Pukelsheim
- Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies
- William Thomson
- Allan Gibbard
- Matthew D. Adler and John Weymark
- Arrow’s Theorem
- Eerik Lagerspetz
- Distance Rationalizability of Scoring Rules
- Burak Can
- The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences
- William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
- Egalitarian Collective Decisions as ‘Good’ Corporate Governance?
- Federica Alberti, Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Kei Tsutsui
- Axiom Content: Robustness to Strategizing
- William Thomson
- Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy
- Andranik Tangian
- A Priori Voting Power When One Vote Counts in Two Ways, with Application to Two Variants of the U.S. Electoral College
- Nicholas R. Miller
- Conclusion
- Steve Bickerstaff
- A Gentle Majority Clause for the Apportionment of Committee Seats
- Friedrich Pukelsheim and Sebastian Maier
- Climate Change and Social Choice Theory
- Norman Schofield
- On the Microtheoretic Foundations of Cagan’s Demand for Money Function
- Rajat Deb, Kaushal Kishore and Tae Kun Seo
- Condorcet's Paradox with Three Candidates
- William V. Gehrlein
- Exploring Alternative Ways to Allocate Delegates
- Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
- Allotment According to Preferential Vote: Ecuador’s Elections
- Victoriano Ramírez
- “One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May
- Olivier Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton and Issofa Moyouwou
- Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors
- Frank Huettner and Dominik Karos
- When Kolm Meets Mirrlees: ELIE
- Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy
- Hicksian Surplus Measures of Individual Welfare Change When There is Price and Income Uncertainty
- Charles Blackorby, David Donaldson and John Weymark
- On the Probability to Act in the European Union
- Marc R. Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin and Jean-Louis Rouet