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Studies in Choice and Welfare

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Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions
İpek Özkal-Sanver, Pelin Pasin and Remzi Sanver
Paradoxes
Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and π
Karol Życzkowski and Wojciech Słomczyński
Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data
Rahhal Lahrach and Vincent Merlin
Gabrielle Demange
Karine der Straeten
Inequality of Life Chances and the Measurement of Social Immobility
Jacques Silber and Amedeo Spadaro
Compositions and Decompositions of Condorcet Domains
Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Generalized Bandit Problems
Rangarajan K. Sundaram
An Alternative Polity
Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
A Strategic Problem in Approval Voting
Jack H. Nagel
Criteria for Determining District Boundaries
Steve Bickerstaff
Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih
Characterization of the Maximin Choice Function in a Simple Dynamic Economy
Koichi Suga and Daisuke Udagawa
Acyclic Domains of Linear Orders: A Survey
Bernard Monjardet
The Impact of Voter Indifference
William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
David Donaldson
Nick Baigent and Walter Bossert
Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers
Youngsub Chun
All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games
Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
Axiom Content: Solidarity Underlying Relational Requirements on Welfare Redistribution
William Thomson
Single-Profile Choice Functions and Variable Societies: Characterizing Approval Voting
Hanji Wu, Yongsheng Xu and Zhen Zhong
The Institution Responsible for Redistricting or Reallocating Seats in the National Legislature
Steve Bickerstaff
Symmetric Condorcet Domains
Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
The Fate of the Square Root Law for Correlated Voting
Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner
Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach
Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin
Claims-based Fair Division
Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
The Italian Bug: A Flawed Procedure for Bi-Proportional Seat Allocation
Aline Pennisi
A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections
Olga Birkmeier, Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim and Matthias Rossi
The Basic Approval Voting Game
Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver
Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems
Koichi Tadenuma
Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Bankruptcy Problems
Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
The Role of Courts
Steve Bickerstaff
Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy
Andranik Tangian
Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox
Maria Montero
Suzumura Consistency
Walter Bossert
Constructions of Large Condorcet Domains
Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
The Mean Voter, the Median Voter, and Welfare-Maximizing Voting Weights
Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
Condorcet Domains: A Geometric Perspective
Donald G. Saari
Axiom Content: Robustness to Choices of Perspective in Evaluating Changes
William Thomson
Other Voting Rules and Considerations
William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Breton
Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet and Laurent Vidu
Peter Fishburn
Steven Brams, William Gehrlein, Fred Roberts and Maurice Salles
Approval Voting in Large Electorates
Matias Nuñez
Current Issues of Apportionment Methods
Friedrich Pukelsheim
Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies
William Thomson
Distance Rationalizability of Scoring Rules
Burak Can
Arrow’s Theorem
Eerik Lagerspetz
Allan Gibbard
Matthew D. Adler and John Weymark
The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences
William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
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