Studies in Choice and Welfare

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Gabrielle Demange: Karine der Straeten
Generalized Bandit Problems: Rangarajan K. Sundaram
An Alternative Polity: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
A Strategic Problem in Approval Voting: Jack H. Nagel
Criteria for Determining District Boundaries: Steve Bickerstaff
Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules: Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih
Acyclic Domains of Linear Orders: A Survey: Bernard Monjardet
Characterization of the Maximin Choice Function in a Simple Dynamic Economy: Koichi Suga and Daisuke Udagawa
The Impact of Voter Indifference: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers: Youngsub Chun
David Donaldson: Nick Baigent and Walter Bossert
Axiom Content: Solidarity Underlying Relational Requirements on Welfare Redistribution: William Thomson
Single-Profile Choice Functions and Variable Societies: Characterizing Approval Voting: Hanji Wu, Yongsheng Xu and Zhen Zhong
All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games: Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
The Institution Responsible for Redistricting or Reallocating Seats in the National Legislature: Steve Bickerstaff
The Fate of the Square Root Law for Correlated Voting: Werner Kirsch and Jessica Langner
Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach: Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Simone Tonin
Claims-based Fair Division: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
The Italian Bug: A Flawed Procedure for Bi-Proportional Seat Allocation: Aline Pennisi
A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections: Olga Birkmeier, Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim and Matthias Rossi
The Basic Approval Voting Game: Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver
Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems: Koichi Tadenuma
Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Bankruptcy Problems: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
The Role of Courts: Steve Bickerstaff
The Mean Voter, the Median Voter, and Welfare-Maximizing Voting Weights: Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox: Maria Montero
Suzumura Consistency: Walter Bossert
Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Axiom Content: Robustness to Choices of Perspective in Evaluating Changes: William Thomson
Other Voting Rules and Considerations: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Condorcet Domains: A Geometric Perspective: Donald G. Saari
The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems: Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Breton
Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union: Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet and Laurent Vidu
Approval Voting in Large Electorates: Matias Nuñez
Peter Fishburn: Steven Brams, William Gehrlein, Fred Roberts and Maurice Salles
Current Issues of Apportionment Methods: Friedrich Pukelsheim
Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies: William Thomson
Allan Gibbard: Matthew D. Adler and John Weymark
Arrow’s Theorem: Eerik Lagerspetz
Distance Rationalizability of Scoring Rules: Burak Can
Egalitarian Collective Decisions as ‘Good’ Corporate Governance?: Federica Alberti, Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and Kei Tsutsui
The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Axiom Content: Robustness to Strategizing: William Thomson
Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Conclusion: Steve Bickerstaff
A Gentle Majority Clause for the Apportionment of Committee Seats: Friedrich Pukelsheim and Sebastian Maier
A Priori Voting Power When One Vote Counts in Two Ways, with Application to Two Variants of the U.S. Electoral College: Nicholas R. Miller
Climate Change and Social Choice Theory: Norman Schofield
On the Microtheoretic Foundations of Cagan’s Demand for Money Function: Rajat Deb, Kaushal Kishore and Tae Kun Seo