Studies in Choice and Welfare

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Computational Aspects of Approval Voting: Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Parameterizing Axioms; Operators on Spaces of Rules: William Thomson
The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining: Daniel Diermeier and Rebecca Morton
Solidarity and Fair Taxation in TU Games: André Casajus
Degressively Proportional Methods for the Allotment of the European Parliament Seats Amongst the EU Member States: Victoriano Ramírez, Antonio Palomares and Maria L. Márquez
Aspects of Power Overlooked by Power Indices: Manfred J. Holler and Hannu Nurmi
Peter J. Hammond: Philippe Mongin
Relevant Irrelevance: The Relevance of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Family Bargaining: Elisabeth Gugl
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference: Steven Brams and Remzi Sanver
Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk: Peter Hammond
Modeling the Outcomes of Vote-Casting in Actual Elections: T. Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann
Kolm’s Tax, Tax Credit, and the Flat Tax: Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik Indices in Games with a Coalition Structure: A Special Case Study: Maria Ekes
Hidden Mathematical Structures of Voting: Donald G. Saari
Characterizations and Impossibilities: William Thomson
Analyzing the Zerkani Network with the Owen Value: Encarnación Algaba, Andrea Prieto, Alejandro Saavedra-Nieves and Herbert Hamers
Forced Trades in a Free Market: Marc Fleurbaey
Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities: Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz
Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation: Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov and Vyacheslav Yakuba
Direct Democracy: Andranik Tangian
A Comparison of Electoral Formulae for the Faroese Parliament: Petur Zachariassen and Martin Zachariassen
Unemployment and Vulnerability: A Class of Distribution Sensitive Measures, its Axiomatic Properties, and Applications: Kaushik Basu and Patrick Nolen
Anonymous Voting Rules with Abstention: Weighted Voting: William S. Zwicker
Positional Equity and Equal Sacrifice: Design Principles for an EU-Wide Income Tax?: Peter J. Lambert
The Power of Closeness in a Network: Manfred J. Holler and Florian Rupp
Prasanta K. Pattanaik: Taradas Bandyopadhyay and Yongsheng Xu
Pathology or Revelation? The Public Good Index: Manfred J. Holler and Hannu Nurmi
Interpretations: Eerik Lagerspetz
Testing Theories of Lawmaking: Keith Krehbiel, Adam Meirowitz and Jonathan Woon
Other Characteristics of Voting Rules: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions: Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Strobel
Unequal Exchange, Assets, and Power: Recent Developments in Exploitation Theory: Roberto Veneziani and Naoki Yoshihara
On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives: Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin and Fabrice Valognes
On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice: Hannu Nurmi
Ordinal Distance, Dominance, and the Measurement of Diversity: Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
John E. Roemer: Roberto Veneziani and Marc Fleurbaey
Political Power on a Line Graph: René Brink, Gerard Laan, Marina Uzunova and Valeri Vasil’ev
On the Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index: The Strategic Power Index Revisited: Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg
Comparing Societies with Different Numbers of Individuals on the Basis of Their Average Advantage: Nicolas Gravel, Thierry Marchant and Arunava Sen
Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives: Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
Direct Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Conducting Axiomatic Work: A User’s Guide: William Thomson
Deliberation and Voting Rules: David Austen-Smith and Timothy Feddersen
Complements to the Axiomatic Method in Economic Design: William Thomson
Bruhat Orders and the Sequential Selection of Indivisible Items: Brian Hopkins and Michael A. Jones
Putting Paradoxes into Perspective: in Defence of the Alternative Vote: Ken Ritchie and Alessandro Gardini
Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems: Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou
William Thomson: Youngsub Chun and Christopher Chambers