Studies in Choice and Welfare

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The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Axiom Content: Robustness to Strategizing: William Thomson
Modernity and Schism in Understanding Democracy: Andranik Tangian
Dittrich’s Classification of Maximal Condorcet Domains on Four Alternatives: Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Conclusion: Steve Bickerstaff
A Gentle Majority Clause for the Apportionment of Committee Seats: Friedrich Pukelsheim and Sebastian Maier
A Priori Voting Power When One Vote Counts in Two Ways, with Application to Two Variants of the U.S. Electoral College: Nicholas R. Miller
Climate Change and Social Choice Theory: Norman Schofield
On the Microtheoretic Foundations of Cagan’s Demand for Money Function: Rajat Deb, Kaushal Kishore and Tae Kun Seo
Condorcet's Paradox with Three Candidates: William V. Gehrlein
Arrovian Aggregation and Strategy-Proof Social Choice: Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Exploring Alternative Ways to Allocate Delegates: Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer M. Wilson
“One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May: Olivier Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton and Issofa Moyouwou
Allotment According to Preferential Vote: Ecuador’s Elections: Victoriano Ramírez
Condorcet Domains of Weak and Partial Orders: Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors: Frank Huettner and Dominik Karos
When Kolm Meets Mirrlees: ELIE: Laurent Simula and Alain Trannoy
Weighted Bankruptcy Problems: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
Hicksian Surplus Measures of Individual Welfare Change When There is Price and Income Uncertainty: Charles Blackorby, David Donaldson and John Weymark
On the Probability to Act in the European Union: Marc R. Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin and Jean-Louis Rouet
Computational Aspects of Approval Voting: Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jörg Rothe
Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining: Daniel Diermeier and Rebecca Morton
Parameterizing Axioms; Operators on Spaces of Rules: William Thomson
The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules: William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Degressively Proportional Methods for the Allotment of the European Parliament Seats Amongst the EU Member States: Victoriano Ramírez, Antonio Palomares and Maria L. Márquez
Aspects of Power Overlooked by Power Indices: Manfred J. Holler and Hannu Nurmi
Solidarity and Fair Taxation in TU Games: André Casajus
Peter J. Hammond: Philippe Mongin
Relevant Irrelevance: The Relevance of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Family Bargaining: Elisabeth Gugl
Weighted Bankruptcy with Discrete Estates: Apportionments and Lotteries: Harrie de Swart and Stefan Wintein
Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk: Peter Hammond
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference: Steven Brams and Remzi Sanver
Modeling the Outcomes of Vote-Casting in Actual Elections: T. Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann
Kolm’s Tax, Tax Credit, and the Flat Tax: Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
Hidden Mathematical Structures of Voting: Donald G. Saari
Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik Indices in Games with a Coalition Structure: A Special Case Study: Maria Ekes
Analyzing the Zerkani Network with the Owen Value: Encarnación Algaba, Andrea Prieto, Alejandro Saavedra-Nieves and Herbert Hamers
Characterizations and Impossibilities: William Thomson
Forced Trades in a Free Market: Marc Fleurbaey
Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities: Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz
Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation: Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov and Vyacheslav Yakuba
Direct Democracy: Andranik Tangian
A Comparison of Electoral Formulae for the Faroese Parliament: Petur Zachariassen and Martin Zachariassen
Unemployment and Vulnerability: A Class of Distribution Sensitive Measures, its Axiomatic Properties, and Applications: Kaushik Basu and Patrick Nolen
Anonymous Voting Rules with Abstention: Weighted Voting: William S. Zwicker
Positional Equity and Equal Sacrifice: Design Principles for an EU-Wide Income Tax?: Peter J. Lambert
The Power of Closeness in a Network: Manfred J. Holler and Florian Rupp
Prasanta K. Pattanaik: Taradas Bandyopadhyay and Yongsheng Xu
Interpretations: Eerik Lagerspetz