Papers of Peter Cramton

From University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().

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09anr: How Best to Auction Natural Resources

Peter Cramton

09aibc: Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09aghg: Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia

Regina Betz, Stefan Seifert, Peter Cramton and Suzi Kerr

09add: Auctioning the Digital Dividend

Peter Cramton

08tara: A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

08rtfghz: A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction

Peter Cramton

08rlba: A Review of the L-Band Auction

Peter Cramton

08qcspr: Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

Robert Day and Peter Cramton

08ibsaa: The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35

Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham and Hal J. Singer

08gm: Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia

Peter Cramton

08frm: Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

08adcfrp: Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

07rggi: Comments on the RGGI Market Design

Peter Cramton

07rev700: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson

07oca: An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions

Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg

07mbac: Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport

Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, Peter Cramton, George Donohue, Mark Hansen and Karla Hoffman

07fem: Colombia’s Forward Energy Market

Peter Cramton

07fcc700mhz: Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73

Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson

07entry700mhz: Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton

07el700mhz: Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie and Robert Wilson

07d700mhz: Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson

07cpm: Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

07cfem: Colombia Firm Energy Market

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

07c700mhz: The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson

06scfem: Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market

Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft and Jeffrey West

06oil: How Best to Auction Oil Rights

Peter Cramton

06mdfra: The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

05mdi: Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England

Peter Cramton, Hung-po Chao and Robert Wilson

05licap: A Capacity Market that Makes Sense

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

04mit5: The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom

04mit4: Simultaneous Ascending Auction

Peter Cramton

04mit: Combinatorial Auctions

Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg

04jeea: Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

04hicss: Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets

Peter Cramton

03ferc2: Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties

Peter Cramton

03ferc1: Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets

Peter Cramton

02ubs: Unions, Bargaining and Strikes

Peter Cramton and Joseph Tracy

02eptc: Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather

Peter Cramton and Suzi Kerr

02emd: Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Peter Cramton

02collude: Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz

02barg: Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere

01nao: Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction

Peter Cramton

01hte: Spectrum Auctions

Peter Cramton

01ej: Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond

Alfred Kahn, Peter Cramton, Robert Porter and Richard D. Tabors

01calpx: Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?

Alfred Kahn, Peter Cramton, Robert Porter and Richard D. Tabors

00senate: Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions

Peter Cramton

00jre: Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz

00jel: A Review of Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program

Peter Cramton

00flaws: Eliminating the Flaws in New England's Reserve Markets

Peter Cramton and Jeffrey Lien

99wpvic: Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton