Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

From Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation pp. 271-288: Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook
Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness” pp. 289-301: Israel Kirzner
Using Psychology to Reinforce the Austrian Argument for Freedom: The Case of Loan Decisions pp. 303-321: Martti Vihanto
Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology pp. 323-333: Daniel Sutter
A Comment on Müller's “Unveiling of the Veil of Uncertainty” pp. 335-338: Andreas Kyriacou
Risk-Aversion in Constitutional Choice: Reply to Kyriacou pp. 339-343: Christian Müller

Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy pp. 171-186: Dennis Mueller
Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions pp. 187-212: Tone Dieckmann
Environmental (De-) Regulation, Competition, and Policy Rules pp. 213-234: Gerhard Wegner
The Constitutional Political Economy of Public Deficits: The Spanish Case 1 pp. 235-249: Javier Salinas

Legal Questions to Economists Raised by Simple Rules for a Complex World pp. 87-103: Dick Ruiter
Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing pp. 105-111: Richard Wagner
Epstein's Profound Simplicity pp. 113-120: Norman Barry
Simple? pp. 121-126: Gordon Tullock
Simple Paths to Simple Rules pp. 127-131: Andrew Morriss
Promises Made and Promises Broken in the Russian Transition pp. 133-142: Peter Boettke
Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization pp. 143-150: Todd Zywicki
The Promise and Pitfalls of Simple Rules pp. 151-161: Richard Epstein

Editors' Note pp. 3-3: Dennis Mueller and Viktor Vanberg
The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled pp. 5-17: Christian Müller
Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: An Advance Sketch pp. 19-44: Razeen Sally
Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems pp. 45-66: Douglas Whitman
Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy pp. 67-74: Costas Azariadis and Vincenzo Galasso
Avinish K. Dixit. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Approach pp. 75-80: Thomas Willett
John Dunn. The History of Political Theory and Other Essays pp. 79-80: Loren Lomansky

Benjamin Constant and Carl Schmitt Go to Russia pp. 271-282: Vladimir Gligorov
Asian Values and the Constitutional Order of Contemporary Singapore pp. 283-300: David Jones
Friedrich Hayek's Theory of Spontaneous Order: Two Problems pp. 301-317: Elias Khalil
Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations pp. 319-335: Daniel Klein
Convergence of Income Distributions: Another Measurement Problem pp. 337-352: Barbara Dluhosch
David Boaz (1997) Libertarianism: A Primer pp. 353-354: Bruce Benson
Cass R. Sunstein (1996) Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict pp. 355-358: Todd Zywicki
Matt Ridley (1997) The Origins of Virtue pp. 359-361: Donald Boudreaux

Differing World-Views and Collective Action: The Case of Research pp. 179-194: Horst Hegmann
Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process pp. 195-213: Thomas Schaller
Constitutional Contractarianism pp. 215-224: Robert Ehman
The Formation of Economic Policy: A Cognitive-Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making pp. 225-254: Tilman Slembeck
Reviews pp. 255-259: Daniel Klein
Reviews pp. 261-264: Andrew Rutten

Editorial Note pp. 103-103: Viktor Vanberg and Richard Wagner
Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons pp. 105-122: Viktor Vanberg
The Political Economy of Frank Knight: Classical Liberalism from Chicago pp. 123-138: Razeen Sally
Enforcing Constitutional Constraints pp. 139-150: Daniel Sutter
The Separation of Spending from Taxation: Implications for Collective Choices pp. 151-163: Michael Marlow and William Orzechowski
Dennis C. Mueller: Constitutional Democracy pp. 165-167: Dwight Lee
Lansing Pollock: The Free Society pp. 169-171: Jody Lipford

Some Reflections on The Calculus of Consent pp. 3-13: Michael Brooks
The Emergence of Constitutional Rights pp. 15-36: Ejan Mackaay
Exploring the Production of Social Order pp. 37-55: Jody Lipford and Bruce Yandle
Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels? pp. 57-70: Thomas Apolte
Competence Catalogues and the Principle of Subsidiarity in a European Constitution pp. 71-87: Christian Kirchner
Reviews pp. 89-95: Peter Boettke