Constitutional Political Economy
1990 - 2025
Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt From Springer Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 11, issue 4, 2000
- The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax pp. 295-318

- Frank Buckley and Eric Rasmusen
- The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth pp. 319-337

- Seth Norton
- Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon pp. 339-352

- Leonard Wantchekon
- Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion pp. 353-369

- Niclas Berggren
- Constitutions as Commitment or Coordination Device? Comment on C. Azariadis and V. Galasso: Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy pp. 371-374

- Martin Kolmar
- Reply to Kolmar's Comment pp. 375-375

- Costas Azariadis and Vincenzo Galasso
Volume 11, issue 3, 2000
- Privatization, Land Reform, and Property Rights: the Mexican Experience pp. 215-230

- Malcolm Dunn
- The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power pp. 231-253

- José Molinero
- William Hutt and the Economics of Apartheid pp. 255-264

- Peter Lewin
- Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis pp. 265-279

- Martin Leschke
- Robert Jervis: System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life pp. 281-283

- Giulio Gallarotti
- Steven G. Medema (Ed.): Coasean Economics: Lawn and Economics and the New Institutional Economics pp. 285-288

- Thomas Leonard
Volume 11, issue 2, 2000
- Latent Theoretical Convergence upon a Pluralist Conception of Economic Action: Adam Smith and Max Weber pp. 119-145

- Milan Zafirovski
- Interest Groups, Referenda, and the Political Process: On the Efficiency of Direct Democracy pp. 147-163

- Klaus Zimmermann and Tobias Just
- Institutions Meet Mind: The Way out of a Deadlock pp. 165-180

- Salvatore Rizzello and Margherita Turvani
- Continuous Time Models of Collective Action and Political Change pp. 181-198

- Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi
- Reviews pp. 199-203

- James Bond
- Reviews pp. 205-209

- Todd Zywicki
Volume 11, issue 1, 2000
- Editorial pp. 3-3

- Dennis Mueller
- A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy pp. 5-25

- Sebastiano Bavetta and Fabio Padovano
- The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View pp. 27-39

- Charles Blankart
- Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union pp. 41-57

- Christophe Crombez
- Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority pp. 59-67

- Domenico Da Empoli
- From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy pp. 69-86

- Paulo Pereira
- Globalization, Democracy, and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy? 1 pp. 87-112

- Viktor Vanberg
Volume 10, issue 4, 1999
- Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union pp. 327-338

- Roland Vaubel
- A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle pp. 339-353

- Niclas Berggren
- Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and the Puzzle of Changing Constitutional Identity pp. 355-365

- John Finn
- The Voice of the People pp. 367-374

- Alan Hamlin
- On Ackerman's Justification of Irregular Constitutional Change: Is Any Vice You Get Away With a Virtue? pp. 375-383

- Robert Higgs
- On Amending Constitutions pp. 385-396

- Dennis Mueller
- Who are “We The People”? Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Jefferson, and the Problem of Revolutionary Reform pp. 397-404

- Peter Onuf
- From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution pp. 405-414

- Keith Whittington
- Constitutional Economics--Constitutional Politics pp. 415-424

- Bruce Ackerman
Volume 10, issue 3, 1999
- Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules pp. 211-218

- James Buchanan and Yong Yoon
- Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism pp. 219-243

- Viktor Vanberg
- Conventions and Economic Change: A Contribution toward a Theory of Political Economy pp. 245-264

- Young Choi
- The Virtue of Installing Veto Players pp. 265-282

- Shyh-Fang Ueng
- Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions pp. 283-300

- Stefan Voigt
Volume 10, issue 2, 1999
- Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States pp. 119-148

- Dennis Mueller
- How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties pp. 149-166

- Frank Vibert
- On the Constitution of a Compound Republic pp. 167-175

- William Niskanen
- Is There an Optimal Constitution? pp. 177-184

- Joao Faria
- Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life: An Empirical Analysis pp. 185-197

- Alfredo Esposto and Peter Zaleski
Volume 10, issue 1, 1999
- Party Fragmentation and Presidential Elections in Post-Communist Democracies pp. 3-26

- Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova
- Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases from Russia pp. 27-52

- Michael McFaul
- Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries pp. 53-88

- Matthew Shugart
- The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox pp. 89-105

- Thomas Schwartz
Volume 9, issue 4, 1998
- Alliances versus Federations: An Extension of Riker's Analysis of Federal Formation pp. 271-288

- Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook
- Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness” pp. 289-301

- Israel Kirzner
- Using Psychology to Reinforce the Austrian Argument for Freedom: The Case of Loan Decisions pp. 303-321

- Martti Vihanto
- Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology pp. 323-333

- Daniel Sutter
- A Comment on Müller's “Unveiling of the Veil of Uncertainty” pp. 335-338

- Andreas Kyriacou
- Risk-Aversion in Constitutional Choice: Reply to Kyriacou pp. 339-343

- Christian Müller
Volume 9, issue 3, 1998
- Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy pp. 171-186

- Dennis Mueller
- Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions pp. 187-212

- Tone Dieckmann
- Environmental (De-) Regulation, Competition, and Policy Rules pp. 213-234

- Gerhard Wegner
- The Constitutional Political Economy of Public Deficits: The Spanish Case 1 pp. 235-249

- Javier Salinas
Volume 9, issue 2, 1998
- Legal Questions to Economists Raised by Simple Rules for a Complex World pp. 87-103

- Dick Ruiter
- Social Democracy, Societal Tectonics, and Parasitical Pricing pp. 105-111

- Richard Wagner
- Epstein's Profound Simplicity pp. 113-120

- Norman Barry
- Simple? pp. 121-126

- Gordon Tullock
- Simple Paths to Simple Rules pp. 127-131

- Andrew Morriss
- Promises Made and Promises Broken in the Russian Transition pp. 133-142

- Peter Boettke
- Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization pp. 143-150

- Todd Zywicki
- The Promise and Pitfalls of Simple Rules pp. 151-161

- Richard Epstein
Volume 9, issue 1, 1998
- Editors' Note pp. 3-3

- Dennis Mueller and Viktor Vanberg
- The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled pp. 5-17

- Christian Müller
- Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: An Advance Sketch pp. 19-44

- Razeen Sally
- Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems pp. 45-66

- Douglas Whitman
- Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy pp. 67-74

- Costas Azariadis and Vincenzo Galasso
- Avinish K. Dixit. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Approach pp. 75-80

- Thomas Willett
- John Dunn. The History of Political Theory and Other Essays pp. 79-80

- Loren Lomansky
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