Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Volume 21, issue 4, 2010

Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries pp. 309-335

Thushyanthan Baskaran

Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights pp. 336-359

Feler Bose

The problem of political calculation in autocracies pp. 360-373

Sherzod Abdukadirov

The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England pp. 374-406

Mark Koyama

Gerald Berk: Louis D. Brandeis and the making of regulated competition, 1900–1932 pp. 407-413

Richard Adelstein

Volume 21, issue 3, 2010

Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal economy pp. 207-230

Roberto Dell’Anno

Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries pp. 231-248

Dominik Enste

Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States pp. 249-269

Ringa Raudla

Understanding economic change: the impact of emotion pp. 270-287

Roberta Patalano

Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament pp. 288-307

Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto

Volume 21, issue 2, 2010

Federalism and individual liberty pp. 101-118

C. Mantzavinos

Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece pp. 119-144

George Tridimas

Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning, market, and organizations pp. 145-170

Stefano Fiori

Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence pp. 171-201

Lorenzo Sacconi and Marco Faillo

Marion Fourcade: Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s pp. 202-205

Philippe Fontaine

Volume 21, issue 1, 2010

The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum pp. 1-27

Mwangi Kimenyi and William Shughart

The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: a constitutional economics perspective pp. 28-49

Viktor Vanberg

An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case pp. 50-79

Juan Carlos Molero and Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo

Relationships among democratic freedoms in the former Soviet Republics: a causality analysis pp. 80-96

Jac Heckelman

Vernon L. Smith: Discovery—A Memoir pp. 97-99

E. Roy Weintraub

Volume 20, issue 3, 2009

Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings—introduction pp. 197-201

Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt

Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? pp. 202-229

José Cheibub and Svitlana Chernykh

The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions pp. 230-250

Fabio Padovano

Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers pp. 251-266

Simon Hug

Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks? pp. 267-295

Marc Quintyn

Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework pp. 296-322

Anne Aaken

International delegation and state disaggregation pp. 323-340

Tom Ginsburg

Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU pp. 341-365

Daniel Finke and Thomas König

Toward global checks and balances pp. 366-387

Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs

Volume 20, issue 2, 2009

The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe pp. 99-117

Andrew Roberts

Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy pp. 118-138

Anthony Evans

Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism pp. 139-159

Niclas Berggren

Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective pp. 160-176

Dalibor Roháč

Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States pp. 177-192

Phillip Magness

Steven M. Teles: The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law pp. 193-196

Richard Adelstein

Volume 20, issue 1, 2009

Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study pp. 1-41

Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics pp. 42-56

Alain Marciano

From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis pp. 57-70

Michael Makowsky and Richard Wagner

Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation? pp. 71-93

Abel Escribà-Folch

Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine: Against Intellectual Property pp. 94-97

F. Scherer

Volume 19, issue 4, 2008

The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification pp. 277-300

Jens Meierhenrich

Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law pp. 301-312

Assaf Meydani

The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach pp. 313-355

Sebastian Coll

Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness pp. 356-360

Thomas Leonard

Margaret Schabas: The Natural Origins of Economics pp. 361-367

David Levy

Volume 19, issue 3, 2008

Editorial introduction pp. 169-170

Alan Hamlin

Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics pp. 171-179

James Buchanan

Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings pp. 180-202

William Blomquist and Elinor Ostrom

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences? pp. 203-225

Ulrich Witt and Christian Schubert

Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism pp. 226-248

Robert Sugden

Regulation and revenue pp. 249-260

Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations pp. 261-276

Nils Goldschmidt and Michael Wohlgemuth

Volume 19, issue 2, 2008

Direct democracy: obstacle to reform? pp. 81-93

Gebhard Kirchgässner

An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses pp. 94-110

Peter Calcagno and Christopher Westley

The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic pp. 111-128

Dalibor Roháč

Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience pp. 129-147

Antonio Saravia

Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world pp. 148-157

Mark Jackson

Robert H. Frank, Falling behind: how rising inequality harms the middle class pp. 158-164

Thomas Leonard

James R. Hackney, Jr., Under cover of science: American legal-economic theory and the quest for objectivity pp. 165-168

Alain Marciano

Volume 19, issue 1, 2008

Editorial Announcement pp. 1-1

Alan Hamlin, Dennis Mueller and Peter Ordeshook

Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order pp. 3-18

Sandra Peart and David Levy

The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector pp. 19-33

Vladislav Valentinov

America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective pp. 35-59

Roger Congleton

Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in voting on segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution pp. 61-80

Michael Reksulak and William Shughart