Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity pp. 279-301: Karsten Mause and Friedrich Groeteke
Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization pp. 302-336: Alexander Libman
The political economy of civil society pp. 337-356: Adrian Pabst and Roberto Scazzieri
State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture pp. 357-379: Paul Aligica and Vlad Tarko

Introductory note and acknowledgements pp. 181-181: Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard Wagner
The political economy of public debt pp. 182-198: Geoffrey Brennan
Indebted state versus intermediary state: who owes what to whom? pp. 199-212: Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard Wagner
Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009 pp. 213-243: J. Stephen Ferris, Stanley Winer and Bernard Grofman
A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts pp. 244-260: Reiner Eichenberger, David Stadelmann and Marco Portmann
Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons pp. 261-277: Richard Wagner

Economic freedom and growth. Which policies matter the most? pp. 95-133: Martin Rode and Sebastian Coll
Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states pp. 134-165: George Crowley
Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity pp. 166-180: Andreas Kyriacou

Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot pp. 1-21: George Tridimas
Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector pp. 22-44: Maoz Rosenthal
Designing the institutions of international liberalism: some contributions from the interwar period pp. 45-65: Fabio Masini
Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America pp. 66-93: John Dove

Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems pp. 303-324: Katharina Holzinger, Andrea Schneider and Klaus Zimmermann
The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration pp. 325-354: Barbara Dluhosch and Nikolai Ziegler
Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China pp. 355-372: Eric Ip and Michael Law
Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment pp. 373-397: Timo Tammi

Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process pp. 203-220: Jeremy Horpedahl
The political economy of constitutional restraints pp. 221-237: Dimitrios Xefteris
Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators pp. 238-264: Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt
The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures pp. 265-286: Gregory Randolph
Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation? pp. 287-301: Louis Jaeck

Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan pp. 103-121: O. Yap
Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany pp. 122-140: Joachim Zweynert
Making executive politics mutually productive and fair pp. 141-172: T. Durant
Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League pp. 173-190: Alexander Fink
Federalism and exit costs pp. 191-197: Gebhard Kirchgässner and Mark Schelker
Federalism and individual liberty: a rejoinder pp. 198-199: C. Mantzavinos
Vernon Smith, Rationality in economics: constructivist and ecological forms pp. 200-202: Maria Paganelli

Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy pp. 1-20: Viktor Vanberg
Enfranchisement from a political perspective pp. 21-57: Soumyanetra Munshi
A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens pp. 58-82: George Tridimas
A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization pp. 83-102: Thomas Döring and Jan Schnellenbach

Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries pp. 309-335: Thushyanthan Baskaran
Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights pp. 336-359: Feler Bose
The problem of political calculation in autocracies pp. 360-373: Sherzod Abdukadirov
The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England pp. 374-406: Mark Koyama
Gerald Berk: Louis D. Brandeis and the making of regulated competition, 1900–1932 pp. 407-413: Richard Adelstein

Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal economy pp. 207-230: Roberto Dell’Anno
Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries pp. 231-248: Dominik Enste
Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States pp. 249-269: Ringa Raudla
Understanding economic change: the impact of emotion pp. 270-287: Roberta Patalano
Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament pp. 288-307: Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto

Federalism and individual liberty pp. 101-118: C. Mantzavinos
Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece pp. 119-144: George Tridimas
Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning, market, and organizations pp. 145-170: Stefano Fiori
Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence pp. 171-201: Lorenzo Sacconi and Marco Faillo
Marion Fourcade: Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s pp. 202-205: Philippe Fontaine

The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum pp. 1-27: Mwangi Kimenyi and William Shughart
The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: a constitutional economics perspective pp. 28-49: Viktor Vanberg
An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case pp. 50-79: Juan Carlos Molero and Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo
Relationships among democratic freedoms in the former Soviet Republics: a causality analysis pp. 80-96: Jac Heckelman
Vernon L. Smith: Discovery—A Memoir pp. 97-99: E. Roy Weintraub