Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Volume 29, issue 4, 2018

Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece pp. 371-388

Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen

Making direct democracy work: a rational-actor perspective on the graphe paranomon in ancient Athens pp. 389-412

Carl Hampus Lyttkens, George Tridimas and Anna Lindgren

Arbitration in classical Athens pp. 413-423

Bryan McCannon

The law and economics of sycophancy pp. 424-439

Daniel J. D’Amico

What was the law of Leptines’ really about? Reflections on Athenian public economy and legislation in the fourth century BCE pp. 440-464

Mirko Canevaro

Volume 29, issue 3, 2018

Political parties: insights from a tri-planar model of political economy pp. 253-267

David J. Hebert and Richard Wagner

The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access pp. 268-280

Louis Corriveau

The effect of equalizing differences on tax-price: explaining patterns of political support across industries pp. 281-302

Joseph Newhard

Interest group support for non-group issues pp. 303-316

Randall Holcombe and Robert J. Gmeiner

Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities? pp. 317-337

Julio López-Laborda, Fernando Rodrigo and Eduardo Sanz-Arcega

Correction to: Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities? pp. 338-338

Julio López-Laborda, Fernando Rodrigo and Eduardo Sanz-Arcega

The political economy of Kulturkampf: evidence from imperial Prussia and republican Turkey pp. 339-369

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Theocharis Grigoriadis

Volume 29, issue 2, 2018

Social contracts for real moral agents: a synthesis of public reason and public choice approaches to constitutional design pp. 115-136

Kevin Vallier

A short history of constitutional liberalism in America pp. 137-170

Roger Congleton

Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government pp. 171-192

Alexander Salter and Andrew T. Young

Judicial impartiality in politically charged cases pp. 193-229

Raphael Franck

Why the Arab Spring turned Islamic: the political economy of Islam pp. 230-251

Mario Ferrero

Volume 29, issue 1, 2018

Regime types, ideological leanings, and the natural resource curse pp. 1-19

Chong-Sup Kim and Seungho Lee

Institutions and the effectiveness of expenditures on environmental protection: evidence from Middle Eastern countries pp. 20-39

Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni and Mohammad Reza Farzanegan

Do democracies have higher current account deficits? pp. 40-68

Antonis Adam and Sofia Tsarsitalidou

The weight of the median voter ageing on public debt pp. 69-92

Ernest Dautović

Contributions to the exchequer funds by state level public sector enterprises: does political alignment matter? pp. 93-113

Ritika Jain

Volume 28, issue 4, 2017

A proposal for a more objective measure of de facto constitutional constraints pp. 311-320

Konstantin Yanovskiy and Tim Ginker

De jure and de facto determinants of power: evidence from Mississippi pp. 321-345

Graziella Bertocchi and Arcangelo Dimico

Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption pp. 346-372

Jamie Bologna Pavlik

Managing judges mathematically: an empirical study of the medical malpractice litigations in Shanghai pp. 373-406

Wei Zhang

Who pays taxes? Liturgies and the Antidosis procedure in Ancient Athens pp. 407-421

Bryan McCannon

Volume 28, issue 3, 2017

Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making pp. 209-230

George Tridimas

The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered pp. 231-256

Pablo Paniagua

The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design? pp. 257-269

Gebhard Kirchgässner

Buchanan on increasing returns and anticommons pp. 270-285

Yong J. Yoon

Normative economics and paternalism: the problem with the preference-satisfaction account of welfare pp. 286-310

Cyril Hédoin

Volume 28, issue 2, 2017

Federalism and horizontal equity across Switzerland and Germany: a new rationale for a decentralized fiscal structure pp. 97-116

Peter Schwarz

Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle pp. 117-141

J. Stephen Ferris and Derek E. H. Olmstead

Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies pp. 142-166

Florian Kiesow Cortez and Jerg Gutmann

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage pp. 167-192

Cortney Rodet

Erratum to: Poor institutions as a comparative advantage pp. 193-194

Cortney Rodet

The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice pp. 195-208

Aris Trantidis

Volume 28, issue 1, 2017

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry pp. 1-17

Jac Heckelman

Gordon Tullock’s ill-fated appendix: “Flatland Revisited” pp. 18-34

David Levy and Sandra J. Peart

Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action? pp. 35-47

Stefan Voigt

Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics pp. 48-61

Francesco Parisi, Barbara Luppi and Alice Guerra

Political incentives for rent creation pp. 62-78

Randall Holcombe

Expressive voting and two-dimensional political competition: an application to law and order policy by New Labour in the UK pp. 79-96

Stephen Drinkwater and Colin Jennings

Volume 27, issue 4, 2016

Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules pp. 355-376

Christian Walter Martin and Nils D. Steiner

Native American reservation constitutions pp. 377-398

R. Warren Anderson

Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption pp. 399-417

Jonathan Stone and Jeffrey Wagner

No progressive taxation without discrimination? On the generality of the law in the classical liberal tradition pp. 418-434

Åsbjørn Melkevik

Will a government find it financially easier to neutralize a looming protest if more groups are involved? pp. 435-450

Oded Stark and Ewa Zawojska

Volume 27, issue 3, 2016

We start from here pp. 249-259

Russell Hardin

Is democracy compatible with global institutions? pp. 260-272

Josep M. Colomer

EU enlargement and satisfaction with democracy: a peculiar case of immiserizing growth pp. 273-298

Barbara Dluhosch, Daniel Horgos and Klaus Zimmermann

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules pp. 332-353

Keith L. Dougherty and Robi Ragan

Volume 27, issue 2, 2016

Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly pp. 112-123

Dennis C. Mueller

Where are the rent seekers? pp. 124-141

Arye Hillman and Heinrich Ursprung

Rent seeking and the economics of corruption pp. 142-157

Toke Aidt

Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship pp. 158-178

Thomas Apolte

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government pp. 179-193

Roger Congleton

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice pp. 214-226

Arthur Schram

Volume 27, issue 1, 2016

State provision of constitutional goods pp. 1-40

Romain Espinosa

On the overthrow or endurance of kings pp. 41-65

George Tridimas

An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014 pp. 66-92

Jarosław Kantorowicz and Nuno Garoupa

Hayek on corporate social responsibility pp. 93-110

Shigeki Kusunoki