Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Volume 27, issue 4, 2016

Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules pp. 355-376

Christian Walter Martin and Nils D. Steiner

Native American reservation constitutions pp. 377-398

R. Warren Anderson

Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption pp. 399-417

Jonathan Stone and Jeffrey Wagner

No progressive taxation without discrimination? On the generality of the law in the classical liberal tradition pp. 418-434

Åsbjørn Melkevik

Will a government find it financially easier to neutralize a looming protest if more groups are involved? pp. 435-450

Oded Stark and Ewa Zawojska

Volume 27, issue 3, 2016

We start from here pp. 249-259

Russell Hardin

Is democracy compatible with global institutions? pp. 260-272

Josep M. Colomer

EU enlargement and satisfaction with democracy: a peculiar case of immiserizing growth pp. 273-298

Barbara Dluhosch, Daniel Horgos and Klaus Zimmermann

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules pp. 332-353

Keith L. Dougherty and Robi Ragan

Volume 27, issue 2, 2016

Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly pp. 112-123

Dennis C. Mueller

Where are the rent seekers? pp. 124-141

Arye Hillman and Heinrich Ursprung

Rent seeking and the economics of corruption pp. 142-157

Toke Aidt

Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship pp. 158-178

Thomas Apolte

Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government pp. 179-193

Roger Congleton

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice pp. 214-226

Arthur Schram

Volume 27, issue 1, 2016

State provision of constitutional goods pp. 1-40

Romain Espinosa

On the overthrow or endurance of kings pp. 41-65

George Tridimas

An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014 pp. 66-92

Jarosław Kantorowicz and Nuno Garoupa

Hayek on corporate social responsibility pp. 93-110

Shigeki Kusunoki

Volume 26, issue 4, 2015

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence pp. 391-420

Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume

Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens? pp. 421-433

Travis Wiseman and Andrew Young

Endogenous voting weights for elected representatives and redistricting pp. 434-441

Justin Svec and James Hamilton

Analytic conservatism and analytic radicalism: Of understated distinctions and other analytical things pp. 442-454

Michael Brooks

Modeling the individual for constitutional choice pp. 455-474

Brian Kogelmann

“The other side of the argument”: Isaiah Berlin versus F. A. von Hayek on liberty, public policies, and the market pp. 475-494

Athanassios Pitsoulis and Steffen Groß

Volume 26, issue 3, 2015

Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition pp. 247-280

Christian Bjørnskov

The importance of the political process on corporate tax policy pp. 281-306

Åsa Hansson, Susan Porter and Susan Williams

The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong pp. 307-327

Eric Ip

Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India pp. 328-355

Shruti Rajagopalan

Votes on behalf of children: a legitimate way of giving them a voice in politics? pp. 356-374

Stephan Wolf, Nils Goldschmidt and Thomas Petersen

Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm pp. 375-390

Alexander Salter

Volume 26, issue 2, 2015

Income and the stability of democracy: Pushing beyond the borders of logic to explain a strong correlation? pp. 121-136

Federico Traversa

The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform pp. 137-158

Martin Paldam

Strategic and expressive voting pp. 159-170

Brad Taylor

Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats pp. 171-189

Marco Sorge

Direct voting and proxy voting pp. 190-220

James Green-Armytage

Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared pp. 221-245

Barbara Krug and Alexander Libman

Volume 26, issue 1, 2015

Introduction: a new perspective on modern German history pp. 1-3

Steven Webb and Joachim Zweynert

The concept of Ordnungspolitik through the lens of the theory of limited and open access orders pp. 4-18

Joachim Zweynert

Becoming an open democratic capitalist society: a two-century historical perspective on Germany’s evolving political economy pp. 19-37

Steven Webb

Weimar Germany: The first open access order that failed? pp. 38-60

Alfred Reckendrees

Capitalist transformation without political participation: German capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century pp. 61-86

Gerhard Wegner

On the stability of open access orders: the Federal Republic of Germany since the 1960s pp. 87-102

Jan-Otmar Hesse

The mature limited access order at the doorstep: Imperial Germany and contemporary China in transition pp. 103-120

Erik Grimmer-Solem

Volume 25, issue 4, 2014

Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science pp. 331-353

Charles Plott

Fiscal federalism, jurisdictional competition, and the size of government pp. 354-375

Jason Sorens

Crisis and belief: confirmation bias and the behavioral political economy of recession pp. 376-392

Petrik Runst

Land, men and taxation: an application to pre-modern China and Europe Erik Jones’ European Miracle revisited pp. 393-406

Charles Blankart

Loss of control: legislature changes and the state–local relationship pp. 407-433

Jessica Hennessey

Volume 25, issue 3, 2014

James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order pp. 231-252

Lars Feld

James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction pp. 253-264

Richard Wagner

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan pp. 265-279

James Gwartney and Randall Holcombe

Is there a self-enforcing monetary constitution? pp. 280-300

Alexander Salter

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike? pp. 301-329

Martin Ardanaz and Carlos Scartascini

Volume 25, issue 2, 2014

On a fallacy in the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency–equity analysis pp. 125-136

David Ellerman

Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic pp. 137-153

Josef Brechler and Adam Gersl

Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments pp. 154-176

Karsten Mause

Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law: an example of Ottoman and Habsburg legacies in Romania pp. 177-206

Martin Mendelski and Alexander Libman

Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration pp. 207-229

David Stadelmann, Reiner Eichenberger and Marco Portmann

Volume 25, issue 1, 2014

The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan pp. 2-17

Gebhard Kirchgässner

James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism pp. 18-38

Viktor Vanberg

The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan pp. 39-67

Roger Congleton

Reasoning about rules pp. 68-87

Alan Hamlin

Constraining Leviathan pp. 88-102

Dennis Mueller

The reason for ‘The Reason of Rules’ pp. 103-109

Geoffrey Brennan

What should classical liberal political economists do? pp. 110-124

Peter Boettke