Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Buchanan clubs pp. 265-284: Todd Sandler
European unification: a new proposal pp. 285-294: Bruno Frey
Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law pp. 295-309: Shruti Rajagopalan and Richard Wagner
US shadow economies: a state-level study pp. 310-335: Travis Wiseman
When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions? pp. 336-351: Fabio Padovano and Ilaria Petrarca

On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers pp. 177-198: Roger Congleton
Independent central banks as a component of the separation of powers pp. 199-214: Peter Bernholz
Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls pp. 215-238: Niklas Potrafke
The constitutional political economy of virtual worlds pp. 239-264: Carl Mildenberger

Decentralization and growth: what if the cross-jurisdiction approach had met a dead end? pp. 87-107: Pierre Salmon
Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance pp. 108-124: Roger Congleton and Yongjing Zhang
Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game pp. 125-138: Robert Oxoby
Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan pp. 139-165: Karim Khan
Analytic radicalism pp. 166-172: Brad Taylor
Conservatism and radicalism pp. 173-176: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin

On the editorial transition pp. 1-1: Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt
A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders pp. 2-18: Anthony Evans and Nikolai Wenzel
On the problem of scale: Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the reinvention of the political state pp. 19-42: Benjamen Gussen
Veto players and foreign aid provision pp. 43-56: Yu Wang and Shuai Jin
Islamic constitutionalism and rule of law: a constitutional economics perspective pp. 57-85: Moamen Gouda

New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity pp. 279-301: Karsten Mause and Friedrich Groeteke
Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization pp. 302-336: Alexander Libman
The political economy of civil society pp. 337-356: Adrian Pabst and Roberto Scazzieri
State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture pp. 357-379: Paul Aligica and Vlad Tarko

Introductory note and acknowledgements pp. 181-181: Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard Wagner
The political economy of public debt pp. 182-198: Geoffrey Brennan
Indebted state versus intermediary state: who owes what to whom? pp. 199-212: Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard Wagner
Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009 pp. 213-243: J. Stephen Ferris, Stanley Winer and Bernard Grofman
A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts pp. 244-260: Reiner Eichenberger, David Stadelmann and Marco Portmann
Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons pp. 261-277: Richard Wagner

Economic freedom and growth. Which policies matter the most? pp. 95-133: Martin Rode and Sebastian Coll
Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states pp. 134-165: George Crowley
Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity pp. 166-180: Andreas Kyriacou

Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot pp. 1-21: George Tridimas
Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector pp. 22-44: Maoz Rosenthal
Designing the institutions of international liberalism: some contributions from the interwar period pp. 45-65: Fabio Masini
Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America pp. 66-93: John Dove

Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems pp. 303-324: Katharina Holzinger, Andrea Schneider and Klaus Zimmermann
The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration pp. 325-354: Barbara Dluhosch and Nikolai Ziegler
Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China pp. 355-372: Eric Ip and Michael Law
Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment pp. 373-397: Timo Tammi

Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process pp. 203-220: Jeremy Horpedahl
The political economy of constitutional restraints pp. 221-237: Dimitrios Xefteris
Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators pp. 238-264: Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt
The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures pp. 265-286: Gregory Randolph
Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation? pp. 287-301: Louis Jaeck

Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan pp. 103-121: O. Yap
Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany pp. 122-140: Joachim Zweynert
Making executive politics mutually productive and fair pp. 141-172: T. Durant
Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League pp. 173-190: Alexander Fink
Federalism and exit costs pp. 191-197: Gebhard Kirchgässner and Mark Schelker
Federalism and individual liberty: a rejoinder pp. 198-199: C. Mantzavinos
Vernon Smith, Rationality in economics: constructivist and ecological forms pp. 200-202: Maria Paganelli

Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy pp. 1-20: Viktor Vanberg
Enfranchisement from a political perspective pp. 21-57: Soumyanetra Munshi
A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens pp. 58-82: George Tridimas
A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization pp. 83-102: Thomas Döring and Jan Schnellenbach