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Constitutional Political Economy1990 - 2025
 Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt From SpringerBibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().
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 Volume 32, issue 4, 2021
 
  Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies   pp. 413-430 Giuseppe IeraciConstitutional monarchy as power sharing   pp. 431-461 George TridimasParties   pp. 462-475 Thomas SchwartzThe Acceptability of Accountability   pp. 476-501 John Bone, Paolo Crosetto, John Hey and Carmen PascaThe political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring   pp. 502-522 Friedrich HeinemannReview for constitutional political economy of the book by George C. Bitros, Emmanouil M. L. Economou and Nicholas C. Kyriazis   pp. 523-526 Bertram SchefoldCorrection to: Richard E. Wagner (Ed.): James M. Buchanan—A theorist of political economy and social philosophy   pp. 527-528 Karen Horn Volume 32, issue 3, 2021
 
  Fragile democracies and constitutional crises: a laboratory for studying the role of constitutional constraints   pp. 273-277 Monika Nalepa and Emilia Justyna PowellTransitional justice and authoritarian backsliding   pp. 278-300 Monika NalepaRiding the democracy train: incumbent-led paths to autocracy   pp. 301-325 İpek ÇınarTerm-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle   pp. 326-345 Zachary ElkinsVulnerability, due process, and reform in modern Mexico   pp. 346-375 Milena Ang and Yuna Blajer  de la GarzaIslam-based legal language and state governance: democracy, strength of the judiciary and human rights   pp. 376-412 Emilia Justyna Powell, Steven Christian McDowell, Robert O’Brien and Julia Oksasoglu Volume 32, issue 2, 2021
 
  Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state   pp. 145-164 Otto Lehto and John MeadowcroftThe calculus of democratic deliberation   pp. 165-186 Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard and Urs Steiner BrandtAre civil liberties contagious? Analysis of determinants of de facto civil rights protection in post-socialist countries   pp. 187-217 Anna LewczukThe demise of the Roman Republic: a faulty constitution?   pp. 218-232 Richard JankowskiPost-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?   pp. 233-265 Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska and Jacek LewkowiczPeter Bernholz’s: Totalitarianism, terrorism and supreme values: history and theory (Springer, 2017)   pp. 266-271 Thomas Baumert Volume 32, issue 1, 2021
 
  Power sharing at the local level: evidence on opting-in for non-citizen voting rights   pp. 1-30 Alois Stutzer and Michaela SlotwinskiThe politics within institutions for regulating public spending: conditional compliance within multi-year budgets   pp. 31-51 Bernard SteunenbergAnalysis of the implementation of information disclosure ordinances in Japan: the effect on the income of chief executives in local governments   pp. 52-67 Eiji Yamamura and Ryo IshidaComparing governments’ efficiency at supplying income redistribution   pp. 68-97 Fabio Padovano, Francesco Scervini and Gilberto TuratiCulture, democracy and regulation   pp. 98-126 Claudia R. WilliamsonThe political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe   pp. 127-143 Andrew T. Young Volume 31, issue 4, 2020
 
  Do inheritance rules affect voter turnout? Evidence from an Alpine region   pp. 395-445 Andrea Bonoldi, Chiara Dalle Nogare, Martin Mosler and Niklas PotrafkeQualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities   pp. 446-457 Dušan Pavlović and Dimitros XefterisThe impact of electoral rules on manufacturing industries: evidence of disaggregated data of 61 industries of 55 countries   pp. 458-488 Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung and Izaskun ZuazuThe impacts of civil society and inequality on the extractive capacity of authoritarian regimes: a conceptual model and the case study of Vietnam   pp. 489-508 Thai Q. Nguyen and Giang K. NguyenConstitutional power concentration and corruption: evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean   pp. 509-536 Andrea Sáenz  de Viteri Vázquez and Christian Bjørnskov Volume 31, issue 3, 2020
 
  What happens when voting rules change? the case of New Zealand   pp. 267-291 J. Stephen FerrisDoes the 4th estate deliver? The Political Coverage Index and its application to media capture   pp. 292-328 Ralf Dewenter, Uwe Dulleck and Tobias ThomasA panel data analysis of Latin American populism   pp. 329-343 Nicolas Cachanosky and Alexandre PadillaRole of political connections in land investment: evidence from rural India   pp. 344-362 Malik Altaf Hussain and Malvika TyagiAllocation of village public goods at community level: does political reservation help?   pp. 363-393 Vivekananda Mukherjee, Saheli Bose and Malabika Roy Volume 31, issue 2, 2020
 
  Generality and knowledge: Hayek's constitutional theory of the liberal state   pp. 145-168 Christopher S. Martin and Nikolai G. WenzelHow the Republic of Venice chose its Doge: lot-based elections and supermajority rule   pp. 169-187 M. Cristina MolinariBlockchains and constitutional catallaxy   pp. 188-204 Alastair Berg, Chris Berg and Mikayla NovakTurn-taking in office   pp. 205-226 Daniel SmithThe consistency of market beliefs as a determinant of economic freedom   pp. 227-258 Pál CzeglédiRichard E. Wagner (Ed.): James M. Buchanan—A theorist of political economy and social philosophy   pp. 259-265 Karen Horn Volume 31, issue 1, 2020
 
  Economic freedom and materialism: an empirical analysis   pp. 1-44 Megan V. Teague, Virgil Henry Storr and Rosemarie FikeJustice, what money can buy: a lab experiment on primary social goods and the Rawlsian difference principle   pp. 45-69 Joshua Chen-Yuan Teng, Joseph Wang and C. C. YangThe psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs   pp. 70-88 Brad R. TaylorMaking exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession   pp. 89-110 Martijn Huysmans and Christophe CrombezGovernance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism   pp. 111-141 Roger CongletonFortifying the fragile order of democracy   pp. 142-144 Stefan Kolev Volume 30, issue 4, 2019
 
  Perceptions of institutional quality and justification of tax evasion   pp. 367-382 Alvaro Forteza and Cecilia NoboaParliamentary and semi-presidential advantages in the sovereign credit market: democratic institutional design and sovereign credibility   pp. 383-406 Isa CamyarThe classical limits to police power and the economic foundations of the Slaughterhouse dissents   pp. 407-437 Nicola GiocoliDeterminants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption   pp. 438-466 Dennis Coates, Iuliia Naidenova and Petr ParshakovThe Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: a masterful compendium   pp. 467-479 Richard E. Wagner Volume 30, issue 3, 2019
 
  Collective choice in Aristotle   pp. 261-281 Adrian Miroiu and Catalin PartenieBusy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies   pp. 282-299 Anders GustafssonPublic R&D under different electoral rules: evidence from OECD countries   pp. 300-329 Pijus KrūminasSanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting: theory and experimental results   pp. 330-357 Kai Konrad and Raisa SherifSheilagh Ogilvie: The European guilds: an economic analysis   pp. 358-362 Sebastian CollGovernance and the political entrepreneur   pp. 363-366 Oliver Schmidt Volume 30, issue 2, 2019
 
  Governance and the dimensions of autocracy   pp. 131-148 Ryan MurphyDo parliamentary gender quotas decrease gender inequality? The case of African countries   pp. 149-176 Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl and Iyabo ObasanjoChoregia and trierarchy as profit-oriented entrepreneurships   pp. 177-193 Joshua Günther and Felix HahnSignals from a politicized bar: the solicitor general as a direct litigant before the U.S. Supreme Court   pp. 194-210 Scott S. BodderyBootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking   pp. 211-234 Patrick A. McLaughlin, Adam C. Smith and Russell SobelA decentralized cooperative solution to the iterated pacifist’s dilemma game: notes in the margin of Pinker’s theory of Leviathan   pp. 235-260 Matti Vuorensyrjä Volume 30, issue 1, 2019
 
  Electoral systems and the economy: a firm-level analysis   pp. 1-30 Isa Camyar and Bahar UlupinarUsing tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success   pp. 31-49 J. Zachary KlingensmithPolitical polarization, term length and too much delegation   pp. 50-69 Carsten HefekerEscape from Europe: a calculus of consent model of the origins of liberal institutions in the North American colonies   pp. 70-95 Vlad Tarko and Kyle O’DonnellLiberalism and great upheaval: What did classical liberals do in the Tsarist Russia?   pp. 96-113 Leonid Krasnozhon and Mykola BunykMetaphysical justification for an economic constitution? Franz Böhm and the concept of natural law   pp. 114-129 Daniel Nientiedt |  |