Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Volume 32, issue 4, 2021

Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies pp. 413-430

Giuseppe Ieraci

Constitutional monarchy as power sharing pp. 431-461

George Tridimas

Parties pp. 462-475

Thomas Schwartz

The Acceptability of Accountability pp. 476-501

John Bone, Paolo Crosetto, John Hey and Carmen Pasca

The political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring pp. 502-522

Friedrich Heinemann

Review for constitutional political economy of the book by George C. Bitros, Emmanouil M. L. Economou and Nicholas C. Kyriazis pp. 523-526

Bertram Schefold

Correction to: Richard E. Wagner (Ed.): James M. Buchanan—A theorist of political economy and social philosophy pp. 527-528

Karen Horn

Volume 32, issue 3, 2021

Fragile democracies and constitutional crises: a laboratory for studying the role of constitutional constraints pp. 273-277

Monika Nalepa and Emilia Justyna Powell

Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding pp. 278-300

Monika Nalepa

Riding the democracy train: incumbent-led paths to autocracy pp. 301-325

İpek Çınar

Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle pp. 326-345

Zachary Elkins

Vulnerability, due process, and reform in modern Mexico pp. 346-375

Milena Ang and Yuna Blajer de la Garza

Islam-based legal language and state governance: democracy, strength of the judiciary and human rights pp. 376-412

Emilia Justyna Powell, Steven Christian McDowell, Robert O’Brien and Julia Oksasoglu

Volume 32, issue 2, 2021

Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state pp. 145-164

Otto Lehto and John Meadowcroft

The calculus of democratic deliberation pp. 165-186

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard and Urs Steiner Brandt

Are civil liberties contagious? Analysis of determinants of de facto civil rights protection in post-socialist countries pp. 187-217

Anna Lewczuk

The demise of the Roman Republic: a faulty constitution? pp. 218-232

Richard Jankowski

Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter? pp. 233-265

Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska and Jacek Lewkowicz

Peter Bernholz’s: Totalitarianism, terrorism and supreme values: history and theory (Springer, 2017) pp. 266-271

Thomas Baumert

Volume 32, issue 1, 2021

Power sharing at the local level: evidence on opting-in for non-citizen voting rights pp. 1-30

Alois Stutzer and Michaela Slotwinski

The politics within institutions for regulating public spending: conditional compliance within multi-year budgets pp. 31-51

Bernard Steunenberg

Analysis of the implementation of information disclosure ordinances in Japan: the effect on the income of chief executives in local governments pp. 52-67

Eiji Yamamura and Ryo Ishida

Comparing governments’ efficiency at supplying income redistribution pp. 68-97

Fabio Padovano, Francesco Scervini and Gilberto Turati

Culture, democracy and regulation pp. 98-126

Claudia R. Williamson

The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe pp. 127-143

Andrew T. Young

Volume 31, issue 4, 2020

Do inheritance rules affect voter turnout? Evidence from an Alpine region pp. 395-445

Andrea Bonoldi, Chiara Dalle Nogare, Martin Mosler and Niklas Potrafke

Qualifying the common pool problem in government spending: the role of positional externalities pp. 446-457

Dušan Pavlović and Dimitros Xefteris

The impact of electoral rules on manufacturing industries: evidence of disaggregated data of 61 industries of 55 countries pp. 458-488

Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung and Izaskun Zuazu

The impacts of civil society and inequality on the extractive capacity of authoritarian regimes: a conceptual model and the case study of Vietnam pp. 489-508

Thai Q. Nguyen and Giang K. Nguyen

Constitutional power concentration and corruption: evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean pp. 509-536

Andrea Sáenz de Viteri Vázquez and Christian Bjørnskov

Volume 31, issue 3, 2020

What happens when voting rules change? the case of New Zealand pp. 267-291

J. Stephen Ferris

Does the 4th estate deliver? The Political Coverage Index and its application to media capture pp. 292-328

Ralf Dewenter, Uwe Dulleck and Tobias Thomas

A panel data analysis of Latin American populism pp. 329-343

Nicolas Cachanosky and Alexandre Padilla

Role of political connections in land investment: evidence from rural India pp. 344-362

Malik Altaf Hussain and Malvika Tyagi

Allocation of village public goods at community level: does political reservation help? pp. 363-393

Vivekananda Mukherjee, Saheli Bose and Malabika Roy

Volume 31, issue 2, 2020

Generality and knowledge: Hayek's constitutional theory of the liberal state pp. 145-168

Christopher S. Martin and Nikolai G. Wenzel

How the Republic of Venice chose its Doge: lot-based elections and supermajority rule pp. 169-187

M. Cristina Molinari

Blockchains and constitutional catallaxy pp. 188-204

Alastair Berg, Chris Berg and Mikayla Novak

Turn-taking in office pp. 205-226

Daniel Smith

The consistency of market beliefs as a determinant of economic freedom pp. 227-258

Pál Czeglédi

Richard E. Wagner (Ed.): James M. Buchanan—A theorist of political economy and social philosophy pp. 259-265

Karen Horn

Volume 31, issue 1, 2020

Economic freedom and materialism: an empirical analysis pp. 1-44

Megan V. Teague, Virgil Henry Storr and Rosemarie Fike

Justice, what money can buy: a lab experiment on primary social goods and the Rawlsian difference principle pp. 45-69

Joshua Chen-Yuan Teng, Joseph Wang and C. C. Yang

The psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs pp. 70-88

Brad R. Taylor

Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession pp. 89-110

Martijn Huysmans and Christophe Crombez

Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism pp. 111-141

Roger Congleton

Fortifying the fragile order of democracy pp. 142-144

Stefan Kolev

Volume 30, issue 4, 2019

Perceptions of institutional quality and justification of tax evasion pp. 367-382

Alvaro Forteza and Cecilia Noboa

Parliamentary and semi-presidential advantages in the sovereign credit market: democratic institutional design and sovereign credibility pp. 383-406

Isa Camyar

The classical limits to police power and the economic foundations of the Slaughterhouse dissents pp. 407-437

Nicola Giocoli

Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption pp. 438-466

Dennis Coates, Iuliia Naidenova and Petr Parshakov

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: a masterful compendium pp. 467-479

Richard E. Wagner

Volume 30, issue 3, 2019

Collective choice in Aristotle pp. 261-281

Adrian Miroiu and Catalin Partenie

Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies pp. 282-299

Anders Gustafsson

Public R&D under different electoral rules: evidence from OECD countries pp. 300-329

Pijus Krūminas

Sanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting: theory and experimental results pp. 330-357

Kai Konrad and Raisa Sherif

Sheilagh Ogilvie: The European guilds: an economic analysis pp. 358-362

Sebastian Coll

Governance and the political entrepreneur pp. 363-366

Oliver Schmidt

Volume 30, issue 2, 2019

Governance and the dimensions of autocracy pp. 131-148

Ryan Murphy

Do parliamentary gender quotas decrease gender inequality? The case of African countries pp. 149-176

Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl and Iyabo Obasanjo

Choregia and trierarchy as profit-oriented entrepreneurships pp. 177-193

Joshua Günther and Felix Hahn

Signals from a politicized bar: the solicitor general as a direct litigant before the U.S. Supreme Court pp. 194-210

Scott S. Boddery

Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking pp. 211-234

Patrick A. McLaughlin, Adam C. Smith and Russell Sobel

A decentralized cooperative solution to the iterated pacifist’s dilemma game: notes in the margin of Pinker’s theory of Leviathan pp. 235-260

Matti Vuorensyrjä

Volume 30, issue 1, 2019

Electoral systems and the economy: a firm-level analysis pp. 1-30

Isa Camyar and Bahar Ulupinar

Using tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success pp. 31-49

J. Zachary Klingensmith

Political polarization, term length and too much delegation pp. 50-69

Carsten Hefeker

Escape from Europe: a calculus of consent model of the origins of liberal institutions in the North American colonies pp. 70-95

Vlad Tarko and Kyle O’Donnell

Liberalism and great upheaval: What did classical liberals do in the Tsarist Russia? pp. 96-113

Leonid Krasnozhon and Mykola Bunyk

Metaphysical justification for an economic constitution? Franz Böhm and the concept of natural law pp. 114-129

Daniel Nientiedt