Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Volume 12, issue 4, 2001

Constitutional Constraints and Redistributive Activities pp. 291-311

Anders Bornefalk

Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada pp. 313-331

Robert Erikson and Mikhail Filippov

Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions pp. 333-349

Pierre Salmon

Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues? pp. 351-370

Bernard Steunenberg

Scott Gordon (1999) Controlling the State: Constitutionalism From Ancient Athens To Today. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 361 pp., $59.95 pp. 371-373

Jacob Levy

Harry Brighouse (2000) School Choice and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 222 pp., $29.95 pp. 375-378

William Howell

Volume 12, issue 3, 2001

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy pp. 193-215

Roger Congleton

An Entrepreneurial Perspective of Institutional Change pp. 217-236

Tony Yu

On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach pp. 237-253

José Casas–Pardo and Juan Montoro–Pons

A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications pp. 255-272

C.Y. Chu and Wen-Fang Liu

Peter Moser (2000) The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 193 pp., $85 pp. 273-275

Niclas Berggren

Stefan Voigt (1999) Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 264 pp., $90 pp. 277-279

Keith Whittington

Volume 12, issue 2, 2001

Introduction to the Symposium on Federalism pp. 91-92

Dennis Mueller

Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization pp. 93-121

Robin Boadway

Funding Versus Control in Intergovernmental Relations pp. 123-140

Clayton Gillette

Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline pp. 141-160

Robert Inman

Centralism, Federalism, and the Nature of Individual Preferences pp. 161-172

Dennis Mueller

Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from South Africa pp. 173-187

Daniel Rubinfeld

Volume 12, issue 1, 2001

Monetary Constitution, Political-Economic Regime, and Long-Term Inflation pp. 3-12

Peter Bernholz

An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action: Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good pp. 13-29

Stephan Kuhnert

Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform pp. 31-50

Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio

Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation pp. 51-75

Suri Ratnapala

Reviews pp. 77-79

Giulio Gallarotti

Reviews pp. 81-84

Thomas Leonard

Volume 11, issue 4, 2000

The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax pp. 295-318

Frank Buckley and Eric Rasmusen

The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth pp. 319-337

Seth Norton

Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon pp. 339-352

Leonard Wantchekon

Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion pp. 353-369

Niclas Berggren

Constitutions as Commitment or Coordination Device? Comment on C. Azariadis and V. Galasso: Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy pp. 371-374

Martin Kolmar

Reply to Kolmar's Comment pp. 375-375

Costas Azariadis and Vincenzo Galasso

Volume 11, issue 3, 2000

Privatization, Land Reform, and Property Rights: the Mexican Experience pp. 215-230

Malcolm Dunn

The Origins of the State from Reciprocity to Coercive Power pp. 231-253

José Molinero

William Hutt and the Economics of Apartheid pp. 255-264

Peter Lewin

Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis pp. 265-279

Martin Leschke

Robert Jervis: System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life pp. 281-283

Giulio Gallarotti

Steven G. Medema (Ed.): Coasean Economics: Lawn and Economics and the New Institutional Economics pp. 285-288

Thomas Leonard

Volume 11, issue 2, 2000

Latent Theoretical Convergence upon a Pluralist Conception of Economic Action: Adam Smith and Max Weber pp. 119-145

Milan Zafirovski

Interest Groups, Referenda, and the Political Process: On the Efficiency of Direct Democracy pp. 147-163

Klaus Zimmermann and Tobias Just

Institutions Meet Mind: The Way out of a Deadlock pp. 165-180

Salvatore Rizzello and Margherita Turvani

Continuous Time Models of Collective Action and Political Change pp. 181-198

Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi

Reviews pp. 199-203

James Bond

Reviews pp. 205-209

Todd Zywicki

Volume 11, issue 1, 2000

Editorial pp. 3-3

Dennis Mueller

A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy pp. 5-25

Sebastiano Bavetta and Fabio Padovano

The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View pp. 27-39

Charles Blankart

Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union pp. 41-57

Christophe Crombez

Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority pp. 59-67

Domenico Da Empoli

From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy pp. 69-86

Paulo Pereira

Globalization, Democracy, and Citizens' Sovereignty: Can Competition Among Governments Enhance Democracy? 1 pp. 87-112

Viktor Vanberg

Volume 10, issue 4, 1999

Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union pp. 327-338

Roland Vaubel

A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle pp. 339-353

Niclas Berggren

Transformation or Transmogrification? Ackerman, Hobbes (as in Calvin and Hobbes), and the Puzzle of Changing Constitutional Identity pp. 355-365

John Finn

The Voice of the People pp. 367-374

Alan Hamlin

On Ackerman's Justification of Irregular Constitutional Change: Is Any Vice You Get Away With a Virtue? pp. 375-383

Robert Higgs

On Amending Constitutions pp. 385-396

Dennis Mueller

Who are “We The People”? Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Jefferson, and the Problem of Revolutionary Reform pp. 397-404

Peter Onuf

From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution pp. 405-414

Keith Whittington

Constitutional Economics--Constitutional Politics pp. 415-424

Bruce Ackerman

Volume 10, issue 3, 1999

Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules pp. 211-218

James Buchanan and Yong Yoon

Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism pp. 219-243

Viktor Vanberg

Conventions and Economic Change: A Contribution toward a Theory of Political Economy pp. 245-264

Young Choi

The Virtue of Installing Veto Players pp. 265-282

Shyh-Fang Ueng

Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions pp. 283-300

Stefan Voigt

Volume 10, issue 2, 1999

Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States pp. 119-148

Dennis Mueller

How Not to Write a Constitution—The Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaties pp. 149-166

Frank Vibert

On the Constitution of a Compound Republic pp. 167-175

William Niskanen

Is There an Optimal Constitution? pp. 177-184

Joao Faria

Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life: An Empirical Analysis pp. 185-197

Alfredo Esposto and Peter Zaleski

Volume 10, issue 1, 1999

Party Fragmentation and Presidential Elections in Post-Communist Democracies pp. 3-26

Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova

Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependency during Transitions: Cases from Russia pp. 27-52

Michael McFaul

Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries pp. 53-88

Matthew Shugart

The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox pp. 89-105

Thomas Schwartz