Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting pp. 263-285: Bernhard Boockmann
The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem pp. 287-299: Varouj Aivazian and Jeffrey Callen
Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms pp. 301-317: Maurizio Mistri
The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court pp. 319-333: Albert Breton and Angela Fraschini
Hayek Contra Pangloss: A Rejoinder pp. 335-338: Douglas Whitman
Reviews pp. 339-341: Tyler Cowen
Reviews pp. 343-346: Steven Medema

A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement pp. 167-190: Roger Congleton, Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria
Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects pp. 191-212: Olga Shvetsova
Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition pp. 213-233: Oliver Budzinski
European Monetary Integration and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of Macroeconomic Policy Making pp. 235-251: Lucia Quaglia
Review pp. 253-258: Robert Frank

The Disunity of Unanimity pp. 83-94: Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi
Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited pp. 95-105: Zane Spindler and Xavier De Vanssay
The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement pp. 107-118: Daniel Sutter and Lee Coppock
Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust pp. 119-140: Benno Torgler
A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO pp. 141-154: Gabriele Orcalli
Review pp. 155-158: Roger Backhouse

The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order pp. 3-21: Sujai Shivakumar
Principles for a European Union's Public Debt pp. 23-37: Christoph Gwosć and Gregor Van Der Beek
A Supply and Demand Exposition of a Constitutional Tax Loophole: The Case of Tariff Symmetry pp. 39-45: Robert Mcguire and T. Van Cott
Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability pp. 47-70: Fabio Padovano, Grazia Sgarra and Nadia Fiorino
Reviews pp. 71-74: Thomas Leonard
Reviews pp. 75-77: Hans Despain

Expressive Constitutionalism pp. 299-311: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
Towards a European Social Union: Impacts on Labor Markets in the Acceding Countries pp. 313-335: Ansgar Belke and Martin Hebler
Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts pp. 337-359: Andreas Wagener
The Evolution of the Social Contract pp. 361-379: Adam Gifford

Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy pp. 223-246: Michael Wohlgemuth
Comparative Administrative Procedure: Evidence from Northeast Asia pp. 247-264: Tom Ginsburg
How Leviathan Taxes pp. 265-273: Klaus Beckmann and Elisabeth Lackner-Frey
Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman pp. 275-285: Andy Denis
Reviews pp. 287-290: Richard Adelstein
Reviews pp. 291-292: Matthew Baker

The Evolution of Institutions: An Agenda for Future Theoretical Research pp. 111-127: Geoffrey Hodgson
The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations pp. 129-148: Thorbjørn Knudsen
The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values pp. 149-172: Christian Sartorius
Stone Age Minds and Group Selection – What difference do they make? pp. 173-195: Jack Vromen
Subjective Diversity and Social Learning: A Cognitive Perspective for Understanding Institutional Behavior pp. 197-210: Salvatore Rizzello and Margherita Turvani
Review pp. 211-213: Adam Gifford
Review pp. 215-218: John Harrison

Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other than the Countries they Serve? pp. 3-24: Peter Ordeshook
On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe pp. 25-52: Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt
MARKET MAKING AS STATE MAKING: Constitutions and Economic Development in Post-communist Eastern Europe pp. 53-72: László Bruszt
The Demand for Constitutional Law pp. 73-87: Katharina Pistor
What Belongs in a Constitution? pp. 89-105: Ruth Gavison

Constitutional Constraints and Redistributive Activities pp. 291-311: Anders Bornefalk
Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada pp. 313-331: Robert Erikson and Mikhail Filippov
Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions pp. 333-349: Pierre Salmon
Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues? pp. 351-370: Bernard Steunenberg
Scott Gordon (1999) Controlling the State: Constitutionalism From Ancient Athens To Today. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 361 pp., $59.95 pp. 371-373: Jacob Levy
Harry Brighouse (2000) School Choice and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 222 pp., $29.95 pp. 375-378: William Howell

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy pp. 193-215: Roger Congleton
An Entrepreneurial Perspective of Institutional Change pp. 217-236: Tony Yu
On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach pp. 237-253: José Casas–Pardo and Juan Montoro–Pons
A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications pp. 255-272: C.Y. Chu and Wen-Fang Liu
Peter Moser (2000) The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 193 pp., $85 pp. 273-275: Niclas Berggren
Stefan Voigt (1999) Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 264 pp., $90 pp. 277-279: Keith Whittington

Introduction to the Symposium on Federalism pp. 91-92: Dennis Mueller
Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization pp. 93-121: Robin Boadway
Funding Versus Control in Intergovernmental Relations pp. 123-140: Clayton Gillette
Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline pp. 141-160: Robert Inman
Centralism, Federalism, and the Nature of Individual Preferences pp. 161-172: Dennis Mueller
Structuring Intergovernmental Grants to Local Governments: Lessons from South Africa pp. 173-187: Daniel Rubinfeld

Monetary Constitution, Political-Economic Regime, and Long-Term Inflation pp. 3-12: Peter Bernholz
An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action: Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good pp. 13-29: Stephan Kuhnert
Election Re-Running and the Nature of Constitutional Choices: The Case of Italian Electoral Reform pp. 31-50: Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation pp. 51-75: Suri Ratnapala
Reviews pp. 77-79: Giulio Gallarotti
Reviews pp. 81-84: Thomas Leonard