Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries pp. 315-338: Sandra Joireman
Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform pp. 339-358: Gerhard Wegner
A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums pp. 359-370: Marc-Jean Martin
Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich pp. 371-381: Franklin Mixon, W. Charles Sawyer and Len Treviño
Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities pp. 383-389: Thomas Schwartz

The Invisible Hand of James Madison pp. 223-237: David Prindle
Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies pp. 239-259: Kjell Hausken, Christian W. Martin and Thomas Plümper
The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework pp. 261-280: Anne van Aaken, Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt
Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History pp. 281-304: Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano
Review: Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner (eds.) (2001) Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 351 pp., $39.00 (hardcover), $20.00 (paperback) pp. 305-307: Thomas Schelling

An Introduction to the Status Quo pp. 127-132: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
The Status of the Status Quo pp. 133-144: James Buchanan
Can We Know the Status Quo? pp. 145-151: Roger L. Faith
The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective pp. 153-170: Viktor J. Vanberg
Contractarianism as Liberal Conservatism: Buchanan's Unfinished Philosophical Agenda pp. 171-185: Hartmut Kliemt
On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility pp. 187-204: Mark S. Peacock
Review pp. 205-213: Dennis C. Mueller

Fiscal Constitutions pp. 3-25: Hans Gersbach
The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution pp. 27-76: Fritz Breuss and Markus Eller
Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy pp. 77-88: Eric Crampton and Andrew Farrant
Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence pp. 89-107: Stefano Solari

Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting pp. 263-285: Bernhard Boockmann
The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem pp. 287-299: Varouj Aivazian and Jeffrey Callen
Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms pp. 301-317: Maurizio Mistri
The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court pp. 319-333: Albert Breton and Angela Fraschini
Hayek Contra Pangloss: A Rejoinder pp. 335-338: Douglas Whitman
Reviews pp. 339-341: Tyler Cowen
Reviews pp. 343-346: Steven Medema

A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement pp. 167-190: Roger Congleton, Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria
Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects pp. 191-212: Olga Shvetsova
Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition pp. 213-233: Oliver Budzinski
European Monetary Integration and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of Macroeconomic Policy Making pp. 235-251: Lucia Quaglia
Review pp. 253-258: Robert Frank

The Disunity of Unanimity pp. 83-94: Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi
Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited pp. 95-105: Zane Spindler and Xavier De Vanssay
The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement pp. 107-118: Daniel Sutter and Lee Coppock
Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust pp. 119-140: Benno Torgler
A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO pp. 141-154: Gabriele Orcalli
Review pp. 155-158: Roger Backhouse

The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order pp. 3-21: Sujai Shivakumar
Principles for a European Union's Public Debt pp. 23-37: Christoph Gwosć and Gregor Van Der Beek
A Supply and Demand Exposition of a Constitutional Tax Loophole: The Case of Tariff Symmetry pp. 39-45: Robert Mcguire and T. Van Cott
Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability pp. 47-70: Fabio Padovano, Grazia Sgarra and Nadia Fiorino
Reviews pp. 71-74: Thomas Leonard
Reviews pp. 75-77: Hans Despain

Expressive Constitutionalism pp. 299-311: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
Towards a European Social Union: Impacts on Labor Markets in the Acceding Countries pp. 313-335: Ansgar Belke and Martin Hebler
Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts pp. 337-359: Andreas Wagener
The Evolution of the Social Contract pp. 361-379: Adam Gifford

Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy pp. 223-246: Michael Wohlgemuth
Comparative Administrative Procedure: Evidence from Northeast Asia pp. 247-264: Tom Ginsburg
How Leviathan Taxes pp. 265-273: Klaus Beckmann and Elisabeth Lackner-Frey
Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman pp. 275-285: Andy Denis
Reviews pp. 287-290: Richard Adelstein
Reviews pp. 291-292: Matthew Baker

The Evolution of Institutions: An Agenda for Future Theoretical Research pp. 111-127: Geoffrey Hodgson
The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations pp. 129-148: Thorbjørn Knudsen
The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values pp. 149-172: Christian Sartorius
Stone Age Minds and Group Selection – What difference do they make? pp. 173-195: Jack Vromen
Subjective Diversity and Social Learning: A Cognitive Perspective for Understanding Institutional Behavior pp. 197-210: Salvatore Rizzello and Margherita Turvani
Review pp. 211-213: Adam Gifford
Review pp. 215-218: John Harrison

Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other than the Countries they Serve? pp. 3-24: Peter Ordeshook
On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe pp. 25-52: Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt
MARKET MAKING AS STATE MAKING: Constitutions and Economic Development in Post-communist Eastern Europe pp. 53-72: László Bruszt
The Demand for Constitutional Law pp. 73-87: Katharina Pistor
What Belongs in a Constitution? pp. 89-105: Ruth Gavison