Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

From Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Partially sighted persons and the public debt elephant pp. 237-249: John Considine and David Duffy
Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms pp. 251-276: Peter Grajzl and Peter Murrell
Between European integration and regional autonomy: the case of Italy from an economic perspective pp. 277-301: Marco Montanari
Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India pp. 303-324: Jaivir Singh

Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade pp. 133-163: Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy pp. 165-187: Michele Santoni and Francesco Zucchini
Germany and Italy: conflicting policy paradigms towards European monetary integration? pp. 189-205: Ivo Maes and Lucia Quaglia
Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members pp. 207-216: Pierre-Guillaume Méon
Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik pp. 217-235: Niclas Berggren

Constitutional Interpretation: Burke and Buchanan and their 18th Century Intellectual Roots pp. 71-85: John Considine
Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’ pp. 87-101: Peter Schwarz
The Political Foundations of Development: The Case of Botswana pp. 103-115: Scott Beaulier and J. Subrick
Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan pp. 117-132: Jan Schnellenbach

The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making pp. 5-13: Torsten Selck
“Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration pp. 15-29: Nathan Griffith
Reflections on the Origins of the Polis pp. 31-48: Carl Hampus Lyttkens
The emergence of institutions in Hayek’s theory: two views or one? pp. 49-61: Stefano Fiori
Review pp. 63-66: Thomas Leonard

Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis pp. 327-346: Xavier Vanssay, Vincent Hildebrand and Zane Spindler
Constitutional Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy pp. 347-368: Cindy Skach
The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy pp. 369-386: J. Faíña-Medín, Antonio García-Lorenzo and Jesus Lopez-Rodriguez
Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition pp. 387-395: Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi

Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms pp. 227-247: Luciano Andreozzi
The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality pp. 249-276: Gianluca Grimalda and Lorenzo Sacconi
Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World pp. 277-284: Mark Jackson
The Common Law Character of English Charters: Spontaneous Order in the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164) pp. 285-311: Robert Mulligan
Book Review: S TEVEN D. L EVITT and S TEPHEN J. D UBNER (2005) Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. New York: WilliamMorrow. 242 pp., $25.95 pp. 313-317: Thomas Leonard

Riker and Federalism pp. 93-111: Mikhail Filippov
Federal Stability in Unequal Societies pp. 113-124: Simon Hug
Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy pp. 125-141: Olga Shvetsova
Pawns Take Queen: The Destabilizing Effects of Regional Parties in Europe pp. 143-159: Dawn Brancati
Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution pp. 161-188: Erik Wibbels
Federalism as a Public Good pp. 189-205: Jenna Bednar
“The Myth of Ownership” Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel pp. 207-219: Geoffrey Brennan

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government pp. 5-30: George Tridmas
Postwar Reconstruction: Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics pp. 31-48: Tyler Cowen and Christopher Coyne
Addressing Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutions and Agency pp. 49-69: Omotunde Johnson
Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective pp. 71-83: George Selgin and Lawrence White

Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries pp. 315-338: Sandra Joireman
Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform pp. 339-358: Gerhard Wegner
A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums pp. 359-370: Marc-Jean Martin
Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich pp. 371-381: Franklin Mixon, W. Charles Sawyer and Len Treviño
Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities pp. 383-389: Thomas Schwartz

The Invisible Hand of James Madison pp. 223-237: David Prindle
Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies pp. 239-259: Kjell Hausken, Christian W. Martin and Thomas Plümper
The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework pp. 261-280: Anne van Aaken, Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt
Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History pp. 281-304: Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano
Review: Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner (eds.) (2001) Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 351 pp., $39.00 (hardcover), $20.00 (paperback) pp. 305-307: Thomas Schelling

An Introduction to the Status Quo pp. 127-132: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
The Status of the Status Quo pp. 133-144: James Buchanan
Can We Know the Status Quo? pp. 145-151: Roger L. Faith
The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective pp. 153-170: Viktor J. Vanberg
Contractarianism as Liberal Conservatism: Buchanan's Unfinished Philosophical Agenda pp. 171-185: Hartmut Kliemt
On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility pp. 187-204: Mark S. Peacock
Review pp. 205-213: Dennis C. Mueller

Fiscal Constitutions pp. 3-25: Hans Gersbach
The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution pp. 27-76: Fritz Breuss and Markus Eller
Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy pp. 77-88: Eric Crampton and Andrew Farrant
Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence pp. 89-107: Stefano Solari