Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Benjamin Constant and Carl Schmitt Go to Russia pp. 271-282: Vladimir Gligorov
Asian Values and the Constitutional Order of Contemporary Singapore pp. 283-300: David Jones
Friedrich Hayek's Theory of Spontaneous Order: Two Problems pp. 301-317: Elias Khalil
Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations pp. 319-335: Daniel Klein
Convergence of Income Distributions: Another Measurement Problem pp. 337-352: Barbara Dluhosch
David Boaz (1997) Libertarianism: A Primer pp. 353-354: Bruce Benson
Cass R. Sunstein (1996) Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict pp. 355-358: Todd Zywicki
Matt Ridley (1997) The Origins of Virtue pp. 359-361: Donald Boudreaux

Differing World-Views and Collective Action: The Case of Research pp. 179-194: Horst Hegmann
Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process pp. 195-213: Thomas Schaller
Constitutional Contractarianism pp. 215-224: Robert Ehman
The Formation of Economic Policy: A Cognitive-Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making pp. 225-254: Tilman Slembeck
Reviews pp. 255-259: Daniel Klein
Reviews pp. 261-264: Andrew Rutten

Editorial Note pp. 103-103: Viktor Vanberg and Richard Wagner
Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons pp. 105-122: Viktor Vanberg
The Political Economy of Frank Knight: Classical Liberalism from Chicago pp. 123-138: Razeen Sally
Enforcing Constitutional Constraints pp. 139-150: Daniel Sutter
The Separation of Spending from Taxation: Implications for Collective Choices pp. 151-163: Michael Marlow and William Orzechowski
Dennis C. Mueller: Constitutional Democracy pp. 165-167: Dwight Lee
Lansing Pollock: The Free Society pp. 169-171: Jody Lipford

Some Reflections on The Calculus of Consent pp. 3-13: Michael Brooks
The Emergence of Constitutional Rights pp. 15-36: Ejan Mackaay
Exploring the Production of Social Order pp. 37-55: Jody Lipford and Bruce Yandle
Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels? pp. 57-70: Thomas Apolte
Competence Catalogues and the Principle of Subsidiarity in a European Constitution pp. 71-87: Christian Kirchner
Reviews pp. 89-95: Peter Boettke

Europe as social reality pp. 253-256: James Buchanan
The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint pp. 257-265: Charles Blankart
A directly democratic and Federal Europe pp. 267-279: Bruno Frey
Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution pp. 281-291: Randall Holcombe
Constitutional quandaries in Europe pp. 293-302: Dennis Mueller
Faustian bargains pp. 303-308: Vincent Ostrom
Vibert's European union: A United Nations or a United States? pp. 309-316: Russell Sobel
The constitutional future of the European Union pp. 317-324: Roland Vaubel

Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates pp. 167-176: Erich Weede
Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist pp. 177-196: Stefan Voigt
A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics pp. 197-219: Steven Kan and Chun-Sin Hwang
Language orders pp. 221-238: Richard Adelstein
Review pp. 239-241: Richard Wagner

Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis pp. 79-102: Roland Vaubel
Rawls, rules and objectives: A critique of the two principles of justice pp. 103-126: Dan Usher
Work supply and constitutional order pp. 127-131: Jiro Obata
James Buchanan's contributions to social and economic thought: Citation counts, self-assessment, and peer review pp. 133-151: Garey Durden and Steven Millsaps
Reviews pp. 153-160: Richard Wagner and Wolfgang Kerber

Public choice interpretations of distributional preference pp. 3-20: Harold Hochman
Public choice versus constitutional economics: A methodological interpretation of the Buchanan research program pp. 21-34: Ingo Pies
Consistent planning, backwards induction, and rule-governed behavior pp. 35-48: Christian Koboldt
Between the constitution and the deep blue sea: Contractual controls on opportunism aboard pirate vessels pp. 49-61: Gary Anderson and Adam Gifford
Reviews pp. 63-71: Georg Vanberg and Michael Brooks