Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Europe as social reality pp. 253-256: James Buchanan
The European Union's debt question: A conceptional viewpoint pp. 257-265: Charles Blankart
A directly democratic and Federal Europe pp. 267-279: Bruno Frey
Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution pp. 281-291: Randall Holcombe
Constitutional quandaries in Europe pp. 293-302: Dennis Mueller
Faustian bargains pp. 303-308: Vincent Ostrom
Vibert's European union: A United Nations or a United States? pp. 309-316: Russell Sobel
The constitutional future of the European Union pp. 317-324: Roland Vaubel

Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates pp. 167-176: Erich Weede
Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist pp. 177-196: Stefan Voigt
A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics pp. 197-219: Steven Kan and Chun-Sin Hwang
Language orders pp. 221-238: Richard Adelstein
Review pp. 239-241: Richard Wagner

Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis pp. 79-102: Roland Vaubel
Rawls, rules and objectives: A critique of the two principles of justice pp. 103-126: Dan Usher
Work supply and constitutional order pp. 127-131: Jiro Obata
James Buchanan's contributions to social and economic thought: Citation counts, self-assessment, and peer review pp. 133-151: Garey Durden and Steven Millsaps
Reviews pp. 153-160: Richard Wagner and Wolfgang Kerber

Public choice interpretations of distributional preference pp. 3-20: Harold Hochman
Public choice versus constitutional economics: A methodological interpretation of the Buchanan research program pp. 21-34: Ingo Pies
Consistent planning, backwards induction, and rule-governed behavior pp. 35-48: Christian Koboldt
Between the constitution and the deep blue sea: Contractual controls on opportunism aboard pirate vessels pp. 49-61: Gary Anderson and Adam Gifford
Reviews pp. 63-71: Georg Vanberg and Michael Brooks

Toward a theory of spontaneous law pp. 211-231: Francesco Parisi
Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model pp. 233-245: Hans Grüner
Do firms plan? pp. 247-261: Richard Langlois
Bounded governance within extended order: The Confucian advantage of synergy under generalized constitutional rules pp. 263-279: Dengjian Jin
Economics as mechanism: The mind as machine in Hayek's sensory order pp. 281-292: David Tuerck
The metamorphosis of John Gray pp. 293-295: James Buchanan

If Hamilton and Madison were merely lucky, what hope is there for Russian federalism? pp. 107-126: Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova
Constitutional politics within the interest-group model pp. 127-137: Daniel Sutter
Preparing Africa for the twenty-first century: Lessons from constitutional economics pp. 139-160: John Mbaku
Constitutional design and economic performance pp. 161-169: Alvaro Montenegro
Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion pp. 171-190: Donald Boudreaux, Jody Lipford and Bruce Yandle
Constitutional implications of alternative models of increasing returns pp. 191-196: James Buchanan and Yong Yoon
Reviews pp. 197-204: Christopher Morris and Richard Wagner

Democracy, dictatorship, and transformation: A proposal for a constitution-guided systematic change in formerly Soviet republics pp. 5-20: Thomas Apolte
Institutions, quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education pp. 21-33: Samuel Staley and John Blair
Economizing on virtue pp. 35-56: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West pp. 57-69: Carsten Hefeker
Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective pp. 71-96: Michael Wohlgemuth
Reviews pp. 97-102: Donald Boudreaux and Nicolai Foss

Manipulating uncertainty pp. 255-271: Antonio Barbosa
Club governments versus representative governments pp. 273-285: Charles Blankart
A constitutional theory of public enterprise pp. 287-306: Larry Kiser
Avoiding the mistreatment of bad risks in a democracy: Universal Health Insurance from a constitutional perspective pp. 307-318: Mark Pauly
The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht pp. 319-353: Manfred Streit and Werner Mussler
Reviews pp. 355-361: Ronald Heiner and Anthony Jesay

Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights pp. 129-158: Bruce Benson
Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker? pp. 159-172: Manfredi Manna and Gabriella Slomp
The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions pp. 173-192: Russell Sobel
Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach pp. 193-219: Viktor Vanberg and Wolfgang Kerber
The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec pp. 221-245: Robert Young
Reviews pp. 247-253: Roger Faith, Robert Sugden and Alan Hamlin

Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains pp. 1-21: Donald Boudreaux and A. Pritchard
Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries pp. 23-43: Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder di Mauro
Constitutional secession clauses pp. 45-60: Yan Chen and Peter Ordeshook
Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison pp. 61-79: Peter Moser
Redistribution and constitutional political economy pp. 81-98: E. Pasour
Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other? pp. 99-115: Dick Ruiter
Reviews pp. 117-127: Steven Horwitz, Geoffrey Brennan and Leland Yeager