Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Hayekian expectations: Theory and empirical applications pp. 303-329: William Butos and Roger Koppl
Entrepreneurship and envy pp. 331-347: Young Choi
Ownership of firms and efficiency: The competence argument pp. 349-392: Pavel Pelikan
Normative judgments and spontaneous order: The contractarian element in Hayek's thought pp. 393-424: Robert Sugden
Redistribution from a constitutional perspective pp. 425-448: Joachim Wessels
Reviews pp. 449-462: Pavel Pelikan, Richard Wagner, Bruce Yandle and Frank Forman

On justifying a minimum welfare state pp. 159-172: Hartmut Kliemt
Rationality, constitutions, and the ethics of rules pp. 173-210: Edward McClennen
Towards monetary constitutionalism in Italy pp. 211-222: Franco Spinelli and Donato Masciandaro
Cognition, competition, and catallaxy in memory of Friedrich August von Hayek pp. 223-262: Manfred Streit
Sir Edward Coke and the struggle for a new constitutional order pp. 263-285: Bruce Yandle
Reviews pp. 287-298: Richard Wagner, Donald Boudreaux, Frank Forman and Stefan Voigt

How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper? pp. 1-6: James Buchanan
German roots of the theory of pluralism pp. 7-39: Michael Dreyer
Mitigating the tyranny of public opinion: Anonymous discourse and the ethic of sincerity pp. 41-78: Timur Kuran
The ethical foundations of constitutional order: A conventionalist perspective pp. 79-95: Noel Reynolds
Institutional evolution in the Icelandic Commonwealth pp. 97-125: Birgir Solvason
Rights: Why do they matter, and to whom? pp. 127-152: Robert Sugden
Reviews pp. 153-157: Richard Wagner and Michael Marlow

The common law as central economic planning pp. 289-319: Peter Aranson
Efficiency criteria for optimal laws: Objective standards or value judgements? pp. 321-342: Louis Alessi
Organizational reputation and constitutional constraints: An application to religious denominations pp. 343-357: Jody Lipford
Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution pp. 359-380: Roger Meiners and Bruce Yandle
Crafting social rules: Common law vs. statute law, once again pp. 381-397: Richard Wagner
Reviews pp. 399-407: Donald McCloskey, David Tucker, Douglas Heckathorn and Willem Thorbecke

I did not call him “Fritz”: Personal recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek pp. 129-135: James Buchanan
Constitutional stability pp. 137-175: Peter Ordeshook
The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments pp. 177-196: Stefan Sinn
Conservatives on the supreme court pp. 197-222: David Tucker
Organizations as constitutional systems pp. 223-253: Viktor Vanberg
The emergence of a protective agency and the constitutional dilemma pp. 255-266: Ulrich Witt
Reviews pp. 267-287: Hartmut Kliemt, Bernd Lahno, Christopher Lingle, D. Reisman, Robert Bish, Dean Lueck and Donald Boudreaux

Customary law as a social contract: International commercial law pp. 1-27: Bruce Benson
International order and individual liberty pp. 29-50: Friedrich Kratochwil
Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit” pp. 51-72: Anton Lowenberg and Ben Yu
Intergovernmental competition, voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure pp. 73-88: Michael Marlow
Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision pp. 89-112: Charlotte Twight
Reviews pp. 113-128: Ronald Heiner, William Mitchell, Michael Dreyer, Karl Wärneryd, William Niskanen and Brooks Hull

Public justification and democratic adjudication pp. 251-281: Gerald Gaus
Thomas Jefferson on the repudiation of public debt pp. 283-301: Frank Gunter
Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions pp. 303-328: Randall Holcombe
Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness pp. 329-370: R. Isaac, Deborah Mathieu and Edward Zajac
Constitutionalism, prosperity, democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe pp. 371-394: Cass Sunstein
Reviews pp. 395-410: Richard Wagner, Viktor Vanberg, Fred Foldvary, Heinrich Ursprung and Peter Moser

Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics pp. 139-161: James Buchanan and Dwight Lee
Madison's constitutional political economy: Principles for a liberal order pp. 163-186: James Dorn
The multi-faceted covenant: The biblical approach to the problem of organizations, constitutions, and liberty as reflected in the thought of Johannes Althusius pp. 187-208: Daniel Elazar
Organic constitutions and common law pp. 225-241: Bruce Yandle
Reviews pp. 243-248: Loren Lomasky and Karl Wärneryd

Jack Wiseman: A personal appreciation pp. 1-6: James Buchanan
Deciding for bigness: Constitutional choice and the growth of firms pp. 7-30: Richard Adelstein
Calhoun's constitutional economics pp. 31-52: Peter Aranson
A reading of the Spanish Constitution (1978) pp. 53-79: Geoffrey Brennan and Jose Pardo
Natural persons, corporate actors, and constitutions pp. 81-106: James Coleman
The common law process: Efficiency or order? pp. 107-126: Louis Alessi and Robert Staaf
Reviews pp. 127-137: Randall Holcombe, Siegwart Lindenberg and Vanberg Viktor