Constitutional Political Economy

1990 - 2025

Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

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Toward a theory of spontaneous law pp. 211-231: Francesco Parisi
Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model pp. 233-245: Hans Grüner
Do firms plan? pp. 247-261: Richard Langlois
Bounded governance within extended order: The Confucian advantage of synergy under generalized constitutional rules pp. 263-279: Dengjian Jin
Economics as mechanism: The mind as machine in Hayek's sensory order pp. 281-292: David Tuerck
The metamorphosis of John Gray pp. 293-295: James Buchanan

If Hamilton and Madison were merely lucky, what hope is there for Russian federalism? pp. 107-126: Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova
Constitutional politics within the interest-group model pp. 127-137: Daniel Sutter
Preparing Africa for the twenty-first century: Lessons from constitutional economics pp. 139-160: John Mbaku
Constitutional design and economic performance pp. 161-169: Alvaro Montenegro
Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion pp. 171-190: Donald Boudreaux, Jody Lipford and Bruce Yandle
Constitutional implications of alternative models of increasing returns pp. 191-196: James Buchanan and Yong Yoon
Reviews pp. 197-204: Christopher Morris and Richard Wagner

Democracy, dictatorship, and transformation: A proposal for a constitution-guided systematic change in formerly Soviet republics pp. 5-20: Thomas Apolte
Institutions, quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education pp. 21-33: Samuel Staley and John Blair
Economizing on virtue pp. 35-56: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West pp. 57-69: Carsten Hefeker
Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective pp. 71-96: Michael Wohlgemuth
Reviews pp. 97-102: Donald Boudreaux and Nicolai Foss

Manipulating uncertainty pp. 255-271: Antonio Barbosa
Club governments versus representative governments pp. 273-285: Charles Blankart
A constitutional theory of public enterprise pp. 287-306: Larry Kiser
Avoiding the mistreatment of bad risks in a democracy: Universal Health Insurance from a constitutional perspective pp. 307-318: Mark Pauly
The economic constitution of the European community: From Rome to Maastricht pp. 319-353: Manfred Streit and Werner Mussler
Reviews pp. 355-361: Ronald Heiner and Anthony Jesay

Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights pp. 129-158: Bruce Benson
Leviathan: Revenue-maximizer or glory-seeker? pp. 159-172: Manfredi Manna and Gabriella Slomp
The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions pp. 173-192: Russell Sobel
Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach pp. 193-219: Viktor Vanberg and Wolfgang Kerber
The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec pp. 221-245: Robert Young
Reviews pp. 247-253: Roger Faith, Robert Sugden and Alan Hamlin

Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains pp. 1-21: Donald Boudreaux and A. Pritchard
Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries pp. 23-43: Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder di Mauro
Constitutional secession clauses pp. 45-60: Yan Chen and Peter Ordeshook
Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison pp. 61-79: Peter Moser
Redistribution and constitutional political economy pp. 81-98: E. Pasour
Economic and legal institutionalism: What can they learn from each other? pp. 99-115: Dick Ruiter
Reviews pp. 117-127: Steven Horwitz, Geoffrey Brennan and Leland Yeager

Hayekian expectations: Theory and empirical applications pp. 303-329: William Butos and Roger Koppl
Entrepreneurship and envy pp. 331-347: Young Choi
Ownership of firms and efficiency: The competence argument pp. 349-392: Pavel Pelikan
Normative judgments and spontaneous order: The contractarian element in Hayek's thought pp. 393-424: Robert Sugden
Redistribution from a constitutional perspective pp. 425-448: Joachim Wessels
Reviews pp. 449-462: Pavel Pelikan, Richard Wagner, Bruce Yandle and Frank Forman

On justifying a minimum welfare state pp. 159-172: Hartmut Kliemt
Rationality, constitutions, and the ethics of rules pp. 173-210: Edward McClennen
Towards monetary constitutionalism in Italy pp. 211-222: Franco Spinelli and Donato Masciandaro
Cognition, competition, and catallaxy in memory of Friedrich August von Hayek pp. 223-262: Manfred Streit
Sir Edward Coke and the struggle for a new constitutional order pp. 263-285: Bruce Yandle
Reviews pp. 287-298: Richard Wagner, Donald Boudreaux, Frank Forman and Stefan Voigt

How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper? pp. 1-6: James Buchanan
German roots of the theory of pluralism pp. 7-39: Michael Dreyer
Mitigating the tyranny of public opinion: Anonymous discourse and the ethic of sincerity pp. 41-78: Timur Kuran
The ethical foundations of constitutional order: A conventionalist perspective pp. 79-95: Noel Reynolds
Institutional evolution in the Icelandic Commonwealth pp. 97-125: Birgir Solvason
Rights: Why do they matter, and to whom? pp. 127-152: Robert Sugden
Reviews pp. 153-157: Richard Wagner and Michael Marlow