Constitutional Political Economy
1990 - 2025
Current editor(s): Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt From Springer Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 20, issue 3, 2009
- Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings—introduction pp. 197-201

- Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt
- Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? pp. 202-229

- José Cheibub and Svitlana Chernykh
- The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions pp. 230-250

- Fabio Padovano
- Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers pp. 251-266

- Simon Hug
- Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks? pp. 267-295

- Marc Quintyn
- Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework pp. 296-322

- Anne Aaken
- International delegation and state disaggregation pp. 323-340

- Tom Ginsburg
- Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU pp. 341-365

- Daniel Finke and Thomas König
- Toward global checks and balances pp. 366-387

- Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs
Volume 20, issue 2, 2009
- The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe pp. 99-117

- Andrew Roberts
- Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy pp. 118-138

- Anthony Evans
- Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism pp. 139-159

- Niclas Berggren
- Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective pp. 160-176

- Dalibor Roháč
- Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States pp. 177-192

- Phillip Magness
- Steven M. Teles: The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law pp. 193-196

- Richard Adelstein
Volume 20, issue 1, 2009
- Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study pp. 1-41

- Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
- Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics pp. 42-56

- Alain Marciano
- From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis pp. 57-70

- Michael Makowsky and Richard Wagner
- Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation? pp. 71-93

- Abel Escribà-Folch
- Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine: Against Intellectual Property pp. 94-97

- F. Scherer
Volume 19, issue 4, 2008
- The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification pp. 277-300

- Jens Meierhenrich
- Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law pp. 301-312

- Assaf Meydani
- The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach pp. 313-355

- Sebastian Coll
- Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness pp. 356-360

- Thomas Leonard
- Margaret Schabas: The Natural Origins of Economics pp. 361-367

- David Levy
Volume 19, issue 3, 2008
- Editorial introduction pp. 169-170

- Alan Hamlin
- Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics pp. 171-179

- James Buchanan
- Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings pp. 180-202

- William Blomquist and Elinor Ostrom
- Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences? pp. 203-225

- Ulrich Witt and Christian Schubert
- Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism pp. 226-248

- Robert Sugden
- Regulation and revenue pp. 249-260

- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
- Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and interpretations pp. 261-276

- Nils Goldschmidt and Michael Wohlgemuth
Volume 19, issue 2, 2008
- Direct democracy: obstacle to reform? pp. 81-93

- Gebhard Kirchgässner
- An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses pp. 94-110

- Peter Calcagno and Christopher Westley
- The unanimity rule and religious fractionalisation in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic pp. 111-128

- Dalibor Roháč
- Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience pp. 129-147

- Antonio Saravia
- Liberty and national security in Adam Smith’s possible world pp. 148-157

- Mark Jackson
- Robert H. Frank, Falling behind: how rising inequality harms the middle class pp. 158-164

- Thomas Leonard
- James R. Hackney, Jr., Under cover of science: American legal-economic theory and the quest for objectivity pp. 165-168

- Alain Marciano
Volume 19, issue 1, 2008
- Editorial Announcement pp. 1-1

- Alan Hamlin, Dennis Mueller and Peter Ordeshook
- Discussion, construction and evolution: Mill, Buchanan and Hayek on the constitutional order pp. 3-18

- Sandra Peart and David Levy
- The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector pp. 19-33

- Vladislav Valentinov
- America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective pp. 35-59

- Roger Congleton
- Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in voting on segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution pp. 61-80

- Michael Reksulak and William Shughart
Volume 18, issue 4, 2007
- Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions pp. 223-241

- Roberta Patalano
- The interrelations between legal and economic processes: a consideration of the reactions pp. 243-285

- Warren Samuels
- Rawls’ Paradox pp. 287-299

- Jason Brennan
- Buchanan on monetary constitutions pp. 301-318

- Domenico D’Amico
- Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy pp. 319-323

- Peter Boettke
- Clifford Winston, Government Failure versus Market Failure pp. 325-328

- Bryan Caplan
Volume 18, issue 3, 2007
- On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs pp. 145-159

- Roger Congleton
- Conceptions of property rights and norms pp. 161-176

- Derek Yonai
- Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988 pp. 177-197

- Gary Reich
- Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics pp. 199-222

- Viktor Vanberg
Volume 18, issue 2, 2007
- On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation pp. 69-82

- Nicolas Andjiga, Daoud Badirou and Boniface Mbih
- Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union pp. 83-97

- Jac Heckelman and John Dinan
- The European Union: confederation, federation or association of compound states? pp. 99-106

- Charles Blankart
- Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro pp. 107-126

- Maurizio Mistri
- Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective pp. 127-143

- Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson
Volume 18, issue 1, 2007
- Constitutional choice and European immigration policy pp. 1-20

- Gabriele Orcalli
- The electoral college: diversification and the election process pp. 21-34

- Chris Cain, Peter Basciano and Ellen Cain
- Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract pp. 35-62

- Christian Cordes and Christian Schubert
- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions pp. 63-68

- Dennis Mueller
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