International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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Split Equilibrium Problems for Related Games and Applications to Economic Theory pp. 1-20: Jinlu Li
An Evolutionary Game Theory Strategy for Carbon Emission Reduction in the Electricity Market pp. 1-20: Ryle S. Perera
Algorithm for Searching an Equilibrium in a Routing Game with Piecewise Constant Cost Functions pp. 1-13: Andrey Parfenov
The Computational Complexity of Finding a Mixed Berge Equilibrium for a k-Person Noncooperative Game in Normal Form pp. 1-13: Ahmad Nahhas and H. W. Corley
Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case pp. 1-8: AntÃ³nio OsÃ³rio
On Analyzing Cost Allocation Problems: Cooperation Building Structures and Order Problem Representations pp. 1-28: John Kleppe, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and Hans Reijnierse

Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly pp. 1-13: Koji Okuguchi and Takeshi Yamazaki
Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly pp. 1-18: Mario A. GarcÃa-Meza, Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova and JosÃ© Daniel LÃ³pez-Barrientos
A Comparison of Game-Theoretic Models for Parallel Trade pp. 1-57: Giorgio Gnecco, Berna Tuncay and Fabio Pammolli
Customer and Cost Sharing in a Jackson Network pp. 1-10: Judith Timmer and Werner Scheinhardt
On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games pp. 1-28: Stefanos Leonardos and Costis Melolidakis
Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project pp. 1-24: Sébastien Rouillon
Preface pp. 1-2: Trine Platz, Peter SudhÃ¶lter, JosÃ© M. Zarzuelo and Lars Peter Ã˜sterdal

A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts pp. 1-15: Nicola Dimitri
On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches pp. 1-14: Julio B. Clempner
A Refinement of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium pp. 1-14: Pavlo Blavatskyy
Hâˆž Constraint Pareto Optimal Strategy for Stochastic LPV Systems pp. 1-20: Mostak Ahmed, Hiroaki Mukaidani and Tadashi Shima
Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources pp. 1-16: Misha Gavrilovich and Victoria Kreps
Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context pp. 1-48: Evangelos Toumasatos and Stein Ivar Steinshamn

Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers pp. 1-30: Kjell Hausken
All or Nothing Caching Games with Bounded Queries pp. 1-9: DÃ¶mÃ¶tÃ¶r PÃ¡lvÃ¶lgyi
Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables pp. 1-13: Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka
Effects of Playersâ€™ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values pp. 1-14: Takumi Kongo
Differential Games for Weakly Coupled Large-Scale Linear Stochastic Systems with an Hâˆž-Constraint pp. 1-24: Hiroaki Mukaidani and Hua Xu
A New Approach to Noncooperative Games Under Uncertainty pp. 1-19: Vladislav Iosifovich Zhukovskiy, Tatiana Vladimirovna Makarkina and Maria Ivanovna Vysokos

Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating pp. 1-23: David Yeung and Ovanes Petrosian
Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior pp. 1-16: Jiabin Wu
Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core pp. 1-16: Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon and T. S. H. Driessen
Games with Costly Winnings pp. 1-9: Irit Nowik and Tahl Nowik
A Duopoly with Common Renewable Resource and Incentives pp. 1-20: Luca Grilli and Michele Bisceglia
Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels pp. 1-18: Volker Benndorf, Dorothea KÃ¼bler and Hans-Theo Normann
Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-Based Allocation and Weighted Division pp. 1-14: Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada

On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games pp. 1-13: Rabia Nessah and Raluca Parvulescu
Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games pp. 1-8: O. V. Baskov
High-Dimensional Nash Equilibria Problems and Tensors Applications pp. 1-25: J. E. Abdou, E. Safatly, B. Nakhle and A. El Khoury
A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries pp. 1-21: Rashid Farooq and Ayesha Mahmood
On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values pp. 1-36: Pierre Dehez
A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games pp. 1-15: Ahmad Nahhas and H. W. Corley

Information Sharing Among Cyber Hackers in Successive Attacks pp. 1-33: Kjell Hausken
On Maximal Vector Spaces of Finite Noncooperative Games pp. 1-7: Victoria Kreps
An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities pp. 1-12: Julio RodrÃguez-Segura and Joss SÃ¡nchez-PÃ©rez
Optimal Fair Division for Measures with Piecewise Linear Density Functions pp. 1-12: Jerzy Legut
Experimental Gaming Comparison of Resource Allocation Rules in Case of Transferable Utilities pp. 1-11: N. A. Korgin and V. O. Korepanov
Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader pp. 1-14: Brishti Guha

Equilibria in Dynamic Multicriteria Games pp. 1-21: Anna Rettieva
Academic Research and the Strategic Interaction of Scholars and Editors: A Two-Stage Game pp. 1-16: Damien Besancenot, Joao Faria and Franklin Mixon
Is a Good Offensive Always the Best Defense? pp. 1-12: J. Quetzalcoatl Toledo-Marin, Rogelio Diaz-Mendez and Marcelo Del Castillo Mussot
Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence pp. 1-7: Marina Sandomirskaia
Existence of Dominant Players and their Role in the Formation of a Cabinet Coalition pp. 1-9: Artyom Jelnov
Nash Bargaining Solution Allocation is Not Suitable for Datacenter Jobs pp. 1-22: Ilya Nikolaevskiy, Andrey Lukyanenko and Andrei Gurtov