International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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CONSISTENCY IN VALUES pp. 461-473: Guillermo Owen
CONFLICT BETWEEN WATER SUPPLY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK: A COMPUTATIONAL NEURAL NETWORK APPROACH pp. 475-492: Emery Coppola and Ferenc Szidarovszky
PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION pp. 493-508: Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini
STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY pp. 509-524: Yukihisa Utsumi and Mikio Nakayama
THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF STRATEGIES pp. 525-554: Gregory Dow
A NOTE ON CLOSEDNESS UNDER MOULIN REDUCTION pp. 555-559: Yan-An Hwang

STATISTICAL DYNAMICS IN PIECEWISE LINEAR COURNOT GAME WITH HETEROGENEOUS DUOPOLISTS pp. 295-321: Akio Matsumoto
A COMPETITION GAME WITH KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION AND SPILLOVERS pp. 323-341: Gian Italo Bischi and Fabio Lamantia
THE LONG RUN OUTCOMES AND GLOBAL DYNAMICS OF A DUOPOLY GAME WITH MISSPECIFIED DEMAND FUNCTIONS pp. 343-379: Gian Italo Bischi, Carl Chiarella and Michael Kopel
STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BERTRAND AND COURNOT DUOPOLIES pp. 381-390: Koji Okuguchi and Takeshi Yamazaki
A GAME THEORETICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL FISHING WITH TIME DELAY pp. 391-415: Ferenc Szidarovszky, Andrew Engel and Carl Chiarella
A PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION pp. 417-442: Jan Tuinstra
LEARNING TO PLAY BEST RESPONSE IN DUOPOLY GAMES pp. 443-459: Jan Wenzelburger

NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY pp. 181-194: S. D. Flåm and Jacqueline Morgan
FORMALIZATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GAMES pp. 195-221: Kjell Hausken and Ross Cressman
GEOMETRY AND COMPUTATION OF THE LORENZ SET pp. 223-238: Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers and Dries Vermeulen
THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS pp. 239-246: M. Cantisani and E. Marchi
THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY pp. 247-264: Miguel Aramendia, L. Ruiz and Federico Valenciano
BARGAINING MODEL WITH SEQUENCES OF DISCOUNT RATES AND BARGAINING COSTS pp. 265-280: Agnieszka Rusinowska
TECHNICAL NOTE: NONTRANSFERABLE INDIVIDUAL PAYOFFS IN COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES pp. 281-289: David W. K. Yeung
BOOK REVIEW: Differential Games in Marketing. By Steffen Jørgensen and Georges Zaccour pp. 291-293: Simon Pierre Sigué

TWO DIRECT METHODS FOR OBTAINING SOLUTIONS TO VARIATIONAL PROBLEMS pp. 1-13: Dean A. Carlson
AN EXTENSION OF LEITMANN'S DIRECT METHOD TO INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS pp. 15-20: Pierre Cartigny and Christophe Deissenberg
A GAME-THEORETIC TREATMENT OF A TIME-DISCRETE EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL pp. 21-34: Werner Krabs and Stefan Pickl
SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY pp. 35-53: Marko Lindroos
WHEN TO RATIFY AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: THE CASE OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES pp. 55-68: Veijo Kaitala and Marko Lindroos
THEG-FUNCTION METHOD FOR ANALYZING DARWINIAN DYNAMICS pp. 69-90: Thomas L. Vincent
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH SEMI-UNCERTAIN DYNAMICS pp. 91-108: Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan
VIABLE CAPTURE BASIN FOR STUDYING DIFFERENTIAL AND HYBRID GAMES: APPLICATION TO FINANCE pp. 109-136: Patrick Saint-Pierre
NEW APPROACH TO THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE PROBLEM FOR A SHIP pp. 137-155: A. Miele and T. Wang
MULTISTAGE COOPERATIVE GAMES AND PROBLEM OF TIME CONSISTENCY pp. 157-170: Victor Zakharov and Maria Dementieva
SOME PROPERTIES OF THE BELLMAN–ISAACS EQUATION FOR THE GAMES ON SURFACES OF REVOLUTION pp. 171-179: Arik Melikyan

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES pp. 307-326: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters
REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE HIGH SEAS: THE HIT-AND-RUN INTERLOPER MODEL pp. 327-345: Robert W. McKelvey, Leif Sandal and Stein I. Steinshamn
A PSEUDO "FOLK" THEOREM IN THE STRATEGIC PROVISION OF STOCK EXTERNALITIES pp. 347-359: Zili Yang
THE LINEAR QUADRATIC DYNAMIC GAME FOR DISCRETE-TIME DESCRIPTOR SYSTEMS pp. 361-374: Hua Xu and Hiroaki Mukaidani
HADAMARD AND TYKHONOV WELL-POSEDNESS IN TWO PLAYER GAMES pp. 375-384: Graziano Pieri and Anna Torre
A NOTE ON NTU CONVEXITY AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES pp. 385-390: Ruud Hendrickx
BOOK REVIEW: Oligopoly Dynamics, edited by Tönu Puu and Irina Sushko pp. 391-392: Georges Zaccour
ERRATUM: APPROXIMATING EQUILIBRIA IN NONZER0-SUM GAMES pp. 393-393: Altman

Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models pp. 193-209: Lawrence Blume and Steven Durlauf
The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation pp. 211-228: Ted Bergstrom
Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation pp. 229-247: Philippe Grégoire and Arthur Robson
Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model pp. 249-262: Burkhard Hehenkamp
Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria pp. 263-290: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities pp. 291-305: Alex Possajennikov

On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker pp. 83-103: Marcel Dreef, Peter Borm and Ben van der Genugten
A Two-Person Conflict Model in Train Scheduling pp. 105-125: Keivan Ghoseiri, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Mohammad Jawad Asgharpour
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction pp. 127-137: Antonio Quesada
Progressive Current Accounts: Profit-Sharing Interest pp. 139-149: Salvador Cruz Rambaud and María del Carmen Valls Martínez
When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players? pp. 151-165: Yigal Gerchak and Qi-Ming He
Verification Theorems for Optimal Feedback Strategies in Differential Games pp. 167-189: Ştefan Mirică
Book Review: "A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games". By Sylvain Sorin pp. 191-192: Ferenc Szidarovszky

INFORMATION SHARING GAMES pp. 1-12: Marco Slikker, Henk Norde and Stef Tijs
LOCATION GAME ON THE PLANE pp. 13-25: Vladimir Mazalov and Minoru Sakaguchi
DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS II: SEMI-DECOMPOSABLE GAMES pp. 27-40: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER pp. 41-61: Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR pp. 63-71: Anders Poulsen
A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH MARGINAL COST DIFFERENTIALS pp. 73-81: Pamela M. Schmitt