International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS UNDER UPSTREAM–DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC INTERACTION pp. 1-23: Giuseppe De Feo, Joana Resende and María Eugenia Sanin Vázquez
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS pp. 1-4: Fioravante Patrone and Ariel Dinar
OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY-SETTING pp. 1-17: Kenji Fujiwara and Ngo Long
A SIMPLE MODEL OF REPRESSION AND REVOLT IN AUTOCRACIES APPLIED TO THE ARAB SPRING pp. 1-29: Mario Gilli
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE pp. 1-22: Hassan Benchekroun and Ngo Long
DIRECT EXCHANGE IN LINEAR ECONOMIES pp. 1-18: Sjur Didrik Flåm and Kjetil Gramstad

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF A BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT pp. 1-22: Terry Eyland and Georges Zaccour
A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRY ON REVENUE IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS pp. 1-8: Arieh Gavious and Yizhaq Minchuk
COMPLETE SOLUTION OF A PURSUIT–EVASION DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH HYBRID EVADER DYNAMICS pp. 1-31: Josef Shinar, Valery Y. Glizer and Vladimir Turetsky
SIMPLE EQUILIBRIA IN SEMI-INFINITE GAMES pp. 1-19: Wojciech Połowczuk, Tadeusz Radzik and Piotr Wiȩcek
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TON-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES: CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS pp. 1-25: Ugo Merlone, Daren R. Sandbank and Ferenc Szidarovszky
NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES pp. 1-16: Juan C. Cesco

ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERRENCE IN SEQUENTIAL COLONEL BLOTTO GAMES pp. 1-13: Kjell Hausken
SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES WITH RANDOM HORIZON pp. 1-22: David W. K. Yeung and Leon A. Petrosyan
Book Review: "Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union" Edited by Marek A. Cichocki and Karol Życzkowski pp. 1-5: Maria Montero
VALUES FOR GAMES ON THE CYCLES OF A DIGRAPH pp. 1-18: William Olvera-Lopez and Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez
A NOTE ON PASSEPARTOUT PROBLEMS pp. 1-9: Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers
EFFECTS OF SYMMETRY ON GLOBALIZING SEPARATED MONOPOLIES TO A NASH-COURNOT OLIGOPOLY pp. 1-15: Hisao Kameda and Takashi Ui
SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM AND PERSISTENT INEFFICIENCY pp. 1-12: Kolpin van
Book Review: "Games and Dynamic Games" Edited by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour pp. 1-3: Steffen Jørgensen

A NEW THEOREM TO FIND BERGE EQUILIBRIA pp. 1-10: Olivier Musy, Antonin Pottier and Tarik Tazdaït
RANKING AUCTIONS: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH pp. 1-19: Juan Aparicio, Natividad Llorca, Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Manuel A. Pulido and Julia Sancho
E-POINTS FOR DIAGONAL GAMES III pp. 1-9: Ezio Marchi
THE COMPETITION BETWEEN INTERNET SERVICE QUALITIES FROM A DIFFERENCE GAME VIEWPOINT pp. 1-36: Joel Blot, Naila Hayek, Ferhan Pekergin and Nihal Pekergin
USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION pp. 1-13: Camelia Bejan and Juan Camilo Gómez
THE NUCLEOLUS OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM BY HYDRAULIC RATIONING pp. 1-11: Tamás Fleiner and Balázs Sziklai
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES? pp. 1-20: Kim Hang Pham Do, Ariel Dinar and Daene McKinney

ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION pp. 363-381: Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan
UNIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: SOME INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE THREE-PLAYER EXAMPLE pp. 383-402: Harald Wiese
AUCTIONS, REAL OPTIONS VALUATION, AND PRIVATIZATION pp. 403-415: Alaa El-Shazly
OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN PROBABILISTIC COALITION SITUATIONS pp. 417-442: Julia Belau
THE ASSIGNMENT GAME WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY pp. 443-459: Kimmo Eriksson, Fredrik Jansson and Thomas Vetander
COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS pp. 461-474: Tanga McDaniel
A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME pp. 475-480: Hubert Kempf and Grégoire Rota Graziosi

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS pp. 247-267: Kjell Hausken
ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES pp. 269-280: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
PROJECT MANAGEMENT GAMES pp. 281-300: Imma Curiel
NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST pp. 301-323: Federica Briata
ON THE EXISTENCE OF BERGE'S STRONG EQUILIBRIUM pp. 325-340: Messaoud Deghdak and Monique Florenzano
STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES pp. 341-352: Paraskevas Lekeas and Giorgos Stamatopoulos
ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION pp. 353-361: Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

DUOPOLY MODELS WITH VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION pp. 121-140: Dave Furth
ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE pp. 141-157: Pierre Dehez
STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION pp. 159-179: Delfina Femenia, Mabel Marí, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo
NASH NETWORKS WITH IMPERFECT RELIABILITY AND HETEROGEOUS PLAYERS pp. 181-194: Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi
AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION pp. 195-208: Christian W. Bach and Conrad Heilmann
PROCESS AND PRODUCT INNOVATION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRY pp. 209-221: Emanuele Bacchiega, Luca Lambertini and Andrea Mantovaini
E-POINTS FOR DIAGONAL GAMES II pp. 223-233: Ezio Marchi
SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS pp. 235-246: Bryan McCannon

ACTIVE VS. PASSIVE DEFENSE AGAINST A STRATEGIC ATTACKER pp. 1-12: Kjell Hausken and Gregory Levitin
COST AND COMPLEXITY OF HARNESSING GAMES WITH PAYMENTS pp. 13-44: Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Pignolet, Stefan Schmid and Roger Wattenhofer
THE STRATEGIC CORES α, β, γ AND δ pp. 45-59: Takashi Harada and Mikio Nakayama
PAYOFF FUNCTIONS IN THE ONE-WAY FLOW MODEL OF NETWORK FORMATION FOR WHICH NASH NETWORKS EXIST pp. 61-73: Jean Derks and Martijn Tennekes
COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA pp. 75-82: Sascha Füllbrunn
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY: A NOTE pp. 83-92: Sumit Joshi, Yu-An Sun and Poorvi L. Vora
A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES pp. 93-104: José Luis Ferreira
A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES pp. 105-118: Evan Shellshear
BOOK REVIEW: "A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics" pp. 119-120: Ngo Long