International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

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ON MERGE PROPERTIES OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE pp. 249-257: Jean Derks and Stef Tijs
LEARNING TO FACE STOCHASTIC DEMAND pp. 259-271: Sjur Didrik Flåm and Maria Sandsmark
A NON-COOPERATIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURE GENERALISING THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY BARGAINING SOLUTION TO NTU GAMES pp. 273-286: Gustavo Bergantiños, Balbina Casas-Méndez and Margarita Vázquez-Brage
THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME pp. 287-305: Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg
A WEAKENED FORM OF FICTITIOUS PLAY IN TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES pp. 307-328: Ben van der Genugten
EXISTENCE OF GENERALISED PARETO EQUILIBRIA FOR CONSTRAINED MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES pp. 329-344: Paolo Cubiotti
A NOTE ON REGULAR SEMIVALUES pp. 345-352: Francesc Carreras and Josep Freixas

UNANIMITY IN VOTING FOR VOTERS pp. 117-127: Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler and Jonathan Shalev
UNILATERAL COMMITMENTS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES pp. 129-139: Ignacio García-Jurado, Luciano Méndez-Naya and Fioravante Patrone
REPEATED PLAY AND NEWTON'S METHOD pp. 141-154: Sjur Didrik Flåm
APPROXIMATING NASH EQUILIBRIA IN NONZERO-SUM GAMES pp. 155-172: Eitan Altman, Odile Pourtallier, Alain Haurie and Francesco Moresino
ON A CLASS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES pp. 173-192: Jean Michel Coulomb and Vladimir Gaitsgory
DOUBLE INVARIANCE: A NEW EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT FOR TWO-PERSON DYNAMIC GAMES pp. 193-207: P. Caravani
DIFFERENTIAL GAME-THEORETIC THOUGHTS ON OPTION PRICING AND TRANSACTION COSTS pp. 209-228: Geert Jan Olsder
ON THE COMPENSATION OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN DYNAMIC GAMES pp. 229-248: Josef Shinar, Tal Shima and Valery Y. Glizer

INNOVATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY pp. 1-28: Maria Luisa Petit, Francesca Sanna-Randaccio and Boleslaw Tolwinski
VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM pp. 29-45: Maria Paz Espinosa and Elena Inarra
DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES pp. 47-65: Jerzy A. Filar and Leon A. Petrosjan
EVOLUTIONARY AND DYNAMIC STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH TWO INDEPENDENT DECISIONS pp. 67-81: Ross Cressman, Andrea Gaunersdorfer and Jean-Francois Wen
DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE pp. 83-96: Jörg Oechssler and Karl Schlag
GAMES ARISING FROM INFINITE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS pp. 97-105: Judith Timmer, Stef Tijs and Natividad Llorca
ON SOME PROPERTIES OF SUPERPOSITION OF OPTIMALITY PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES pp. 107-116: Sergei V. Chistyakov and Svetlana Y. Mikhajlova

SOLUTION OF A DELAYED INFORMATION LINEAR PURSUIT-EVASION GAME WITH BOUNDED CONTROLS pp. 197-217: Josef Shinar and Valery Y. Glizer
DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP pp. 219-240: Rabah Amir, Isabel Grilo and Jim Jin
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING pp. 241-250: Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE pp. 251-265: Steven Brams and Jeffrey M. Togman
UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS pp. 267-272: Walter Trockel
THEH-STRATEGIES IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES pp. 273-281: Andrey N. Liapounov
CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED pp. 283-299: Mark Voorneveld, Peter Borm, Freek van Megen, Stef Tijs and Giovanni Facchini
NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS pp. 301-314: Jean Derks and Hans H. Haller

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES IN STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH ADDITIVE COST AND TRANSITION STRUCTURE pp. 131-147: Heinz-Uwe Küenle
DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GAMES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION pp. 149-158: Victor Domansky
A STOCHASTIC BARGAINING PROCESS AND CORRESPONDING ONE-SHOT SOLUTION CONCEPT pp. 159-168: Ferenc Szidarovszky
ON SOME CATEGORIES OF GAMES AND CORRESPONDING EQUILIBRIA pp. 169-185: Victor Lapitsky
WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE pp. 187-192: Guillaume Haeringer
ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING pp. 193-196: Hovav Perets and Doron Sonsino

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM pp. 1-8: Guillermo Owen
MARKOV STRATEGIES ARE BETTER THAN STATIONARY STRATEGIES pp. 9-31: J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O. J. Vrieze
NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT pp. 33-44: Sabrina Gomez Canovas, Pierre Hansen and Brigitte Jaumard
THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION(ENkAC-)VALUE FOR TU-GAMES pp. 45-61: Tsuneyuki Namekata and Theo S. H. Driessen
STRONGLY CONSISTENT SOLUTIONS TO BALANCED TU GAMES pp. 63-85: Elena Yanovskaya
THE STABILITY OF DYNAMIC RENT-SEEKING GAMES pp. 87-102: Lin Xu and Ferenc Szidarovszky
A STRATEGIC CONCESSION GAME pp. 103-129: Steffen Jørgensen and David W. K. Yeung