International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): David W K Yeung

From World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
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Volume 17, issue 04, 2015

Setting Cournot Versus Lyapunov Games Stability Conditions and Equilibrium Point Properties pp. 1-10

Julio B. Clempner

A Note on the Owen Value for Glove Games pp. 1-8

Julia Belau

On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games pp. 1-7

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

Component Acquisition Games pp. 1-14

Imma Curiel

On the Interrelation of Two Linear NonStationary Problems with Multiple Evaders pp. 1-11

N. N. Petrov and K. A. Shchelchkov

Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions pp. 1-25

Anat Lerner and Rica Gonen

Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure pp. 1-22

Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov

Volume 17, issue 03, 2015

Book Review: Mathematical Game Theory and ApplicationsVladimir Mazalov, Wiley 2014 pp. 1-3

Vladimir Turetsky

The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach pp. 1-9

Aymeric Lardon

On the Existence of Berge Equilibrium: An Order Theoretic Approach pp. 1-9

Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Finite Horizon Game for Voluntary Provision of a Discrete Public Good pp. 1-21

Shizuka Nishikawa

On the Strategic Equivalence of Linear Dynamic and Repeated Games pp. 1-11

Joachim Hubmer

A Note on a Class of Solutions for Games with Externalities Generalizing the Shapley Value pp. 1-12

Joss Sánchez-Pérez

CoalitionalZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence pp. 1-18

Rabia Nessah, Moussa Larbani and Tarik Tazdaït

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds pp. 1-6

Friedel Bolle

Volume 17, issue 02, 2015

A New Method To Solve Bi-Level Quadratic Linear Fractional Programming Problems pp. 1-18

Sanjeet Singh and Nivedita Haldar

Being Credit Rationed: Delay and Transaction Cost pp. 1-28

Rajlakshmi Mallik

Preface pp. 1-3

S. K. Neogy, T. Parthasarathy and A. K. Das

Long-run Strategic Advertising and Short-run Bertrand Competition pp. 1-24

Reinoud Joosten

Ordered Field Property for Semi-Markov Games when One Player Controls Transition Probabilities and Transition Times pp. 1-26

Prasenjit Mondal and Sagnik Sinha

Game Theoretic Modeling of Horizontal Supply Chain Coopetition among Growers pp. 1-22

Tiru Arthanari, David Carfì and Francesco Musolino

A Characterization of Stationary Nash Equilibria of Single Controller Constrained Stochastic Games pp. 1-22

Vikas Vikram Singh and N. Hemachandra

Legal Disputes Resolved via Game Theoretic Methods pp. 1-7

T. E. S. Raghavan

Environmental Policy and Market Structure: A Case of Asymmetric Firms pp. 1-23

Indrani Roy Chowdhury

Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics pp. 1-11

Philippe Uyttendaele and Frank Thuijsman

The Concert Queueing Game: Fluid Regime with Random Order Service pp. 1-15

Sandeep Juneja and Tushar Raheja

Multi Stage Promotional Resource Allocation for Segment Specific and Spectrum Effect of Promotion for a Product Incorporating Repeat Purchase Behavior pp. 1-21

Prerna Manik, Anshu Gupta and P. C. Jha

Volume 17, issue 01, 2015

Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions pp. 1-43

Omkar D. Palsule-Desai

Integer Farkas Lemma pp. 1-9

R. Chandrasekaran

Mixed Solution Strategy for MCGDM Problems Using Entropy/Cross Entropy in Interval-Valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy Environment pp. 1-22

Anjana Gupta, Aparna Mehra and S. S. Appadoo

Product Selection in E-Commerce Under Fuzzy Environment: A MADM Game Theoretic Model pp. 1-14

B. K. Mohanty and Mahima Gupta

Finite Time Ruin Probability of the Compound Renewal Model with Constant Interest Rate and Weakly Negatively Dependent Claims with Heavy Tails pp. 1-14

K. K. Thampi

Nearest Neighbor Based Estimation Technique for Pricing Bermudan Options pp. 1-31

Ankush Agarwal and Sandeep Juneja

Understanding the Other Through Social Roles pp. 1-31

Mamoru Kaneko and J. Jude Kline

Lattices in Social Networks with Influence pp. 1-18

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Preface pp. 1-4

S. K. Neogy, T. Parthasarathy and A. K. Das

Level Sets and NonGaussian Integrals of Positively Homogeneous Functions pp. 1-28

Jean B. Lasserre

Extended Nash Equilibria of Nonmonetized Noncooperative Games on Preordered Sets pp. 1-13

Jinlu Li

Identity, Envy and Resource Loss pp. 1-13

Diganta Mukherjee

Volume 16, issue 04, 2014

STRONG EQUILIBRIA IN THE VEHICLE ROUTING GAME pp. 1-13

Nikolay Zenkevich and Andrey Zyatchin

A SIMPLE AXIOMATIZATION OF THE EGALITARIAN SOLUTION pp. 1-7

Ismail Saglam

BERGE–VAISMAN AND NASH EQUILIBRIA: TRANSFORMATION OF GAMES pp. 1-8

Antonin Pottier and Rabia Nessah

BERGE–ZHUKOVSKII EQUILIBRIA: EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION pp. 1-11

Rabia Nessah and Moussa Larbani

A TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION FORMULA FOR BARGAINING PROBLEM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES pp. 1-11

Leon A. Petrosyan and David W. K. Yeung

FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES pp. 1-16

Miguel Aramendia and Quan Wen

GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES pp. 1-15

Koji Okuguchi and Takeshi Yamazaki

NETWORK TOPOLOGY, HIGHER ORDERS OF STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY pp. 1-21

Subhadip Chakrabarti and Supanit Tangsangasaksri

NASH EQUILIBRIA IN 2 × 2 × 2 TRIMATRIX GAMES WITH IDENTICAL ANONYMOUS BEST-REPLIES pp. 1-9

Carlos González-Alcón, Peter Borm and Ruud Hendrickx

Volume 16, issue 03, 2014

R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES pp. 1-36

Wilfried Pauwels, Peter Kort and Eve Vanhaecht

STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES pp. 1-32

Yukihiko Funaki and Takehiko Yamato

A DIFFERENTIAL GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL WITH OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS pp. 1-14

Stefan Wrzaczek, Ekaterina Shevkoplyas and Sergey Kostyunin

A NOTE ON EQUILIBRIA IN A CIRCULAR LOCATION MODEL WITH A SINGLE-PEAKED DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMERS pp. 1-9

Kirsten Davis and Mark Frascatore

DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY AS THE OBJECTIVE OF CONTEST DESIGN pp. 1-20

Yigal Gerchak and D. Marc Kilgour

THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS AND CONVENTIONS UNDER LOCAL INTERACTIONS AND IMITATION pp. 1-23

Sebastian Ille

EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS pp. 1-23

Brandon Lehr

Volume 16, issue 02, 2014

NIKOLAI NIKOLAYEVICH KRASOVSKII: AN EXTRAORDINARY RUSSIAN SCIENTIST pp. 1-8

A. G. Chentsov

CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS IN PURSUIT-EVASION GAMES BASED ON THEIR PREFERENCES pp. 1-20

Dušan M. Stipanović, Christopher Valicka and Ali E. Abbas

STOCHASTIC CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL pp. 1-14

Vladimir V. Mazalov, Tatyana E. Nosalskaya and Julia S. Tokareva

SOLUTION OF A SINGULAR ZERO-SUM LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME BY REGULARIZATION pp. 1-32

Josef Shinar, Valery Y. Glizer and Vladimir Turetsky

EXPLORATION FOR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY: AN ARROVIAN RESULT pp. 1-11

Luca Lambertini

PREFACE pp. 1-2

Leon Petrosyan and David Yeung

GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO GUARANTEE OPTIMIZATION IN DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS WITH CONTROL DELAYS pp. 1-19

Mikhail Gomoyunov, Dmitri Kornev and Nikolai Lukoyanov

INVARIANCE PROPERTY WITH APPLICATION TO SOLVING CONTROL PROBLEMS pp. 1-19

V. N. Ushakov, S. A. Brykalov, A. R. Matviychuk and A. V. Ushakov

SUBGAME CONSISTENT COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR RANDOMLY FURCATING STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES WITH UNCERTAIN HORIZON pp. 1-29

David W. K. Yeung and Leon A. Petrosyan

Volume 16, issue 01, 2014

ON THE COMPLETENESS OF THE UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE–BELIEF SPACE: A TECHNICAL NOTE pp. 1-6

Miklós Pintér

BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING pp. 1-30

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Güth and Stephan Schosser

A GENERAL NOTION OF UNIFORM STRATEGIES pp. 1-33

Bastien Maubert and Sophie Pinchinat

INTRODUCTION pp. 1-5

Giacomo Bonanno, Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek and Steffen Jørgensen

AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE pp. 1-37

Michael Trost

UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES pp. 1-12

Elias Tsakas

FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY pp. 1-22

Andrés Perea